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ABSTRACT
Recent technological improvements have allowed airlines to implement
sophisticated Revenue Management systems in order to maximize revenues.
Computational capabilities make it possible to perform network-based analysis of
supply and demand and therefore to increase the gains achieved with the help of "0-
D control" Revenue Management algorithms. However, the more commonly used
and cheaper flight leg-based algorithms have not yet been used to the best of their
potential and can still benefit from better modeling of passenger behavior.
Our first purpose in this thesis is therefore to evaluate the benefits of incorporating
sell-up models into current leg-based airline Revenue Management algorithms.
Another question we would like to try and address is whether it would be possible to
improve the leg-based models to reach revenue gains comparable to those of O-D
control algorithms. To try and achieve this goal, we improve the modeling in our
leg-based Revenue Management algorithms by accounting for the possibility of sell-
up, that is the probability that a passenger will accept a more expensive ticket than
originally desired if seats are not available at the lower fare. In addition, previous
research has shown that there are revenue gains to be achieved through better
forecasting, therefore, we also evaluate the use of better forecasting methods and
quantify their revenue impact. In particular, we focus our efforts on understanding
the impact of the unconstraining models on revenue gains by using various
detruncation methods and comparing their effect.
Thesis Advisor: Dr. Peter Paul Belobaba
Title: Principal Research Scientist, Department of Aeronautics and Astronautics
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INTRODUCTION
In this thesis, our goal is to evaluate the revenue benefits that can be achieved by an
airline if it improves its models of passenger behavior. In the recent past, airlines
have been looking for ways to increase their revenues. In particular, airlines started
segmenting demand through differential pricing, that is, recognizing the fact that
there are different types of passengers who respond differently to prices, availability,
level of service, etc. The next step was then to develop Revenue Management
algorithms that allowed airlines to increase total passenger revenues by protecting
seats for late-booking high fare passengers on high demand flights, while making
more seats available to early-booking low fare passengers on flights expected to
have empty seats. Our goal will be to simulate the possible revenue gains that can be
achieved through better understanding and modeling of passenger behavior, and
point out the potential for yet unachieved revenue gains.
To do this, we will be using the Passenger Origin Destination Simulator (PODS)
developed at the Boeing Company by Hopperstad to model an airline in a
competitive setting with various levels of capabilities in terms of the finesse of the
model of a real life environment. In this context, we will try to reach our previously
described objective.
In the following paragraphs, we will introduce the fundamental concepts of Revenue
Management, demand forecasting and sell-up. Sell-up will be of particular interest to
us in this thesis, as it is a passenger behavior that has not yet been combined with
Revenue Management algorithms, even though sell-up models have already been
developed.
Revenue Management
Revenue Management, also known as Yield Management, has been the subject of
much research in the past few decades. It represents the determination of the airlines
to increase their revenues as much as possible. The fundamental idea behind Yield
Management lies in the term "yield". In the airline industry, "yield" refers to the
dollar amount paid by a passenger on a per-mile or per-kilometer basis. Hence, when
managing yield, the airlines clearly try to attract as many high yield passengers as
possible, rather than high revenue passengers (even though the two are not
incompatible). In this section, we will give a very brief overview of the history of the
13
airline industry and the advent of Revenue Management. In particular, we will
discuss the changes that were brought about by deregulation.
Before deregulation, airlines would typically not set their own fares; they would be
determined on a per-mile basis by the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB), and
independently of the origin-destination (O-D) market. If the airlines were to suffer
losses, the Civil Aeronautics Board would allow fare increases to compensate for the
airline's losses. Similarly, the airlines did not have to worry about costs, be they
maintenance or labor related, as the CAB would again allow fare increases to cover
the operating costs. Within this context, airlines then offered an extremely high
quality service to passengers, with a high level of in-flight services and good
frequencies of flights. However, this high level of service had inevitable downsides,
such as low load factors.
In 1978, after US airline deregulation, the airlines were faced with the problem of
increasing their revenues and decreasing their costs in the new competitive
environment. Competition naturally led to O-D fares that strongly depended on the
market and its attractiveness to passengers, and less on the distance flown. In the
process of increasing their revenues, the airlines found out that the most efficient
way to achieve higher profits was to charge passengers their maximum willingness-
to-pay (WTP). However, this economic theory cannot be fully realized in any
industry since it would mean charging each customer a different price for the same
service or goods. Therefore, Revenue Management was developed to try and
approach optimality in terms of prices charged to passengers. Before deregulation,
airlines had attempted to introduce differential pricing in order to attract more
passengers on their empty flights, but on a very small scale.
Yield Management led to extremely complicated fare structures as the airlines were
trying to get as many high yield passengers as possible, and yet to fill up their
airplanes at the same time. To ensure these two goals, they introduced fences, also
known as restrictions, that prevented business passengers from meeting the
requirements to buy low fare tickets and yet allowed leisure passengers, with more
flexible schedules, to buy these tickets. This was the first step to filling up the
airplanes without losing revenue from business passengers. Examples of fences are:
* Advance purchase
e Saturday night stay
e Round trip purchase requirement
" Non refundability or partial refundability
These fences serve their purpose well, as it is clear that a business passenger will in
most cases not know his schedule well in advance or be willing to stay over a
Saturday night. Similarly, the round trip requirement prevents passengers from
traveling to several cities consecutively.
14
Yet, to increase revenues, airlines had to get as many high yield business passengers
as possible on board the planes. To do this, they needed forecasts of the demand for
future flights, and then would assign a certain number of seats to a certain fare
category. This allocation of seats to a specific fare class with its associated
restrictions is the essence of what is commonly referred to as Revenue Management.
Yield Management has today become much more complex. The goal has now
become to optimize the seat allocation process, and this has led to new forecasting
techniques, as well as a number of seat allocation algorithms. There are two types of
seat allocation algorithms: flight-leg based, Fare Class algorithms, such as Expected
Marginal Seat Revenue (EMSR) algorithms (EMSRa or EMSRb), and O-D
algorithms, such as Displacement Adjusted Virtual Nesting (DAVN) or Network Bid
Price (Netbid). By Origin-Destination (O-D) algorithm, we mean any type of
algorithm that either protects seats or forecasts demand on a per O-D market basis as
opposed to a per leg basis. In airline terms, a market is a pair of origin and
destination cities, such as Boston-Miami for example, regardless of the number of
flight legs required to fly from the origin city to the destination city.
All these Revenue Management algorithms are aimed at maximizing the airlines'
revenues. To achieve this goal, they use mathematical formulas to forecast demand
and protect seats on a flight according to the forecasts. Hence, there are two major
issues in Revenue Management: demand forecasting and seat protection. Seat
allocation algorithms are numerous, as discussed earlier. Demand forecasting
currently implies using techniques based on past historical data. However, demand
modeling also requires modeling passenger behavior, such as "willingness-to-pay",
possibilities to meet various requirements and fences, and sell-up behavior, which is
the major focus of this thesis.
In the following paragraphs, we will come back to forecasting and sell-up in more
detail so as to give a definition and a brief description of the mechanisms involved.
Forecasting
To try and predict future demand, airlines use forecasting techniques. These are
numerous and rely on historical data. For example, to forecast demand for a Friday
evening flight, airlines will use data from the previous weeks' Friday evening flights
and estimate what the actual demand will be for this particular Friday evening flight.
However, given the many parameters in play, it is very difficult to obtain an accurate
forecast. Indeed, demand varies with economic conditions, seasons, days of the week
and time of day. Hence, it is very tricky to determine what portion of the historical
data should be used to forecast demand.
Moreover, there also is the problem of previous flights that sold out, and that
therefore cannot be used directly as raw data. In order to be able to use these full
flights in our forecasting algorithms, we need to apply a transformation that will let
us estimate the actual demand for these flights. Indeed, the capacity on a flight
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clearly limits the number of bookings and hence does not reflect actual demand
when the flight is sold out. This process of unconstraining demand is also known as
detruncation. These methods are forecasting methods that predict what the actual
data would have looked like, had there been no capacity constraints.
Therefore, forecasting is basically divided into two major parts: detruncation and
actual forecasting. Once again, detruncation consists of unconstraining since a flight
may sell out, or close down, for capacity reasons. It then becomes very difficult to
predict what the actual demand, the unconstrained demand, was for the flight. This is
the role of the detruncation method: it projects a closed observation to an estimate of
the unconstrained demand for the associated flight. Forecasting then uses this data to
project what the future demand for a given flight will be. The major difference
between forecasting and detruncation lies in the fact the forecasting predicts future
demand, whereas detruncation "predicts" or rather estimates past demand.
Overall, demand forecasting has an enormous impact on Revenue Management
algorithms. Several forecasting and detruncation algorithms are available for our use,
as we will discuss later in this thesis.
Sell-up
In any origin-destination market, a given discretionary passenger will seek the
lowest available price. In the event that a passenger cannot book his desired flight
and fare class, he then may choose one of the following options:
e Horizontally shift to the same airline, but on a different flight, and in the same
fare class.
" Spill to another airline.
* Not travel at all.
e Vertically shift to a higher fare class on the same flight and airline.
(Source: Belobaba, Peter P., Air Travel Demand and Airline Seat Inventory
Management, 1987)
The last possibility is what is referred to as sell-up, and constitutes an important part
of current research. In particular, as stated earlier, we will study this passenger
behavior in order to assess the revenue gains that can be achieved without
necessarily improving the network or Revenue Management models used by the
airlines.
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Goal of the Thesis
Currently, most airlines use leg-based algorithms to manage their seat inventory.
Only the more advanced airlines use O-D control algorithms that forecast demand
and protect their seating capacity or inventory at the network level. In this
environment, other airlines are considering switching to a more advanced network
Revenue Management method, in order to increase their revenues and therefore their
profits.
The question that we raise here is whether a first step to higher revenues would not
be to upgrade the existing leg-based, Fare Class Revenue Management algorithms in
order to achieve revenues similar to those of O-D algorithms. Indeed, the financial
implications of upgrading the entire Revenue Management system are enormous.
Hence, the goal of the thesis is first of all to assess the revenue benefits of better
modeling passenger behavior and second to establish whether or not it would be
possible to increase the airline's revenues to make them comparable to those of the
better O-D methods.
Specifically, airlines are currently interested in the implications of accounting for
sell-up and improving the detruncation and forecasting methods. Therefore, in this
thesis we will incorporate the notion of sell-up in the typical leg-based, Fare Class
Revenue Management EMSRb algorithm, and improve the detruncation and
forecasting methods in order to increase, hopefully, the revenues of the airline using
this leg-based algorithm. We will evaluate the impact of these changes for both the
airline leading the change and its competitor. Moreover, we will test the robustness
of the results achieved by the airline accounting for sell-up by changing the Revenue
Management method of the competitor.
Previous studies have shown that O-D algorithms can bring as much as 2.5 percent
revenue gains over the basic leg-based EMSRb algorithm. We will therefore focus
on the benefits of accounting for sell-up in a leg-based Revenue Management
environment such as EMSRb, and try and reach revenue gains similar to or better
than those of the O-D algorithms by accounting for sell-up, if it is possible.
To do this, we will be using the Passenger Origin Destination Simulator (PODS),
developed by Hopperstad from the Boeing Company and to be described in detail in
Chapter 1.1. This software enables us to run simulations of a network of routes and
airlines competing on the various markets and gives us the revenues for all the
airlines. We will be running a number of simulations to answer our previous
questions regarding sell-up. The simulator enables us to input the sell-up rates,
choose from a variety of forecasting methods, and decide what type of Revenue
Management methods (O-D or leg-based) the competing airlines will be using.
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Structure of the Thesis
The thesis will be divided into two major parts. In the first part, we will introduce
and explain the fundamental concepts that are used in the thesis. In particular, in the
first chapter, we will explain how the Passenger Origin Destination Simulator
(PODS) works. We will get into the details of the structure of the simulator and
briefly describe the mechanisms of the algorithms that are used. We will then discuss
Revenue Management more thoroughly and get into the details of the algorithms
used in PODS. In particular, we will describe six of the more commonly used
algorithms in the airline industry today, divided into leg-based algorithms and O-D
based algorithms. These six algorithms that we focus on are Expected Marginal Seat
Revenue (EMSR), Greedy Virtual Nesting (GVN), Displacement Adjusted Virtual
Nesting (DAVN), Heuristic Bid Price (HBP), Network Bid Price (Netbid) and
Prorated Bid Price (ProBP).
In the second chapter, we then discuss forecasting and detruncation methods. We
first discuss detruncation methods and focus on the ones more commonly used in the
airline industry, namely Booking Curve detruncation (BC), Projection detruncation
(Proj) and Adjusted Booking Curve detruncation (AdjBC). The latter was recently
described and tested by Bratu to account for low biases in unconstraining
mechanisms, as an improvement of the more typical BC. Second, we focus on
forecasting methods, Regression forecasting (REG) and Pick-up forecasting (PU).
In the third and final chapter of this first part, we come back to the notion of sell-up
and explain in more details the phenomena that are responsible for this behavior of
passengers. In particular, we will discuss passenger segmentation, price
discrimination and maximum willingness-to-pay (WTP). We will also explain how
this sell-up potential can be incorporated in several Revenue Management
algorithms with the Belobaba-Weatherford 2 heuristic.
By the end of this first part, we hope to have explained enough about Revenue
Management and sell-up behaviors for the reader to understand the results presented
in the following chapters and the relevance of the topic to airlines.
In the second part, we focus on simulations and results pertaining to sell-up and
better detruncation. Again, this second part will be divided into several chapters.
Chapter 4 is the first chapter of this second part, focusing on a leg-based, Fare Class
Revenue Management environment. More specifically, we study what happens when
airline A accounts for sell-up and upgrades to more aggressive detruncation methods
(i.e. methods that lead to higher estimates of the unconstrained demand) as a
function of what the competitor does.
1 Bratu, St6phane J-C., Modified Booking Curve Detruncation and Sell-up Techniques, PODS Summit IX
Presentation
2 Belobaba, P.P.,Weatherford, L.R., Comparing Decision Rules that Incorporate Customer Diversion in
Perishable Asset Revenue Management Situations, Decision Sciences, Volume 27, Spring 1996
18
In Chapter Five, we study what happens to an airline that accounts for sell-up in an
O-D based environment, as opposed to a leg-based environment. In this paragraph
we simulate essentially the same cases as in our previous analysis, but airline A now
uses GVN combined with sell-up.
Finally, in Chapter Six, we compare the results we achieved with previously
observed results from analyses of the Revenue Management methods available to
airlines. In this chapter we also try and validate our results in a bigger network, but
more importantly study the effects of this larger network on the gains observed
previously. Finally, we use the capabilities of PODS to compare the sell-up rates
input in the simulations (i.e. the estimated sell-up rates on our part) to the actual
observed sell-up rates at the end of the simulation.
In conclusion, we will have, if not proven, at least strongly suggested that both
accounting for sell-up and improving the detruncation methods can lead to higher
revenues for the airline implementing this minor change in its Revenue Management
system. Moreover, the order of magnitude of the gain is the same as the gains
obtained by some O-D Revenue Management methods.
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PART I: THEORY
In this first part of the thesis, we focus on a few critical details that must be
understood before we can present our results. In particular, we define the important
concepts of Revenue Management, Forecasting, Detruncation and Sell-up. We also
describe the simulator we used to obtain our results.
This first part is therefore divided into three chapters. The first chapter deals with the
introduction of the simulator and the general task of explaining what Revenue
Management is and why it is very important to the airlines today. The second chapter
gets into the details of Forecasting and Detruncation methods, as they will play an
important role in our simulations. Finally, the third and last chapter of this first part
deals with the notion of Sell-up. We explain what Sell-up is and how previous
research has proposed to account for it in a Revenue Management environment.
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Chapter 1: Pods And Revenue Management
In this chapter, we will first introduce the Passenger Origin Destination Simulator
that we have been alluding to in the introduction. We will get into the basics of how
it works and how it simulates a realistic airline environment. In a second part, we
will focus on Revenue Management algorithms, be they Fare Class or O-D based.
We will point out the specificity of each algorithm and provide a general
understanding of each of them. Overall, this chapter will be devoted to the two
fundamental elements in this research study, namely the simulator and the critical
notion of Revenue Management in the airline industry.
1.1 PODS
For the purpose of this thesis, we used a simulator, the Passenger Origin Destination
Simulator (PODS), developed at Boeing by Hopperstad 3. This simulator evolved
from the Decision Window Model 4 (DWM), also developed at Boeing. However,
PODS incorporates major additional simulation capabilities, in that in addition to the
DWM characteristics, PODS also takes into consideration the fares offered on each
flight and path, as well as the restrictions associated with each fare category on a
specific flight. Originally, the DWM choice model determined passenger preferences
based on the schedule offered by the airlines, the airline image and a set of other
factors, such as the aircraft type. PODS uses the same logic as the DWM model,
includes fares and associated restrictions, and also allows the two (or more)
competing airlines to simulate the effects of various Revenue Management methods
on their network revenues.
The greatest improvement from previous Revenue Management simulators, such as
MITSIM (c.f. Williamson5, Mak6 ), for example, is that PODS allows the simulation
of a competitive environment where passengers actually choose among paths and
airlines. Moreover, the demands are correlated across passenger types and markets,
unlike previous simulations. As explained by Mak , MITSIM requires the user to
input the mean demand for each fare class. In addition, the forecaster evaluates
future demand by summing the mean incremental ODF demands for all remaining
periods. That is, the forecaster uses mean incremental input demands, while PODS
uses historical data. This is the major difference with PODS, as demand is generated
by the passengers' choice in the simulator. In addition, there are two competing
airlines, which was not the case with MITSIM.
3 Boeing PODS, developed by Hopperstad, Berge and Filipowski
4 Decision Window Path Preference Model (DWM), The Boeing Company, February 1994
s Williamson, Elisabeth L., Airline Network Seat Inventory Control: Methodologies and Revenue Impacts, June
1992
6 Mak, Chung Y., Revenue Impacts of Airline Yield Management, January 1992
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PODS is able to simulate an entire network of origin-destination markets for one or
more airlines and enables us to then use its outputs to analyze the competitive
implications of various Revenue Management methods on airline revenues.
Moreover, PODS allows the user to simulate competing airlines with different
Revenue Management and forecasting methods. The fundamental characteristic of
PODS is that it simulates the booking process for a single day's departures on a
network, with competing airlines using different fare structures and (or) different
Revenue Management methods.
In the following paragraphs, we will briefly describe the model, its inputs and its
outputs.
1.1.1 The model
Our primary use of PODS is to simulate a competitive environment in which various
airlines operate a pre-determined network of flights. Given this situation, we then try
to analyze the influence of Revenue Management on different measures such as
airline network revenues or load factors.
Conceptually, PODS is composed of four interrelated elements: the historical
booking database, the forecaster, the Revenue Management optimizer and the
passenger decision model. These four components are linked as shown on Figure 1.
Figure 1: PODS Architecture
PATH/CLASS
PASSENGER AVAILABILITY REVENUE
CHOICE MANAGEMENT
MODEL PATH/CLASS SEAT INVENTORYBOOKINGS/
CANCELLATIONS CONTROL
CURRENT FUTUREBOOKINGS BOOKINGS
FORECASTER
UPDATE HISTORICAL
BOOKINGS
HISTORICAL
BOOKING
DATA BASE
Source: Hopperstad, The Boeing Company
The historical booking database collects information from previous flights and feeds
this historical data into the forecaster, whose historical database is manually
initialized at the beginning of each simulation run. The forecaster then uses this data,
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along with bookings currently on hand, provided by the Revenue Management
optimizer, to forecast future demand for a given flight. These expected future
bookings are then fed into the Revenue Management optimizer. With this data and
actual path and class bookings and cancellations, the Revenue Management
optimizer then determines seat protections and availability. Finally, this data is fed
into the passenger choice model, which uses it to assign new prospective passengers
to available path-fare combinations according to their decision window and budget.
All this information is then input back into the Revenue Management optimizer as
historical data to be used by the airline for future flight departures.
On a finer level, the simulations can be described as a set of trials. Each simulation,
or case, has specific input parameters that determine the type of forecaster and
Revenue Management optimizer that will be used by each airline, along with the
network definition. In the following paragraphs, we describe the structure of PODS
in a little more detail, but the reader is referred to Wilson7 and Lee for more
exhaustive explanations.
Each case was chosen to be subdivided into 20 trials, each trial being composed of
600 samples, 200 of which are discarded in order to avoid initial conditions effects.
This amount of trials and samples was chosen in order to get statistically significant
results, as explained by Lee". The first 200 samples are discarded in order to
eliminate the initial conditions' effects, while the 20 trials provide stable results.
Each sample contains one set of flight departures for the network representing a
single day of operations.
Overall, we have a set of 12,000 samples per case, 8000 of which provide us with
actual data gathered in the output files. These samples are separated among 20 trials
in order to reduce the correlation between the samples. Indeed, every sample is
influenced by the conditions in which the system is when the sample is run. This
condition is a result of the previous sample run, or the previous departure day
bookings. Therefore, to reduce the correlation, the model is split in 20 trials of 600
samples each. This high number of 600 samples was chosen in order to obtain
steady-state results that actually give us reliable information. Moreover, as we
discussed earlier, the first 200 samples are discarded in order to eliminate the initial
conditions' effect. It has been determined in previous research work by Lee8 that 600
samples with 200 bums yields statistically significant and stable results while at the
same time uses reasonable computational power.
The demand generation processes are then created using DWM according to the
following steps. First, the system generates a window that is set according to the
passenger's earliest possible departure time and latest possible arrival time. Second,
once this window has been determined, the model generates the paths that are
compatible with this window for each given passenger. Finally, given these paths,
the first choice path is systematically generated, according to airline image, path
7 Wilson, John L., The Value of Revenue Management Innovation in a Competitive Airline Industry, May 1995
8 Lee, Alex Y., Investigation of Competitive Impacts of Origin-Destination Control Using PODS, June 1998,
Chapter3.1.2, pp43-44
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quality (i.e. number of connections, etc.) and other factors. Once the paths are
generated, we then get time of day distribution for each O-D market. The system
then uses stochastic processes to simulate actual demand by passenger type for each
O-D market. At the same time, the Revenue Management algorithm determines
booking limits, in order to optimize revenues.
At the trial level, the sequence followed is explained on Figure 2. Each trial contains
600 repetitions of the same day (sample) with no trends. Bookings are spread over
16 time frames (i.e. booking periods) for each day.
Figure 2: PODS Flow Chart
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by Seat Optimizer
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Actual Flight
Data Obtained
Source: Zickus, Jeffrey S., Forecasting for Airline Network Revenue Management;
Revenue and Competitive Impacts, May 1998, p5 5 .
As we described earlier, a historical database is the first thing that is input at the
beginning of a trial: at the beginning of a trial, there is no previous flight information
to initialize the system and we therefore initialize the database with default values.
This is done by using the booking curves initially given as input to the system.
From this point on, the simulation works on a per-sample (i.e. on a per-day) basis,
both working on the supply and the demand side at the same time. Within each
sample there are 16 booking periods, also referred to as time frames. At the
beginning of each time frame, PODS first updates its databases, that is, records the
number of bookings that were observed in the previous booking period. With this
information now available, it becomes possible for the Revenue Management
systems of our simulated airlines to create a forecast of booking requests for the
upcoming booking periods and set the booking limits accordingly.
For each passenger, PODS then determines whether the passenger is accepted on a
path/fare combination, given availability, and removes these passengers from an
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ODF demand accordingly. The availability is then recalculated, taking into account
the Revenue Management booking limits and the actual number of bookings.
Finally, this new booking information is added to the databases.
Once this process has been completed for each passenger and each time frame, the
simulated flight data is summarized and the process is repeated for each of the 600
samples and the 20 trials.
The final output is an average of all the results obtained from the 400 samples that
are kept over each of the 20 trials. The output is simply an average of 8000 samples
or 8000 repetitions of the booking process for the "same" departure day.
1.1.2 Inputs
As we briefly discussed earlier, PODS requires the user to input a great deal of
parameters. Table 1 gives a summary of the major inputs in the Passenger Origin
Destination Simulator. These inputs are gathered in the input files according to the
structure detailed in the following paragraphs.
Table 1: Major Input Parameters in PODS (See Zickus9 )
Airlines (2) Passenger Types (2) Seat Optimization Method (RM)
Markets (54) Fare Classes (4) Forecasting Method
Booking Curves (2) Leg Fares (For Leg-based RM) Detruncation Method
Observations in Forecaster (26) Base Fare in Market Probability of Sell-up
Samples (Days - 600) Restrictions (3) Capacity on each Leg
Samples Burned (200) Cancellation Penalty ($0) Percentage of Business Passengers
Number of Trials (20) Cancellation Rate (0%) Number of Paths per Market
Time Frames (16) No-show Rate (0%) Distance on each Leg
Time Frame Reoptimization Days Denied Boarding Penalty Numberies When aClasses and
The first set of data that need to be input in the model is general data, including
when the flights become available for bookings (or open), or how many time frames
we want to use. In this part of the input file, the number of markets is stipulated. This
first set of data also includes the booking curves by passenger type, and whether we
model cancellations and no-shows.
Then, we need to determine how many fare types are offered by each airline and
with what restrictions. These restrictions are time restrictions - each fare class is
available until a given time frame, after which it is closed down and unavailable -
minimum stay restrictions - Saturday night minimum stay - or roundtrip or
refundability restriction.
The following step involves the type of Revenue Management and forecasting that
each of the simulated airlines will be using. In this part of the input file, for each
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airline, we must define the algorithm that will be used by the airline, the associated
detruncation method and forecasting routine. Other parameters must also be input at
this point, including whether the airline decides to account for the possibility of sell-
up or not.
The input file then focuses more on the market definition by first detailing all the
flight legs that will be used in the network, the associated distances, and the airline
that flies each given leg.
The rest of the input file then details each market specifically.
Overall, the input parameters can be divided into three sets of specific types of
inputs, as follows.
1.1.2.a System Level Input Parameters
These input parameters we kept constant during our simulations, but can be changed
by the user, as any other input in the system. These parameters include the number of
airlines, the number of markets, the number of fare classes and so on. For a complete
listing of all these parameters, the reader should refer to Zickus9 .
1.1.2.b Airline Input Parameters
These inputs we modified according to the hypotheses we were trying to test. They
include the Revenue Management method, the forecasting and detruncation methods
and all the related parameters. Again, the reader is referred to Zickus.
1.1.2.c Market Level Parameters
Finally, this set of input parameters affects the settings of the markets, the size of
demand, the time of day curve, etc. These were not used for our simulations, but the
reader can refer to Zickus9 or Skwarekl0 for more detail regarding these parameters.
The more important parameters to be discussed are the following:
* Number of observations used from the historical databases,
" Number of time frames and their time spacing,
* Fare classes and associated fences, and,
* Demand factor.
9 Zickus, Jeffrey S., Forecasting for Airline Network Revenue Management; Revenue and Competitive Impacts,
May 1998, Chapter 3.1, pp52-64
10 Skwarek, Daniel K., Competitive Impacts of Yield Management Systems Components: Forecasting and Sell-up
Models, June 1996
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Indeed, the number of observations from the historical databases to be used in the
forecaster should be large enough to provide reliable forecasts that are not
oversensitive to unusual flights. On the other hand, this number of observations
should at the same time not be so large that it incorporates flights that are too old to
be of interest. However, this seasonality problem is not taken into account within
PODS, and therefore a set of 26 departed flights is a sufficient number.
Second, the number of time frames used in our simulations is 16. The flights open
for bookings 63 days before scheduled take-off time. Calculations for the booking
limits are then done for each of the 16 time frames. These time frames are weekly
time frames until 35 days before departure. They then become bi-weekly, that is,
every 3.5 days, until 7 days before departure. At this point, the booking limits are
updated every 2 days until 1 day before departure, which is the last update.
Third, the fare classes must be determined for each airline and for each market. In
our PODS model, it is assumed that the airline uses a system of four classes - Y, B,
M and Q class, where Y class is the highest fare class and is therefore unrestricted.
However, the actual fare by class depends on the O-D market, according to a
distance formula. The ratios between the fares are 4, 2 and 1.5 between Y and B, B
and M, and M and Q, respectively, and remain unchanged whatever the market. The
base fare of $200 for the Q-class 2000 miles market is used to get the fare for the
other classes. A factor of 1.6 is applied to this base fare for each doubling of the
distance flown on a leg.
The fares in the simulator were chosen to reflect reality as best as possible. In this
respect, they do not correspond exactly to fares observed by everyday travelers, but
they lead to realistic simulations in terms of seat protections and Revenue
Management efficiency. Moreover, the fare ratios are comparable to those observed
in the industry.
Table 2: O-D Fares
Distance (Miles)
O-D Fares 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500 4000
Y $ 320.00 $ 500.00 $ 660.00 $ 800.00 $ 910.00 $1,020.00 $1,205.00 $1,280.00
B $ 160.00 $ 250.00 $ 330.00 $ 400.00 $ 455.00 $ 510.00 $ 602.50 $ 640.00
M $ 120.00 $ 187.50 $ 247.50 $ 300.00 $ 341.25 $ 382.50 $ 451.88 $ 480.00
Q $ 80.00 $ 125.00 $ 165.00 $ 200.00 $ 227.50 $ 255.00 $ 301.25 $ 320.00
Each fare type then has fences in order to prevent business passengers from having
access to these fares. The fences are set up as summarized in Table 3.
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Fare Dollar Advance Round Sat. Night Percent Non-
Code Price Purchase Trip? Min. Stay Refundable
Y $100 -- -- -- --
B $80 3 day Yes - 50%
M $50 7 day Yes Yes 100%
Q $40 14 day Yes Yes 100%
The last very important factor to be stressed here is the demand factor. The demand
factor is the ratio of the average demand to the aircraft capacity (which was set to
100 in our studies). Hence, a demand factor (DF) of 1.0 means that the demand, on
average, will be 100 passengers per flight. On the other hand, a demand factor of 1.2
means that the demand will be of 120 passengers per flight. However, average
demand ranges from 60 to 140 depending on the flight, for a system-wide average of
100, at demand factor 1.0. It ranges from 48 to 112- at demand factor 0.8 and from
72 to 168 at demand factor 1.2. In our analysis, we use demand factors 0.8, 1.0 and
1.2 to see how the change in demand influences the results of each Revenue
Management method that we will be using. The influence of demand on the results
will greatly depend on the type of algorithm used, as the user also decides on the
percentage of local vs. connecting passengers in a market, which influences the
performance of each Revenue Management alternative. These demand factors were
chosen to reflect average system load factors of roughly 70%, 78% and 83%
respectively.
1.1.3 Outputs
The output files generated by PODS are comprehensive results of the simulation.
They are divided into four sections:
" The first section summarizes the inputs, but does not include the
market data,
e The second section holds the intermediate results, that is the revenues
per trial,
* The third section is the primary output section, where the revenues and
loads per market and leg are recorded, and, finally,
e The fourth section contains supplemental outputs, such as the time
frame at which a given flight closed down, etc.
In order to get a clear analysis out of the output files we concentrate on a set of 3
primary measures that will enable us to compare the results of each competitor.
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Table 3: Fences
First, the most obvious measure is the overall network revenue of both airlines. This
again is the average of the revenues over the twenty trials. While this only gives a
first order of magnitude on the performance of the airline's Revenue Management
system, it is clearly the more important indicator. However, it does not show
differences on a flight basis.
The second indicator then is the load, be it the average network load factor (ALF),
the leg load factor, the fare class load mix or even the virtual buckets load mix.
These loads give us an indication of the ability of the airline to fill up its planes, and
therefore its ability to forecast demand correctly by finding out the loads by fare
class. This also provides an explanation of why revenues have varied, depending on
the loads of high fare passengers versus low fare passengers.
The third indicator is the fare class closure: it gives the time frame when a given fare
class actually closed down. This is a good indicator of the availability of a fare class,
on average. The availability depends on the fare class and the demand for a given
flight. Ideally, the top fare class should close down upon departure or just before
departure, while B class should also remain available longer than M and Q classes,
and so on. This would then suggest that the booking limits were very well estimated.
However, for a high demand flight, the lower classes will surely close down much
earlier than the last available time frame associated with this class. Overall, this
indicator lets us gauge whether a lot of passengers were spilled in a given class or
not, and whether this lost revenue was offset by the loads in higher classes.
The output files allow us to obtain raw data on the results of a case, data that can
then be used to compare the effects of various changes in the airline's Revenue
Management system. The three major indicators that we described earlier must be
combined to get the best understanding of what really happened, and are not the only
tools that we can use. As we briefly discussed, the output files provide us with
extensive data on the results of a case.
1.1.4 Network 68
In order to use PODS, we need to model a network of operations for our competing
airlines. In the interest of saving computational power and time because of the
intensive passenger choice simulation of 8000 samples, we restricted ourselves to a
small network of 6 spoke cities and two hubs, one for each airline, with no inter-hub
flights. Moreover, this network has been extensively tested by Lee11 and has proven
to be very stable in the results it provides. It is therefore a very good basis for
analyzing the impacts of sell-up models on airline revenues. This network also
models (in a very simplified way) the current situation within the domestic United
States, where a variety of routes and O-D markets are available through a hub. In this
case, each airline has its own hub which allows connections to all the spoke cities.
This network design was generated and tested by Lee".
" Lee, Alex Y., Investigation of the Impacts of Origin-Destination Control Using PODS, Network 6B is referred
to as Network 3 in the thesis, p55
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Figure 3: Network 6B
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This set of 6 spoke cities associated with two hub airports includes 54 different
origin-destination markets, connected by 24 different flight legs, 12 for each airline.
The spatial layout of the network can be seen in Figure 3. There are two spoke cities
500 miles away from either hub, two other spoke cities 1000 miles away from either
hub, one spoke 1500 miles away from the hub and one spoke city 2000 miles away
from the hub. This enables a range of ODFs from 500 to 4000 miles, while flights
range from 500 to 2000 miles.
As for demand, it is segmented into two types - business and leisure.
On a leg basis, demands were set in a systematic way. It was assumed that the short-
haul legs and paths have the highest demands, while the longest-haul legs have the
lowest demands. The logic behind this attribution of demand is that the higher the
demand on short-haul, the more important it becomes to perform Origin and
Destination (O&D) Revenue Management. Indeed, not only will the short-haul legs
have the lowest fares, as we use a distance based pricing scheme, but this is where
the demand bottlenecks will also tend to occur. Therefore, it becomes crucial to have
a good Revenue Management system in order to first of all try and keep as many
high fare passengers, but also to maximize the gains from displacing a connecting
passenger in favor of two local passengers, apparently paying less but actually
contributing more to the overall revenues of the airline on a network basis. The issue
should become apparent when comparing O-D based Revenue Management systems
to leg-based Revenue Management optimizers.
In summary, PODS is a highly detailed simulator that essentially simulates bookings
for identical repetitions of a single day, on a competitive network. We briefly
discussed earlier the numerous input parameters and the possibilities offered by the
simulator. In this thesis, we only use a limited portion of the capabilities of the
simulator, on the small network 6B, for consistency purposes.
1.2 Revenue Management Methods
Six different Revenue Management algorithms, or seat optimizers, will be used in
the PODS simulations. The goal of this section is to give a brief overview of the
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operation of these six methods. More detailed information on each of these six
algorithms can be found in Williamson and Lee . The first five methods we will
describe, namely EMSRb, GVN, HBP, DAVN and Netbid, have been extensively
described by Lee. The last one, ProBP was first introduced by Williamson" in her
prorated EMSR approach and implemented in more detail by Bratu3 .
In the thesis, we will always consider that the fare structure consists in four classes,
Y, B, M and Q, from the highest class (Y) down to the lowest (Q).
1.2.1 Fare Class Revenue Management Algorithms
Fare Class Revenue Management algorithms lead to the setting of booking limits on
a flight leg, based on forecasts of demand on a leg basis. Therefore, regardless of
whether the passenger is traveling via one or more connections, the algorithm
nevertheless protects the inventory, i.e. the available capacity, on a flight leg basis.
Hence, it is possible that two short-haul passengers will be denied access to a flight
in a given fare class in order to enable a long haul, seemingly higher paying
passenger, to book the flight. This leads to a few optimization problems and lower
revenues than expected. Such Fare Class Revenue Management algorithms
detruncate, forecast and protect the inventory on a leg basis. We will explain
detruncation and forecasting later on in Part I, Chapter 2:.
1.2.1.a Expected Marginal Seat Revenue (EMSR)
This Expected Marginal Seat Revenue algorithm was developed by Belobaba"
(1987). This was one of the first published algorithms for nested booking classes on
a flight leg in the passenger airline industry. The algorithm uses leg-based forecasts,
by fare class or bucket, and protections.
This rather straightforward Revenue Management model sets the booking limits for
each fare class and flight leg, based on a forecast that is also made on a fare class and
flight leg basis. The underlying idea is that the uncertainty that a passenger will book
a given flight should be taken into consideration when setting the booking limits.
Ideally, if demand were deterministic, one could set the protections for each class to
its expected demand. However, as this is very far from the truth, this algorithm sets
the protections according to the expected marginal revenue of each incremental seat
sold in a given class. Therefore, as the probability of selling a seat decreases as the
number of seats already booked increases, the expected marginal revenue of the n 1h
seat in the highest class is only a fraction of the original full fare in this class (Y).
Hence, the algorithm sets the protection for one class when the next class's full fare
equals the expected marginal seat revenue of the n th seat sold in this higher class.
This method follows three basic steps:
12 Williamson, Elisabeth L., Comparison of Optimization Techniques for Origin-Destination Seat Inventory
Control, May 1998
13 Bratu, St6phane J-C., Network Value Concept in Airline Revenue Management, June 1998, Chapter 3.3
14 Belobaba, Peter P., Air Travel Demand and Airline Seat Inventory Management, May 1987
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1. Forecast demand on a leg basis, by fare class, including uncertainty, hence
with a standard deviation
2. Determine the protections for each fare class according to the expected
marginal revenue of each seat
3. Get the nested protections for each class, in order to always have the full
inventory available to the highest class
To be a little more precise, another issue that comes up in this method is that
protecting one class from the next is sub optimal as, in fact, one should protect one
class from all the classes lower. Indeed, it is possible that the EMSR value of the
n+1th seat in the highest class (Y) be still higher than the full fare in M class, while it
is already lower than the B fare. Therefore, to deal with this problem in a less
computationally intensive manner, the EMSRb15 version of the algorithm protects
the joint upper classes from the class immediately below. For example, if the fare
classes are Y, B, M and Q, in descending order, the algorithm will compute the
protection for the joint Y and B classes, from M class. The demand estimates are
obtained for these joint classes by assuming that demand is normally distributed and
independent from class to class. Hence, we simply add the mean demands and add
the variances to get the characteristics of the distribution for the lower classes.
Example
In this example, we have a two-class flight. Figure 4 shows the Expected Marginal
Revenue of each additional seat sold.
15 Belobaba, Peter P., Optimal vs. Heuristic Methods for Nested Seat Allocation, Presentation to AGIFORS
Reservations Control Study Group Meeting, Brussels, Belgium, May 1992
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Figure 4: EMSR value of each seat
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The idea is to follow the highest curve. First, the probability of selling the initial
seats at a high price is close to 1; hence, the expected revenue out of these first seats
is close to the full fare. However, as bookings increase, this probability decreases
and then, as soon as the highest curve drops below the Low fare curve, we switch to
the second curve. As shown on the chart, this gives us the protection for class 1. The
transition point between two curves determines the number of seats that should be
protected for the associated fare.
Note: This example is valid for both EMSRa14 and EMSRb15 models. Determining
the protection levels when there are more than two classes becomes more
complicated for EMSRa, as we must then determine the protection for one class
from all the lower classes. Therefore, in this thesis, we focus on EMSRb and use the
algorithm described by Belobaba.
Mathematical Explanation
The mathematical logic behind this algorithm is very simple and is as follows:
Determine the value of the protection 17 where both curves intersect, according to
the following formula:
P(1 <r)= 2
1
Where r is the number of requests for class 1, fi and f2 are the fares for classes 1 and
2 and the requests are normally distributed with a given mean and standard deviation
(basic assumption of the model).
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In summary, the EMSR algorithms are leg-based Revenue Management algorithms
that focus on the expected revenue from the sale of a given seat on the aircraft. These
algorithms depend on many assumptions including the distribution of demand (it is
assumed to be normally distributed for EMSRb).
1.2.2 Origin-Destination Algorithms
There are various levels of Origin-Destination (O-D) Revenue Management
algorithms. By O-D control algorithms we mean any algorithm that allows for
different availability for different Origin-Destination pairs. A Revenue Management
algorithm is said to be an O-D control method as soon as it involves any type of O-D
detruncation, forecasting or protection -- this applies to virtual bucket mapping,
which is done on an O-D basis (c.f Part I, Chapter1.2.2.a). Hence, among the
algorithms used in PODS and in the airline industry we will be seeing all the
possible combinations: leg forecast and protection with O-D virtual mapping, O-D
forecast with leg protection, leg forecast with O-D protection, and O-D forecast with
O-D protection. The last combination we naturally expect to be the most beneficial
combination. As we will see in the following paragraphs, there are essentially three
types of O-D Revenue Management algorithms. DAVN solves a linear programming
(LP) problem in order to ultimately come up with protections for each fare class
while GVN uses the EMSR logic. On the other hand, Netbid and Heuristic Bid Price
use the concept of a bid price, i.e. set a minimum price that should be paid by the
customer in order for him to be allowed to book a seat. The major difference relies in
the fact that there is no actual protection in the case of the bid price algorithms and
that any passenger paying more than this threshold price can book a seat.
1.2.2.a Greedy Virtual Nesting (GVN)
Greedy Yirtual Nesting, a.k.a. VEMSRb (Yirtual EMSRb), is an "improvement" on
the EMSRb algorithm in that it tries to take into account the fact that it can be more
profitable to take a long-haul passenger, thus higher paying passenger, than a short-
haul passenger. Therefore, GVN still is leg-based, but uses a set of Virtual Buckets
to allocate the fare on a given flight leg. Hence, the mapping of the fares is done on
an O-D basis as it ranks the fares from highest to lowest in virtual buckets. Then, the
connecting fares, often higher, are ranked higher in the bucketing system and hence
benefit from a higher protection on each leg. The protection is, in this case, not made
on a fare code basis (a product type) anymore, but rather on a price basis only.
This method obviously allows more low-yield passengers with restricted fares to
make the flight. The logic of this algorithm is a "greedy" approach to the problem:
Accept the higher paying passengers first, on the basis that they bring more net
revenue to the airline. However, as far as yield is concerned, these passengers are
lower yield passengers than local passengers, who may have been displaced. In this
respect, this method is clearly not revenue maximizing, as it does not account for
passenger displacements.
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As we will see, it does, however, perform better than EMSRb in general (in Network
6B).
Overall, this Revenue Management algorithm is similar to EMSRb and computes
protections in the same way. The major difference is that the fare classes are mapped
differently, which results in very different protections. Table 4 gives an example of
possible virtual bucket mapping.
Table 4: An Example of Virtual Bucketing
Published Restrictions Published Mapped Booking Forecast
Fare Class Fare Class Detruncation
Virtual Bucket
Local Y Unrestricted $400.00 Y1
B 7-day adv. $200.00 Y2
M 14-day adv. $100.00 Y3
Connecting Y Unrestricted $1,000.00 Y4 CD
B 7-day adv. $500.00 Y5 _
M 14-day adv. $250.00 Y6_
In this example, we see that the unrestricted Y connecting fare is mapped to the
highest Y1 virtual bucket, while the other full Y fare, but local fare, is only mapped
into bucket Y3, after the B connecting fare.
In summary, GVN is a leg-based algorithm that is considered O-D based because it
actually maps the fares regardless of the O-D and therefore allows for different
availability for different O-Ds. However, the forecasting, detruncation, and
availability control are all leg-based. GVN has an obvious advantage over EMSRb
when flights are not very full in that it will take more connecting passengers.
However, when flights are full, this advantage can turn into a big disadvantage as
two local passengers bring more revenue than one connecting passenger. Another
advantage of this method is that it is transparent to customers, travel agents and
competitors.
1.2.2.b Displacemen t Adjusted Virtual Nesting (DA VN)
Displacement Adjusted Virtual Nesting (DAVN) is one of the few Revenue
Management algorithms in PODS to use O-D forecasting. However, it still uses leg-
based inventory control. The mechanism behind DAVN involves solving the revenue
maximization linear programming (LP) problem described by Williamson5 . The LP
problem solved is actually a deterministic LP that allows us to determine the shadow
price for each leg in the network. The shadow price is the price that the airline is
willing to accept for an additional seat on board a given flight leg. Another way to
put it is to say that the shadow price is the expected revenue increase observed from
relaxing the capacity constraint. The following step is to set a pseudo fare for each
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passenger, in order to account for the displacement cost incurred from booking a
seat. For local passengers, the pseudo fare is the actual fare the passenger is paying.
For connecting passengers, however, the pseudo fare is the difference between the
fare on the leg the passenger is booking on and the shadow price on the other leg
(where a local passenger is being displaced). Therefore, for two connecting flight
legs i and j, we get the following:
Leg i: Local Passenger PFL = Fare on leg i
Connecting Passenger PFc' = Fare on leg i - Shadow price on leg j
Leg j: Local Passenger PFdj = Fare on leg j
Connecting Passenger PF = Fare on leg j - Shadow price on leg i
Where PF stands for Pseudo-Fare.
This example was in the case of a two-leg connection. For multi leg paths, the same
method is used with more shadow prices, the sum of the shadow prices on the other
legs being subtracted from the fare on the leg studied for a connecting passenger.
At this point, the optimization algorithm used is GVN after mapping all the new
Pseudo-fares into the system. Using the same example as earlier, we get the
following mapping:
Table 5: Mapping the Fares with DAVN
Published Restrictions Published Pseudo Fare Mapped Booking Forecast Protection
Fare Fare Class Detruncation
Class Virtual Bucket
Local Y Unrestricted $400.00 Y1
B 7-day adv. $200.00 Y2 W
M 14-day adv. $100.00 Y3
Connecting Y Unrestricted $1,000.00 $800.00 Y4 Q 6)
B 7-day adv. $500.00 $300.00 Y5 6
M 14-day adv. $250.00 $50.00 -- Y61
In summary, DAVN performs O-D forecast and data collection, while it still remains
a leg-based algorithm in terms of protection. As was established by Lee8 , this
algorithm proves to be amongst the higher performance Revenue Management
algorithms tested in the PODS simulations.
1.2.2.c Deterministic LP Network Bid Price (Netbid)
Netbid uses the notion of bid prices to determine whether a passenger should be
allowed to book a flight or not. Unlike the EMSR methods and the related methods
(EMSRb, GVN and DAVN), the bid price methods base the booking of a passenger
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on the price he (or she) pays, compared to a minimum price. The algorithm
determines dynamically a minimum price that should be paid by a passenger in order
to be able to board the flight.
In the case of Netbid, the same deterministic LP is solved as for DAVN, which again
involves O-D forecasting and detruncation, based on ODF historical data. This LP
yields the shadow prices for each leg in the network. These shadow prices are then
directly used and compared to the price the passenger is willing to pay in order to
determine whether he should be allowed to book the flight. This optimization then is
done on an O-D basis. Indeed, for local passengers, the fare offered to the passenger
is compared to the bid price on the leg. For connecting passengers, the fare paid by
the passenger should be greater than the sum of all the shadow prices on the legs
traversed.
In summary, this algorithm can be considered to be a fully O-D based algorithm, as
it both forecasts on an O-D basis and optimizes seat allocation on an O-D basis.
The following example shows a very simple network where the bid prices for each
leg have been computed. Then, if a passenger requests a seat on leg A-B, he will be
accepted only if he is willing-to-pay more than $150. Another point to stress here is
that different paths may have very different bid prices. For example, to get from A to
C, passengers can fly nonstop, or connect through B or D. The nonstop flight has a
bid price of $200, while the A-B-C connection has a bid price of $250 and the A-D-
C connection has a bid price of $350. These differences reflect the convenience of
each path, as they are more or less demanded.
Figure 5: Netbid Bid Prices
Bid Price $150 Bid Price $100
A B C
Bid Price $200
Bid Pr 200 Bid Pric 50
D
1.2.2.d Heuristic Bid Price (HBP)
This HBP method was developed by Belobaba16 . The idea, again, is to account for
the displacement of local passengers by connecting passengers. This bid price
method uses the same logic as Netbid. However, there are a few crucial differences.
Forecasting, detruncation and optimization are all done on a leg-basis. HBP uses the
16 Belobaba, Peter P., The Evolution of Airline Yield Management: Fare Class to Origin-Destination Seat
Inventory Control, Handbook of Airline Marketing, 1't Ed., 1998, Chapter 23, pp. 285-302
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same data collection and forecasting principles as GVN and only differs from GVN
in terms of optimization and availability control.
This bid price is calculated based on the EMSR value of the last seat available on a
flight for the local passengers. However, for connecting passengers, the bid price
becomes the sum of this value and the product of the percentage of local passengers
on both legs and the EMSR value of the last seat available on the connecting flight.
For a simple two-leg case, the bid prices are connected as follow:
Leg i: BPU = EMSRci
BPci = EMSRci + d.EMSRcj
Where i is the index of the leg, EMSRc is the critical EMSR (EMSR value of the last
available seat), d is the product of the estimated percentage of local passengers on
each leg, and BP the Bid Price for local (L) or connecting (C) passenger.
Once again, to determine whether a passenger may book a seat on a flight, his (her)
fare is compared to the bid price on each leg. For connecting passengers, the fare
must be higher than the higher of both bid prices on each leg. In terms of
mathematical formulation, we accept a connecting passenger if and only if the fare F
that he (she) pays is such that:
F > Max(BPcs , BPcaj)
For the simple network example that we used earlier, the bid prices would look a
little more complicated, as shown on Figure 6. For a passenger flying from A to C on
the connecting flight through B, the airline will accept the booking if and only if the
fare paid by this passenger is greater than the maximum of the two connecting bid
prices, that is, $220.
Figure 6: HBP Bid Prices
.onnecting lgP=Max($220, $200)=$22b y
Local Bid Price $150 / Local BP 100
nnecting BP$2 nnecting BP $2
A B C
Local Bid Price $200
LocalBi e $200 Local ice $150
Connecting BP$2 D nnecting BP$220
A rather disturbing issue regarding bid prices is that this type of algorithm does not
protect seats and offers no control over the number of bookings in between
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recalculations of the bid prices. However, if bid prices are recalculated with
reasonable frequency, this should not be an issue.
Once again, as GVN, HBP is a fully leg-based algorithm that uses virtual mapping of
the fares on a network level. For this reason, we consider HBP as an O-D Revenue
Management method.
1.2.2.e Prorated Bid Price (ProBP)
Finally, the last and most recent Revenue Management algorithm tested and used in
PODS is ProBP. This method was thoroughly examined and tested by Bratul . The
underlying idea behind this method is again to use a bid price method to determine
whether a passenger should be allowed to book on a given flight. However, the
algorithm now determines the bid price for each leg depending on the O-D and splits
up the actual total fare in between the legs traversed, for connecting passengers. This
concept takes into account the structure of the network and is a zero-sum algorithm
that takes into consideration the demand on each leg.
The method used to compute the value of each prorated fare is the following:
X EMSRC (m) 0 =>PRF(j, k) = EMSRc(k) x F.
mE L EMSRc(m)
me Lj
F.
2 EMSRc(m)=0- 4PRF(j,k) '
ne L card(L,)
Where PRF(j,k) is the prorated fare of ODF j on leg k
Lj is the set of legs traversed by ODF j
Fj is the original fare of ODFj
EMSRc (m) is the critical EMSR value of leg m (i.e. the EMSR value of
the last seat sold on leg m)
As we discussed earlier, this algorithm takes into account the demand on each leg
through the use of the EMSRc values for the proration of the fare.
Another issue that arises in the calculation of these prorated fares is that the EMSRb
model uses the total itinerary fare of the ODF traversing leg k to compute the
EMSRc value, hence overestimating it. A convergence model was therefore
developed to address the problem, as shown on Figure 7.
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Figure 7: ProBP Logic
Initialize PRF(j,k) = Fj
Calculate EMSRc with PRF as inputs
NO Prorate the connecting ODF fares
Is the convergence criterion satisfied?
YES
Booking Control Mechanism
This algorithm was shown to bring significant improvement to the revenues of the
airline using this new algorithm. The gains obtained through this algorithm were
substantially higher than those of any other Revenue Management method
previously described.
1.3 Summary
This introduction to PODS and the Revenue Management methods allowed us to
understand how the simulator itself works. Moreover, we introduced and explained
in detail the notion of Revenue Management and the algorithms used by PODS.
EMSRb, GVN and HBP are fully leg-based algorithm, while all the others combine
either O-D forecasting or O-D optimization, or both. GVN and HBP are considered
O-D Revenue Management methods because they involve mapping all the fares into
virtual buckets. The other distinction between all these Revenue Management
methods concerns the type of protection (or not) that is used. Indeed, in the case of
bid prices, there is no physical protection of the seats, that is, no actual limits set,
only a minimum price that must be paid by the customer.
Table 6 summarizes the different types of Revenue Management systems we just
introduced and their specifications.
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Table 6: Summary of Revenue Management Algorithms Specifications
O-D algortihms
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Revenue Management Data Collection Control Type
Algorithm and Forecast Leg/O-D Limit/Bid
EMSRb Leg-based Leg-based Limit
GVN Leg-based Leg-based Limit
DAVN Path-based Leg-based Limit
Netbid Path-based Path-based Bid
HBP Leg-based Path-based Bid
ProBP Path-based Path-based Bid
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Chapter 2: Detruncation and Forecasting
In this chapter, we discuss detruncation and forecasting methods. Both these
methods contribute to generating a forecast of demand. However, detruncation
differs from forecasting in that it is applied at an earlier stage of the overall process.
Detruncation unconstrains demand, that is, generates an estimate of the actual
demand for a departed flight that was closed (i.e. full). As we will explain in more
detail, once a flight is full, the only information the airlines get is that the demand
was at least equal to the capacity of the aircraft. Forecasting, on the other hand,
consists of getting an estimate of future demand, given previous demand, including
the previously estimated unconstrained demand.
Both these tools are critical to reliable forecasting, as we will explain in the
following paragraphs. We will focus on detruncation methods, as this is one of the
aspects studied in this thesis. We will, however, also discuss forecasting algorithms
in a second part.
2.1 Detruncat ion Methods
Detruncation is the process of estimating the unconstrained demand, given that, in
the passenger airline industry, we have to deal with fixed aircraft capacities.
Therefore, in the event that a flight is full, it becomes very important, for forecasting
reasons, to be able to estimate the actual demand. As soon as requests are refused, it
becomes impossible to infer the actual demand for a flight directly from the
bookings. Therefore, it becomes necessary to find a way to estimate this demand.
Indeed, it will then allow the Revenue Management system to make more accurate
predictions and to set adequate protections. Another alternative would have been to
base our forecasts only on unclosed observations, where we can accurately know
demand on each flight. However, this is obviously not satisfactory, as it does not
account for high demand periods and constantly underestimates unconstrained
demand. Therefore, the basis for unconstraining demand is to use historical booking
patterns and then to apply these patterns to our closed observations in order to
reevaluate the actual demand for a given flight.
In short, there are two possibilities that can occur:
* The flight is not full in any class, or,
* The flight reaches capacity in at least one fare class.
In the first case, we do not need to use our detruncation algorithms, as demand can
be inferred from the number of bookings. In the second case, however, we need to
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apply our detruncation algorithms to our closed observation(s) in order to get an
estimate of the demand and its variance. The reader is referred to Skwarekl who
tested scenarios of one airline using no detruncation in its Revenue Management
system while the other airline did. The results of this analysis show that even at low
demand factors, the impacts of the detruncation models on revenues are as high as
3.5%.
In this chapter we present various detruncation methods that we will be using in
PODS: Booking Curve detruncation, Projection detruncation and Adjusted Booking
Curve detruncation.
2.1.1 Booking Curve Detruncation
In the next paragraphs, we describe how Booking Curve detruncation allows the user
to obtain an estimate of the unconstrained demand on a given flight and fare class.
We first describe a critical assumption of the model and then get into a more detailed
explanation of the algorithm.
2.1.1.a Underlying A ssumption
Booking curve detruncation is the first and easiest method used in PODS to estimate
unconstrained demand. The idea behind this method is that bookings follow a similar
pattern for all flights. Therefore, it is a good approximation to suppose that fourteen
days before departure, for example, 40 percent of the people wanting to take a given
flight will have already booked that flight. Hence, this detruncation method simply
uses the unclosed flights to estimate how much more people (percentage-wise) book
from one time period to the last time period and use these measures to evaluate the
unconstrained demand on closed flights.
2.1.1.b The Algorithm
As briefly described above, the Booking Curve detruncation algorithm computes the
expected increase in relative bookings from one booking period to the next, and,
given these values, computes the relative overall variation in bookings from one
period to the last period. This gives us a booking curve, which is used to determine
the unconstrained demand for closed flights.
The advantage of this method is that it is a time dependent and relatively easy
method. Indeed, the detruncated demand will depend on the period when the closed
flight actually closed down. For example, if a flight closed down at time period 2,
then we may infer from the booking curve, for example, that the bookings represent
only 35% of the total demand. If that same flight closed at time period 5, we may
then assume that we had almost 70% of the total demand. Therefore, we get a
different value for the unconstrained demand as a function of when the flight closed
down.
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Given the available databases at most airlines, it is possible to generate a booking
curve for each fare class and flight. This is done by analyzing the "pick-up" (number
of passengers booked from one time period to the next) in each time interval for the
unclosed observations. The booking curve detruncation algorithm then calculates the
ratio of bookings in each interval to the number of bookings in the preceding time
interval for a given fare class on a flight. Given these pick-up ratios, the algorithm
then builds a booking curve and uses it to detruncate and therefore estimate the
demand for closed observations.
For more detailed explanations of the algorithm, the reader is referred to Zickus .
2.1.2 Projection Detruncation
In this section, we follow the same pattern as for Booking Curve detruncation by
first describing the critical assumptions of the model, then explaining the model in
more details and by finally providing an example.
2.1.2.a Underlying A ssumptions
This algorithm was developed by Hopperstad and is based on the assumption that
the conditional probability that we underestimate the unconstrained demand for a
flight and fare class, given that this fare class closed down, is a constant value. We
get into a little more detail in the following paragraphs, but the reader should refer to
Zickus9 for extensive explanations of the algorithm.
2.1.2.b The Algorithm
The algorithm relies on the assumption that demand is normally distributed. Given
this assumption, the method first computes the average demand over the unclosed
observations. However, this average demand is clearly wrong, as it does not take into
consideration the closed observations.
At this point, the method uses an arbitrary value, t, to evaluate the detruncated value
of the closed observation. The closed observation is projected to a new value such
that the ratio of the area to the right of this new value to the area to the right of the
original value is equal to t. This is clearly explained on the following graph.
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Figure 8: Projection Detruncation
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From this point on, we then use all the observations - the old unclosed observations
and the newly projected observations - to compute the mean and the standard
deviation of demand. We repeat this same process for the originally closed
observations until the projections (and the mean demand and standard deviation)
converge. At this point, we have detruncated and obtained unconstrained values for
demand.
This process is repeated at each of the 16 time frames defined in PODS. Therefore,
we effectively detruncate at each time frame, which leads to different estimates of
the unconstrained demand depending on when a given fare class closed down.
This method can be better understood in the following example from the AGIFORS
meeting in Switzerland in 1987.
2.1.2.c An Example: AGIFORS 1987
Table 7: Application of Projection Detruncation
Tau = 0.3
Obs IjBookings Step 1 Projection 1 IProjection 2
1 26 26 26 26
2 7 23.2 24.9
3 22 27.3 27.6
4 20 20 20 20
5 14 14 14 14,
M ean }20J 22.*-1 2 2.5
Std- dev _____J61 5.3 5.5
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In this example, we have five observations, two of which closed down before take-
off, observations 2 and 3. The r value was set to 0.3. The first step is then, as we
discussed earlier, to compute the mean and standard deviation of the unclosed
observations. Here, the mean is 20 and the standard deviation 6. We then use the 'r
value to project the two closed observations, as shown in "projection 1" in Table 7
above. Again, we compute the mean and standard deviation of this new set of
observations, and apply the projection again, to the original closed observation
values. We repeat this final step until the mean and standard deviation of the
distribution converge. The mean and standard deviations thus obtained converge
after a few iterations.
2.1.2.d Previous Res ults
In his thesis, Zickus9 extensively tested the effect of forecasting and detruncation
algorithms on airline revenues in the same network 6B environment. His findings are
that the "best" t value is 0.15, when airline A uses a combination of Pick-up
forecasting (c.f. 2.2.1 below) and Projection detruncation while airline B uses Pick-
up forecasting with Booking Curve detruncation. This is true for EMSRb and GVN
only. The other Revenue Management algorithms behave differently. However, in
this thesis, we focus on EMSRb and GVN algorithms, and will therefore refer to this
T=0. 15 case as the "base case" for Projection detruncation.
Zickus9 goes much deeper into the details of why such results are observed. The
reader is therefore referred to Zickus' s thesis for more detail regarding the influence
of Projection detruncation on both the EMSRb and the GVN Revenue Management
algorithm.
2.1.3 Adjusted Booking Curve
In this last section regarding detruncation methods, we focus on Adjusted Booking
Curve detruncation. In the first paragraph, we explain the difference between this
method and "regular" Booking Curve detruncation. In a second paragraph, we
briefly present the results of previous research work concerning the impact of this
detruncation method as a function of the adjustment.
2.1.3.a Variation of the Booking Curve Detruncation Method
This method is directly inspired from the booking curve detruncation algorithm.
Booking curve detruncation tends to lead to a biased estimation of the booking
curve. Indeed, low first period bookings will lead the forecaster to protect fewer
seats for the concerned class. Therefore, if bookings then get back to normal, or are
unexpectedly high in the second period (assuming there are only two periods), the
fare class will close down, leading to a closed observation. Hence, this observation
will not be used in the building of the booking curve. Overall, the booking curve will
then be biased high, on average. This is better shown on the following example:
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Table 8: Bookings are biased high
Yclass bookings
Period 1 Period 2
flight#1 50 50
-- ght------------4----------- tMost Likey
flight#3 60 40
55% 100%
Hence, the underlying idea in Adjusted Booking Curve Detruncation is to adjust the
booking curve (obtained through the booking curve detruncation algorithm) slightly
to correct for this high bias effect.
2.1.3.b The correction
The model used to account for this high bias and to correct the booking curve is a
simple linear transformation applied to the initial booking curve results. This model
uses the same methodology as the Booking Curve Detruncation algorithm, and then
applies a correcting factor to the results, as follows:
Pbscale: Scaling Parameter (e [0, 1])
Cumb (t): Cumulative Percent Bookings at Period t (estimated from open
observations)
NCumb (t): New cumulative percent bookings at period t
* If Cumb(t) < 50% then:
NCumb (t) = Pbscale x Cumb (t)
" If Cumb(t) > 50% then:
NCumb (t) = 1 - (1-Cumb (t)) x (2-Pbscale)
This simple linear correction allows us to get lower estimates for the entire curve,
with maximum effect at 50% bookings. The following charts show examples of the
correction effect booking curves. The first chart has a scaling factor of 0.9, the
second chart, a scaling factor of 0.6.
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Figure 9: Pbscale with Scaling Factor 0.9
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Figure 10: Pbscale with Scaling Factor 0.6
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Obviously, the effect of the scaling factor increases as the scaling parameter
decreases and approaches 0.
2.1.3.c Best Scaling Factor
Tests have been run with this detruncation method and have shown that the best
results are obtained with very different Pbscale factors, depending on the
competitive environment and the level of demand. When only one airline changes
detruncation methods, the best scaling factor is somewhere between 0.4 and 0.5 (c.f.
Bratu ), again depending on the demand factor. Hence, it appears here that the
Booking Curve Detruncation model can be greatly improved in some cases by the
use of the scaling factor. However, it must also be pointed out that the scaling factor
does not always improve the performance of the airline.
17 Bratu, St6phane J-C., Modified Booking Curve Detruncation and Sell-up Techniques, PODS Summit IX
Presentation
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2.1.4 Summary
There are a number of detruncation methods that are currently used by Revenue
Management systems in the airline industry. We briefly described the more common
ones in the previous paragraphs. PODS is setup to use any of the previously
described methods. Our base case scenario uses the Booking Curve Detruncation
method to estimate unconstrained demand.
2.2 Forecasting: Two Methods
Forecasting, as opposed to detruncation, is the process of finding a quantitative
estimate of the likelihood of future events, based on past and current information. In
short, in the passenger airline industry, we are trying to get an estimate of the future
demand for a flight, based on similar past flights and current bookings on the flight
of interest. Forecasting can be done on various levels ranging from a macro level
(forecast for the entire network for a year) to a micro level (forecast on a given leg
and fare class). Revenue Management requires mainly micro forecasting. In
particular, we are concerned with leg and fare class forecasts or ODF forecasts,
depending on the type of Revenue Management system we use.
The forecasting algorithms are a necessary part of Revenue Management algorithms.
Indeed, it is necessary for the system to have a forecast of future demand to be able
to set booking limits. The forecasting method is also re-optimized at every time
period, in order to constantly adjust the forecast to the latest available information.
The PODS software offers two possible forecasting methods:
e Pick-up forecasting, which is the more commonly used method in this thesis
e Regression forecasting
We will describe these two methods briefly in the following paragraphs.
2.2.1 Pick-up forecasting
Pick-up forecasting is similar to booking curve detruncation in the method used to
forecast. Moreover, the pick-up forecasting method has similarities to a regular time
series, yet is more detailed. Indeed, instead of only using an average of the
previously observed bookings or unconstrained demand for previous flights, this
method also includes the number of passengers picked up from one time period to
the next. For the purpose of our Revenue Management methods, the forecasting is
done on a fare class and path or leg basis, depending on the Revenue Management
method used.
The forecasting is done by averaging the pick-up from one time period to the next
for a fixed number of previous flights. This average is then added to the current (or
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forecast) number of bookings for the current time
algorithm can be found in Zickus's thesis9 .
period. More details on the
The following example allows better understanding of the algorithm.
Table 9: Historical Bookings on Hand
14 21 28 35 42 49 56
24
19
19
19
23
28
8
15
8
17
20
18
15
13
13
18
6
10
6
16
7
16
12
9
8
5
17
6
6
3
8
4
4
10
11
5
4
4
14
2
5
2
3
1
3
2
13
7
4
0
4
10
3
4
0
3
0
2
2
4
10
7
2
0
3
9
3
3
0
3
0
0
2
2
0
4
5
2
0
1
8
3
0
0
2
0
0
2
2
0
3
Table 9 shows the bookings for a set of eight flights departed between April 2 3rd and
thMarch 5 . We assume in this case that the flights were not closed down so we do not
have to deal with detruncation problems. Given all these bookings from one time
period to the next, we now use this information to forecast the final bookings for the
May 14 th flight, for example.
First of all, we compute the pick-up from one period to the next by simply
previous time period's
Table 10: Pick-up
Pick Up 7 to 0 14 to 7 21 to 14 28 to 21
MAR 05
MAR 12
MAR 19
MAR 26
APR 02
APR 09
APR 16
APR 23
APR 30
MAY 07
MAY 14
MAY 21
MAY 28
JUN 04
JUN 11
JUN 18
30
36
31
15
28
23
29
23
18
3
11
9
13
11
9
11
12
4
1
4
6
10
10
2
5
2
1
35 to 28 42 to 35
4
6
6
5
8
1
0
4
3
8
3
-3
4
1
4
0
4
-1
2
0
0
49 to 42 56 to 49
3 6
0 2
2 0
0 0
1 2
1 1
0 0
1 3
0 0
0 1
0 0
2 0
0 0
2 0
0
The second step
flight (for which
in forecasting the pick-up from day 21 to day 0 for the May 14 th
we already have the bookings on hand on 21 days before departure)
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0
72
58
61
43
64
62
46
49
DAYS OUT
MAR 05
MAR 12
MAR 19
MAR 26
APR 02
APR 09
APR 16
APR 23
APR 30
MAY 07
MAY 14
MAY 21
MAY 28
JUN 04
JUN 11
JUN 18
42
22
30
28
36
39
17
26
20
subtracting the bookings
bookings. We then get the
in one time period from the
following pick-ups:
we then need to get an average pick-up for each set of pick-ups. For example, here,
we will average the pick-ups over eight observations. We then get the following
average pick-ups (Table 11):
Table 11: Average Pick-up and Standard Deviation
Pick Up
MAR 05
MAR 12
MAR 19
MAR 26
APR 02
APR 09
APR 16
APR 23
APR 30
MAY 07
MAY 14
MAY 21
MAY 28
JUN 04
JUN 11
JUN 18
Average Pick-Up
7 to 0 14 to 7 21 to 14
7 to 0
26.875
4 to 7
10.625
1
to 14
5.25
Given these average pick-ups, we can simply add them up and then add them to the
current number of bookings to get the forecast for the May 14* flight, 21 days before
departure. It is also possible to include a measure of the standard deviation, to get an
idea of the spread of the distribution.
Therefore, overall, our forecast for the May 14th flight is 49.75, as we already have 7
bookings on hand 21 days before departure.
L'Heureux18 at the 2 6th AGIFORS meeting in 1986 developed a more general
method involving weighting of observations. The advantages of this modified pick-
up model include the possibility of placing more weight on the most recent flights
and taking into account the most current available data. Therefore, the impact of odd
flights on the forecast is reduced. However, this method is more subject to odd
periods of booking activity. Overall, the basic method and the more sophisticated
ones lead to similar amounts of error.
We stress here that PODS only uses the simplest version of this general formulation
of the Pick-up algorithm. PODS only averages pick-ups over departed flights to
evaluate the pick-up for a certain period of time. Unlike this more complicated
18 L'Heureux, Ed, A New Twist in Forecasting Short-term Passenger Pickup, 26* AGIFORS Symposium,
October 1996
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formulation, PODS does not take current flights into consideration and does not
weigh the flights in any way.
2.2.1.a Important Note
There are a number of assumptions that were made in the example that should be
discussed briefly here. First of all, we used only data on flights from the same day of
week. Indeed, it is crucial to keep in mind that different day of the week demands
behave differently and that this should be taken into consideration when forecasting
demand. Moreover, there also is the problem of seasonality that, even if it is not very
important for leisure passengers, has a heavy influence on business traffic. Hence,
we must be very careful when it comes to building our historical database for the
forecast. Too many flights will lead to seasonality problems, and too few will have
too low a correlation.
Because PODS was designed as a stationary process, it does not account for
seasonality issues or the like. Hence, there are no such issues to be taken into
consideration when using forecasting in the software. PODS uses data from 26
previous flights. It was chosen to use 26 data points in order to combine good
reliability with realism. Indeed, too few data points would not allow for a robust
forecast while too many would make it impossible to realistically encompass
seasonality issues and the like, were we to apply this method in the real world.
2.2.2 Regression Forecasting
Regression forecasting uses the straightforward technique of least-square regression.
In this case, after detruncation methods have been applied to the closed observations,
the forecaster then comes into play and uses the observations to forecast demand on
future flights.
Unlike pick-up forecasting, however, this method uses only flights that have
departed to forecast future flights.
The method tries to relate the number of bookings accumulated at a given point in
time for a given flight to the final bookings. The basic mathematical formula used in
this method is the following:
X ,= n +nJ F,i-n En
Where
e XF,i is the total number of bookings after time frame i,
e n is the number of time frames over which the model is calculated,
" an and p are the intercept and slope of the linear regression model for time
period i, and,
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* en is the error in the model.
We will not get into the details of this method since we are not using it in our
analyses, but the reader can refer to Zickus9 for more detail.
2.3 Objective of Detruncation and Forecasting
To summarize this chapter discussion of detruncation and forecasting, we will
concentrate on the benefits obtained from detruncation and forecasting in the field of
Revenue Management.
Besides the obvious use of being able to forecast demand for a given flight on a
certain day of the week, at a certain time of day and during a specific season, there
are a number of benefits that can be obtained, in the airline industry, from these
detruncation and forecasting techniques. Moreover, it is clear that better forecasting
will allow the airlines to better match their available capacity to the observed
demand, and therefore increase their profits, as we will discuss in the following
chapters. In particular, it has been established by Lee'9 in 1990 that a 10 percent
increase in the forecast accuracy can bring a 10 to 60 million-dollar increase in
annual revenue for a major US airline. Overall, Lee's' 9 conclusion is that forecasting
accuracy is extremely important and all the more important as the demand increases.
19 Lee, Anthony 0., Airline Reservations Forecasting - Probabilistic and Statistical Models of the Booking
Process, September 1990
56
Chapter 3: Sell-up
The goal of this thesis is to explain how accounting for sell-up in airline Revenue
Management can lead to increased revenues for the airline, and how this influences
the competitor's revenues. Before we get into any results, let us first explain what
sell-up is.
Let us consider a passenger who wants to travel from city A to city B on a given day
and at a given time. This passengers calls the airline, or his travel agent and requests
a seat on this particular flight (typically, a passenger will call the airline and give his
(her) time window and let the reservation agents give him the corresponding
schedule), within a given price range. Assuming that there are no seats available
within the passenger's price range, he (she) then has the following possibilities:
e Try another flight in the same market, at his desired price or fare class.
* Try another flight in the same market, in his desired fare class, but on a
different airline.
" Cancel his (her) travel plans.
* Decide to pay more money for the same flight and inquire about the next
higher fare class.
As the reader recalls from the introduction, this final behavior is what we referred to
as sell-up. Depending on this passenger's time and price sensitivity, he (she) may
decide to sell-up or not.
3.1 Understanding the Mechanisms Involved
In this paragraph, we will explain why it is reasonable to expect some passengers to
be willing to sell-up and why sell-up occurs. In particular we will examine passenger
behavior as it is generally modeled in the airline industry. We will then very briefly
talk about pricing schemes that relate to this notion of sell-up and discuss how one
could monitor the occurrence of sell-up in the real world.
In her 1990 Master's thesis, Bohutinsky points out that sell-up can be viewed not
only as a behavior of passengers but also as a means of increasing airline revenues.
Indeed, when a passenger is denied his or her first choice of fare class, the
reservation agent will always try to offer a satisfactory alternative. Among these
20 Bohutinsky, Catherine H., The Sell-up Potential of Airline Demand, 1990
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alternatives, there often is the possibility for the passenger to pay a higher price and
book a seat on the flight he or she was originally targeting. Should the passenger
accept this alternative, the airline increases its revenues by the fare difference. In
reality, what happened is that the passenger was spilled from his or her original
choice to be immediately recaptured by the same airline in another fare class or on a
different path from the origin to the destination city. In all cases, this is to the benefit
of the airline that either:
* Increased its revenues by selling a more expensive ticket to the passenger in a
higher class on the same flight, or,
e Increased its revenues by selling a seat on another flight (if the Revenue
Management system works well, the airline should be expecting to sell all other
high fare seats on the original flight as it denied access to this passenger).
In this view, it is undoubtedly beneficial to try and push all passengers willing to
sell-up to a higher fare class. Therefore, it becomes interesting to evaluate the sell-up
rate, that is, the percentage of people who are willing to sell-up. The Air Transport
Committee of the Canadian Transport Commission (CTC) performed a direct
survey of domestic (Canadian) scheduled passengers using deeply discounted
fares21 . The survey asked these passengers what they would have done if their fare
had not been available. Even though this survey did not focus on a specific airline, it
provided insight on passenger behavior and the probability of sell-up.
As Bohutinsky20 states, the best way to estimate sell-up would be to directly
monitor reservation calls. In doing so, the airlines could observe passenger behavior
and record choices as different alternatives are offered to the passengers. Moreover,
since airlines today try to reduce the number of tickets purchased through travel
agents, this method could prove useful. However, monitoring all reservation calls
would be very costly in terms of time and resources. Moreover, this method could
also prove very unreliable, as many passengers tend to make multiple reservations on
different carriers in order to compare offers and then cancel the alternatives that do
not satisfy them.
Overall, it is clear that there is revenue to be gained from better understanding the
sell-up phenomenon but also the risk of losing revenue if the probability of sell-up is
not correctly estimated. Bohutinsky 20 provides more detail regarding the possible
revenue gains or revenue impact difference of accounting for sell-up.
3.1.1 Passenger Behavior: Leisure vs. Business
The phenomenon of sell-up is closely related to the differences among passenger
types. Indeed, different passengers have different behaviors and these behaviors
include the possibility of sell-up in different ways. Therefore, to better understand
the sell-up phenomenon, we need to describe the different passenger types.
2 Canadian Transport Commission, Low-Priced Air Fare Review; The First Five Years, Report No. 1983/05E,
November 1983.
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It is generally agreed in the airline industry that there are two basic types of
passengers that travel today:
e Business passengers who are extremely time-sensitive and do not care about how
much money they will pay for a flight as they generally do not pay for the ticket
themselves. In addition, these passengers have very tight time constraints and
desire complete flexibility of schedule.
" Leisure passengers, who, on the other hand, are often willing to modify their plans
to take advantage of cheaper flights and special fares. Unlike business passengers,
they are much more sensitive to price but are willing to consider more options as
far as flights are concerned and are willing to alter their plans to reduce their
fares.
In order to take this into consideration in PODS, the input parameters of the
simulator (namely the booking curves and the restrictions) were determined to try
and match the characteristics of each passenger type. For example, each restriction is
given a disutility that is a cost associated with the restriction. These costs are specific
to each restriction, but also to each passenger type. Moreover, the booking patterns
of each passenger type are specified as inputs to PODS, to reflect the differences
between these two passenger types. These booking curves, derived from actual
airline data are shown on Figure 11.
Figure 11: Booking Curves by Passenger Type
Booking Curves
0.9
W!A 0.8
0.7
0.6 -4--Leisure
0.5 Passengers
-- Business
0.4 Passengers
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
60 50 40 30 20 10 0
Days Before Departure
As can be seen on the previous curves, there is a major difference between leisure
and business passengers in the booking pattern. Indeed, leisure passengers book
early and, for example, thirty days before departure, more than fifty percent of the
leisure passengers have requested their flight. However, only about thirty percent of
business passengers have already made booking requests thirty days before
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departure. As we get closer to departure, the business curve slope increases while the
leisure curve tapers to 100%.
This first fundamental notion points out two types of passengers, among which
business passengers are the more likely to sell-up to a higher class, should they be
told that their first choice is unavailable or sold out.
3.1.2 Maximum Willingness-to-Pay
The notion of maximum Willingness-to-Pay (WTP) is very important to the
Belobaba-Weatherford (see 3.3 below) sell-up Heuristic. Indeed, it allows the
user to estimate the probability that a passenger will agree to sell-up. The maximum
WTP is the maximum price a passenger is willing to pay to board a plane. The idea
behind any economic model, including Revenue Management, is to get each
passenger to pay his (her) maximum price. Obviously, this form of price
discrimination, also known as first-degree price discrimination, is almost never
achieved, and clearly not in the airline industry.
There exist two other forms of price discrimination, according to economic theory.
Second-degree price discrimination occurs when the willingness to pay of a
customer decreases with the amount of goods he (she) buys. Hence, this theory
offers lower prices as quantity increases. Evidently, this second approach of price
discrimination is quite difficult to apply in the airline industry, as a passenger rarely
buys more than one ticket at a time. However, in dealing with large business
companies, the airlines may decide to adopt this behavior. The third theory assumes
that there are two (or more) types of customers that are willing to pay a different
price for the same product.
It is not our purpose here to get into the pros and cons of each approach and what
should be used by the airlines in general. However, this quick analysis of the three
price-discrimination theories allows us to conclude that the model that is often used
by the airlines is a mixture of first and third degree price discrimination. Indeed,
airlines try to segregate demand according to willingness-to-pay, hence the business
vs. leisure separation, and then price their products differently depending on
differentiation in service quality.
Overall, the underlying idea in Revenue Management is to try and find the maximum
WTP of each passenger and then try to have this passenger pay the fare that is closer
to this WTP. Therefore, accounting for the possibility of sell-up is a way to adjust for
each passenger's willingness-to-pay and hopefully increase the overall revenues of
the airline.
3.2 Bohutinsky2"'s Study
Bohutinsky (20) analyzed the effects of premature fare class closure, that is, the
closure of a fare class before the final authorized booking day in this fare class. She
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focused the analysis on the sell-up phenomenon and used her observations to draw
very important conclusions regarding sell-up.
First of all, sell-up depends on demand: The higher the demand for a flight, the
greater the probability that sell-up will occur. This result seems very logical and
reasonable, and is confirmed by the fact that the higher the demand the more likely
lower classes will be closed down by the Revenue Management system, and
therefore the more likely passengers are to be willing to travel at a higher fare.
Second, the sell-up rate among higher fare classes appears to be higher. This result
again seems very reasonable, as one would expect high yield passengers (primarily
business) to have a higher willingness-to-pay.
Finally, she noted that a very competitive market may bring a totally different result
than sell-up. Indeed, in that case passengers who could not be accommodated by
their first choice airline could, and often would fly the competition rather than sell-
up.
Regardless of the new variables such as frequent flyer programs that may have an
impact on the findings of Bohutinsky's study20 , it nonetheless documents the
existence of sell-up and supports the relevance of this thesis.
3.3 The Belobaba-Weatherford Heuristic22
In 1996, Belobaba and Weatherford developed a sell-up algorithm to be used with
EMSRb algorithms (therefore directly applicable to GVN and DAVN which both
use EMSRb) and, later with all the Revenue Management schemes. We will briefly
introduce this heuristic in the following paragraphs, but the reader is referred to
Charania2 3 for more detailed explanations regarding sell-up and all the algorithms
that are currently used.
This heuristic is based upon the use of a decision tree for each passenger. At each
step, the passenger decides whether he (she) will sell-up or not. To better understand
the mechanisms of the heuristic, we give the example of a two-class flight. In this
case, the added protection to the previously determined EMSRb protection is
determined according to the following formula:
EMSRb(S2 +V)x (1- p)+ p x f = f 2
In this formula, S12 is the protection for class 1 from class 2,
V 12 is the additional protection obtained through the heuristic,
p is the probability of sell-up,
fi and f2 are the fares for classes 1 and 2.
22 Belobaba, P.P.,Weatherford, L.R., Comparing Decision Rules that Incorporate Customer Diversion in
Perishable Asset Revenue Management Situations, Decision Sciences, Volume 27, Spring 1996
23 Charania, Aamer, Incorporating Sell-up in Airline Revenue Management, June 1998
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This formula then leads to the more general formula below:
Rn+I - R x SUn+1,n
P() R (1 -
Where P(mn) is the probability of selling the tnoth seat in class n or higher,
T, is the protection level for class 1 to n,
R1,n is the weighed average revenue for classes 1 to n,
R n.1 is the revenue from class immediately lower to class n,
SU,. 1,, is the probability of sell-up from class n+1 to n.
This model was tested under two different scenarios and was shown to lead to
simulated additional gains of about 2% in revenues over the basic EMSRb algorithm
revenues.
A brief analysis of the heuristic shows us that the protection level depends on the
fare ratio of one class to the next, the sell-up rate and the demand distribution of the
higher fare class. However, it should be pointed out here that this heuristic does not
take into consideration the lower-fare demand distribution. This is a striking point
that comes from the fact that the algorithm does not estimate the sell-up rate itself,
but only uses a value input by the user. Hence, in this algorithm, it is critical that the
estimation of the sell-up rate be very good. Otherwise, the protection levels may be
far from the actual number of bookings. Another aspect related to this omission is
that the higher the demand, the greater the probability of spill in the lower fare
classes and therefore the greater the probability of sell-up. However, this heuristic
suggests that sell-up is not a function of spill, or at least that if it is, sell-up should be
estimated by the airline on a flight-by-flight basis.
Nonetheless, we use this heuristic in all our analyses in this thesis, and base all our
conclusions on this model, as it was shown to be beneficial on the one hand and, on
the other hand, because it is a simple heuristic.
3.4 Another Sell-up Algorithm: Brumelle et al 24
Brumelle et al.2 developed a decision rule for a two-class example that assumes
that the demands in both fare classes are not independent. The underlying idea in this
study is that a portion of the lower class passengers that are denied boarding will
sell-up to the higher class, thereby increasing demand for the higher class. The
algorithm used to then determine booking limits is essentially the same as EMSRb
other than the fact that it allows for the two demands to be dependent. Without
getting into details, this algorithm then includes factors to account for the possibility
of sell-up with this interdependence of demand across both classes. However, this
algorithm is very difficult to use in any but a two-class case, hence making it
24 Brumelle, S.L., McGill, JI., Oum, T.H., Sawaki, K., Tretheway, M.W., Allocation of Airline Seats between
Stochastically Dependent Demands, Transportation Science, Volume 24, 1990
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difficult if not impossible to use in the "real world". Indeed, when using more than
two classes, the interdependent demands quickly make it impossible to solve the
problem. A more detailed explanation of the mechanisms of the algorithm can be
found in Charania's work23
The authors provide a suggestion, as how to tackle the problem when there are more
than two fare classes involved. In the end, the algorithm they come up with closely
resembles the Belobaba-Weatherford heuristic.
3.5 Objectives of Sell-up
The primary objective of accounting for sell-up in Revenue Management algorithms
is, as we stated earlier in this chapter, to increase revenues for the airline taking this
into consideration. The questions that we will try to answer in the following
simulation results are (1) how does accounting for sell-up in the Revenue
Management optimization algorithm lead to revenue increases, and, (2) what are the
benefits that can be gained from accounting for sell-up, depending on what the
competing airline does.
To the first question, we already have an idea of the answer: if accounting for sell-up
does indeed lead to revenue increases, it is by better understanding the passengers'
behavior. Indeed, as Bohutinsky suggests in her research, passengers do sell-up in
certain situations. Then, by using the Belobaba-Weatherford2 2 heuristic in the
EMSRb algorithm, we are able to adjust our protections to account for this
possibility. In all likelihood, better matching the Revenue Management algorithm to
the actual passenger behavior has to bring revenue benefits.
The second question remains unanswered at this point of the thesis and must be
answered through simulation, which will be the subject of the second part of the
thesis. We will analyze how the revenues of the airline that is accounting for sell-up
change, how they are affected by overestimating the sell-up rate, how they increase
when the sell-up rate is well matched to passenger behavior, and more.
The next chapters present the simulation we ran in order to analyze the effect of sell-
up with PODS and what our results showed. In particular, we look at the revenue
impacts of the Belobaba-Weatherford heuristic on a Fare Class Yield management
algorithm (EMSRb) and a simple O-D based algorithm (GVN), depending on the
sell-up rates and detruncation method used. We show that, as expected, there are
revenues to be gained from these improvements to the revenue management
algorithms.
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PART II: SIMULATION AND RESULTS
In Part Two of this thesis, we will present our findings regarding the influence of
sell-up models and forecasting (more specifically detruncation), on the revenues of
the airline. This second part of the thesis will be divided into three major chapters,
Chapters Four through Six. Chapter Four will present the findings for a traditional
Fare Class Yield Management (FCYM) environment, which is the still the most
common in the airline industry today. Chapter Five will focus on the virtual bucket
environment. At this point, we will have a good idea of the gains that can be
achieved through sell-up models and detruncation modifications. Finally, in Chapter
Six, we will compare these results to the gains that were previously obtained through
O-D Revenue Management algorithms. In addition, we will try to validate these
results in a larger network and study the influence of multiple path choices on the
gains obtained by accounting for sell-up.
We find it important to add here that we recognize that we do not fully address in
this thesis the question of which is the "best" input sell-up rate. We focus on the
influence of sell-up models added to Revenue Management algorithms in terms of
revenue gains, but, even though we look for good estimates of the sell-up rates, this
is not our primary concern. In addition, as shown in Part II, Chapter Four the "best"
input sell-up rates are chosen after trying a few combinations. In the "real" airline
world, it would be necessary to find a way to estimate these sell-up rates and not
guess what they are, as this can lead to revenue losses as shown later.
Before we start presenting our results, we would like to introduce what we will be
referring to in the remainder of the thesis as the "base case". The following
paragraphs will give a brief description of the base case in addition to a few results
regarding the airlines' revenues.
Base Case
Before we can talk about the simulations themselves, we must introduce a "base
case". This "base case" will be used throughout the thesis as our point of reference
and comparison. Our base case was chosen to reflect what is currently assumed to be
the standard Revenue Management system used in the airline industry. It has been
applied and tested by many airlines, as far as the Revenue Management method and
the forecasting methods are concerned.
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The simulation network itself is, as we will explain in the following paragraph, the
small network 6B that has proven to have very robust simulation results.
Specifications of Our Base Case
Our base cases is set up as follows:
e Both airlines use the leg-based, fare class, EMSRb Revenue Management
algorithm. This algorithm, as we discussed earlier in this thesis, is representative
of the standard Fare Class Yield Management method used in the airline industry.
* Both airlines use Booking Curve detruncation in association with Pick-up
forecasting. The reader is referred to previous chapters for descriptions of both
Booking Curve detruncation and Pick-up forecasting.
e The network we are running is network 6B. Briefly, Network 6B is a competitive
network where each airline operates a hub operation with the same 6 spoke cities
at different distances from the hubs. The network is set up to be perfectly
symmetric so that neither of the airlines has a schedule-based competitive
advantage. The cities lie at distances ranging from 500 to 2000 miles from the
hub, which allows for O-D paths with lengths ranging from 500 to 3500 miles.
Once again, the purpose of this short chapter is to define what we will be referring to
as our base case in the following chapters. Most of the results shown in the following
sections will be compared to this base case, unless specifically mentioned otherwise.
The, base case revenues and network load factors are shown on Table 12. The reader
is referred to Lee for more detailed results regarding the base case.
Table 12: Base Case Results at all Tested Demand Factors
Airline A Airline B |
DF Revenue ALF Revenue ALF
0.8[1 $189,813.00 67.40% $189,703.00 67.34%
1.0 $226,954.00 75.78% $226,952.00 75.75%
1.2 $259,762.00 79.99% $260,029.00 80.05%
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Chapter 4: Sell-up and Detruncation in a Fare Class
Yield Management (FCYM) Environment
As we explained earlier, we will focus in this chapter on the impact of sell-up and
detruncation on the Fare Class Yield Management environment, that is, EMSRb
control. This chapter will be divided into two parts: The first part will focus on the
impact of the sell-up heuristic in a "basic" detruncation environment, i.e. when the
airlines are using booking curve detruncation. In addition, this first part will also
allow us to set the basis for input sell-up rates, that is, the sell-up rates we estimate as
the closest match to the simulated sell-up rates (that are independent of our input, in
this thesis and this set of simulations). The second part will then focus on the joint
effect of sell-up models and the more aggressive Projection detruncation. We will
then try to explain how each change affects revenues and how.
The idea behind this first chapter is to determine the gains that can be achieved by
the airline accounting for sell-up in a Fare Class Yield Management environment.
Our goal here is first to assess the potential network revenue gains that can be
achieved by making modifications to an existing Fare Class Yield Management
optimizer.
4.1 Booking C u rve Detruncation
Throughout this chapter, we focus on the gains obtained by the airlines when one
airline, or both, accounts for the possibility of sell-up. The only change from the base
case lies in the fact that one of the competitors, or both, has the possibility to include
in its Revenue Management optimizer the Belobaba-Weatherford Sell-up
heuristic. We will show in the following paragraphs that the outcome of this change
is that accounting for sell-up leads to revenue gains for the airline(s) implementing
the change. Moreover, we will explain the reasons for these gains.
The reader is reminded that PODS is set up in our simulations to be perfectly
symmetric for both airlines (A and B), as there are no preference factors input in the
simulator. Therefore, all the results that we obtain for airline A can be easily
transposed to airline B (if airline B is using the same Revenue Management method,
the same detruncation and forecasting method, etc.).
4.1.1 Airline A Only Accounts for Sell-up
In this case, we run simulations for several demand factors where airline A is the one
accounting for sell-up and we then analyze the results. The EMSRb sell-up heuristic
requires us to input the sell-up rate from one class to the next higher classes. We
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must then try to evaluate as well as possible the "actual" sell-up rate. Hence, we have
the possibility to input a constant sell-up rate throughout the fare classes or to input a
differential sell-up rate, as suggested by Bohutinsky's20 analysis.
4.1.1.a Results
Gains as a Fu n ction of Sell-up Rate and Demand Factor
The first step in our analysis is to try various sell-up rates in the EMSRb heuristic
and see what happens to revenues for both airlines, but more importantly for airline
A, the airline implementing the change. Our goal in this section is to find the "best"
input sell-up rates: The sell-up rates that lead to the highest revenue gains.
Constant Sell-u p Rates
It turns out that revenues for airline A increase as we start inputting even low
constant sell-up rates. However, as the sell-up rate increases above 30 percent, the
algorithm "explodes" and leads to tremendous overprotection for high fare class
seats. As the mathematical formula shows, as soon as the sell-up rate p exceeds the
adjusted-fare ratio between two consecutive fare classes (the reader will recall that
the protections from EMSRb are computed after taking a weighed average of each
fare), the algorithm leads to infinite protection for the higher of the two classes.
Therefore, the resulting protections do not make any sense. The conclusion of this
first analysis of the sell-up algorithm is that the algorithm is very sensitive to
demand forecasts and fare ratios. Hence, high input sell-up rates must be used with
extreme caution.
Table 13: Revenue Gains as a Function of Constant Sell-up Rate and Demand
Factor
Airline A Airline B
Absolute Percentage Absolute Percentage
Revenue Revenue Revenue Revenue
Gain over Gain over Gain over Gain over
DF Sell-up Rate Revenue Base Base Revenue Base Base
0.8 0% $189,813.00 $0.00 $189,703.00 $0.00
10% $190,224.00 $411.00 0.217% $189,500.00 -$203.00 -0.107%
15% $190,414.00 $601.00 0.317% $189,396.00 -$307.00 -0.162%
20% $190,559.00 $746.00 0.393% $189,302.00 -$401.00 -0.211%
25% $190,503.00 $690.00 0.364% $189,267.00 -$436.00 -0.230%
30% $178,200.00 -$11,613.00 -6.118% $193,967.00 $4,264.00 2.246%
1 0% $226,954.00 $0.00 $226,952.00 $0.00
10% $228,028.00 $1,074.00 0.473% $226,315.00 -$637.00 -0.281%
15% $228,508.00 $1,554.00 0.685% $226,006.00 -$946.00 -0.417%
20% $228,846.00 $1,892.00 0.834% $225,731.00 -$1,221.00 -0.538%
25% $228,807.00 $1,853.00 0.816% $225,526.00 -$1,426.00 -0.628%
30% $217,067.00 -$9,887.00 -4.356% $228,493.00 $1,541.00 0.679%
1.2 0% $259,762.00 $0.00 0.000% $260,029.00 $0.00
10% $261,299.00 $1,537.00 0.592% $259,114.00 -$915.00 -0.352%
15% $261,888.00 $2,126.00 0.818% $258,718.00 -$1,311.00 -0.504%
20% $262,205.00 $2,443.00 0.940% $258,423.00 -$1,606.00 -0.618%
25% $262,007.00 $2,245.00 0.864% $258,281.00 -$1,748.00 -0.672%
30% $248,698.00 -$11,064.00 -4.259% $260,965.00 $936.00 0.360%
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Table 13 shows that revenues gradually increase with the assumed sell-up rate for
airline A, as stated earlier. Moreover, the peak revenue gain is reached at 20 percent
assumed sell-up, independent of the demand factor. As soon as the input sell-up rate
exceeds 20 percent, we start seeing lower revenue gains, up to the point when
revenues start dropping below the base value. In particular, at 30 percent assumed
sell-up, all three cases show considerable revenue losses. On the other hand,
revenues increase by as much as 0.94 percent when the airline accounts for sell-up
with 20 percent sell-up assumed. Moreover, as one would expect, the higher the
demand factor, the larger the revenue gains, and the larger the percentage revenue
gain. We will explain the reasons for this in the following chapters.
On the other hand, airline B, which is not accounting for the possibility of sell-up at
this point, suffers from increasing losses as the sell-up rate assumed by airline A
increases to 20 percent but, unlike airline A, its revenues continue to drop at 25
percent sell-up and only recover at 30 percent sell-up. Airline B's revenues vary with
the sell-up rate assumed by airline A. In summary, airline B experiences the opposite
gains and losses than airline A. However, it is interesting to note that at 25 percent
assumed sell-up rate by airline A, the revenues for airline A are beginning to
decrease while the revenues for B continue dropping. The reason for this is that
airline A is now beginning to overprotect its high classes, while the Belobaba-
Weatherford2 2 heuristic has not yet "blown up". Therefore, airline B, which is not
protecting enough high class fares, ends up booking low fare leisure passengers that
are spilled by A. Hence, B fills up with low fare passengers even faster than at 20
percent assumed sell-up (by airline A), and its revenues drop. At the same time,
airline A is flying empty seats as it overprotected for Y and B passengers and its
revenues begin decreasing.
In summary, when only airline A is accounting for sell-up, it achieves the greatest
revenue gains at a constant assumed sell-up rate of 20 percent, regardless of the
demand factor. Moreover, revenue gains range from 0.4% to almost 1%, depending
on the demand factor.
Differential S e li-up Rate
At this point, we have tested constant sell-up rates applied to each pair of adjacent
fare classes. According to Bohutinsky's analysis of sell-up rates and passenger
behaviors, it is more likely that business passengers have a higher probability of
selling up to a higher fare class. Therefore, we need to evaluate the revenue gains at
differential sell-up rates. Based on the assumption that business passengers are more
likely to sell-up, we try differential sell-up rates that are assumed to be higher for
sell-up from B to Y, lower from M to higher classes and even lower from Q to
higher classes. We therefore tried the following input sell-up rates to the EMSRb
sell-up heuristic (See Table 14):
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Table 14: Differential Sell-up Rates
These "differential Sell-up rates" reflect the notion that business passengers are more
likely to sell up, as the sell-up rates for higher fare classes are higher. The simulation
runs show that revenues attain their highest level in the third case shown on Table
14, that is for a differential set of sell-up rates of 20%, 30% and 45% per fare class,
respectively for class Q, M and B. The results are shown in Table 15.
Once again, we observe exactly the same pattern as with constant assumed sell-up
rates. As soon as the fare ratios exceed the input sell-up rate, the algorithm
"explodes". Moreover, as we adjust the input sell-up rates for each fare class, we
increase the revenue gains for airline A, while airline B's revenues decrease. In
addition, when we exceed the "best" input sell-up rate for airline A without reaching
the feasibility limit for the heuristic, airline A's revenues begin to decrease slowly
while airline B's revenues keep dropping for the reasons explained earlier. As we
increase the input sell-up rates and eventually go beyond the algorithm's limit for
airline A, the heuristic blows up and airline B captures all the passengers spilled by
airline A, whose revenues are now substantially below the base case scenario.
Table 15: Revenue Gains as a Function of Differential Sell-up Rates and Demand
Factor
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Sell-up Rate
Case Name Q->Y,B,M M->Y,B B->Y
0.1-0.2-0.3 10% 20% 30%
0.2-0.3-0.4 20% 30% 40%
0.2-0.3-0.45 20% 30% 45%
0.25-0.35-0.45 25% 35% 45%
0.2-0.3-0.5 20% 30% 50%
Airline A Airline B
Absolute Percentage Absolute Percentage
Revenue Revenue Revenue Revenue
Gain over Gain over Gain over Gain over
DF Sell-up Rate Revenue Base Base Revenue Base Base
0.8 0.1-0.2-0.3 $190,582.00 $769.00 0.405% $189,504.00 -$199.00 -0.105%
0.2-0.3-0.4 $190,884.00 $1,071.00 0.564% $189,382.00 -$321.00 -0.169%
0.2-0,3-0,45 $190,948.00 $1,135.00 0.598% $189,575.00 -$128.00 -0.067%
0.25-0.35-0.45 $190,645.00 $832.00 0.438% $189,447.00 -$256.00 -0.135%
0.2-0.3-0.5 $147,846.00 -$41,967.00 -22.110% $209,927.00 $20,224.00 10.655%
1.0 0.1-0.2-0.3 $228,895.00 $1,941.00 0.855% $226,397.00 -$555.00 -0.245%
0.2-0.3-0.4 $229,545.00 $2,591.00 1.142% $225,998.00 -$954.00 -0.420%
0.2-0,3-0,45 $229,593.00 $2,639.00 1.163% $226,540.00 -$412.00 -0.182%
0.25-0.35-0.45 $228,699.00 $1,745.00 0.769% $226,119.00 -$833.00 -0.367%
0.2-0.3-0.5 $187,583.00 -$39,371.00 -17.348% $244,014.00 $17,062.00 7.518%
1.2 0.1-0.2-0.3 $262,878.00 $3,116.00 1.200% $259,185.00 -$844.00 -0.325%
0.2-0.3-0.4 $263,505.00 $3,743.00 1.441% $258,921.00 -$1,108.00 -0.426%
0.2-0,3-0,45 $263,596.00 $3,834.00 1.476% $259,825.00 -$204.00 -0.078%
0.25-0.35-0.45 $262,208.00 $2,446.00 0.942% $259,453.00 -$576.00 -0.222%
0.2-0.3-0.5 $227,747.00 -$32,015.00 -12.325% $274,093.00 $14,064.00 5.409%
i li  Airline B
In summary, the highest revenue gain is achieved for airline A at input differential
sell-up rates of 20%, 30% and 45% per fare class, regardless of the demand factor.
Percentage revenue gains range from 0.6% to 1.5% depending on the demand factor.
4.1.1.b Conclusion
Overall, this first analysis enabled us to determine the "best" sell-up rate in the case
when only one of the two competitors accounts for the possibility of sell-up, in a
Fare Class Yield Management environment, for our particular simulation
environment. The "best" input sell-up rates for the EMSRb heuristic happen to be 20
percent per fare class in the constant sell-up rate case, and 20%, 30% and 45% per
fare class in the differential sell-up rate case. Once again, these sell-up rates were
determined by trying a few combinations and may not be the actual absolute best
sell-up rates. They are an estimate of the actual sell-up rates that the airlines would
also try to estimate in order to incorporate sell-up models in their Revenue
Management system.
Moreover, in this first part, we explained briefly what happens when the input sell-
up rates become too high and the algorithm starts overprotecting and spilling
passengers towards the competing airline. We distinguished between the case when
airline A overprotects and when the heuristic "blows up". This points out an intuitive
but very important result: too much sell-up assumed can lead revenue losses.
We now return in more detail to what happens when one airline accounts for sell-up.
4.1.2 Understanding What Happens
In this section we will explain what happens to demand, how passengers book their
flight, and try and understand why accounting for sell-up brings revenue gains. In
particular, we will be looking at fare class loads on each leg and comparing them to
the base-case loads and to the competitor's loads.
4.1.2.a The Heuristic
First of all, it is quite obvious that when we input a sell-up rate, the Belobaba-
Weatherford heuristic increases the protection for the affected fare classes. In
particular, as the airplane's capacity does not vary, the protection increases for the
upper classes and decreases for the lower classes. The following example shows
what happens to protections when we account for sell-up in a very specific case that
is only meant to illustrate the increase in protections.
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Table 16: Influence of Sell-up Heuristic on Protections
Without Sell-up With Sell-up
Fare Avg Std Avg Std Weighted Top Down Nested Fare Top Down Nested
Class Fare Demand Dev Dev Fare Ratio Protection Protection Ratio Protection ProtectionDemand Rate
Y $ 800.00 25 10 25 10.00 0.750 18.26 100.00 0.2 0.688 20.11 100.00
B $ 400.00 25 10 50 14.14 0.833 36.32 81.74 0.2 0.792 38.51 79.89
M $ 300.00 25 10 75 17.32 0.850 57.05 45.43 0.2 0.813 59.63 41.37
Q $ 200.00 25 10 100 20.00 - 0.2 -
We see here that when we use a constant sell-up rate of 20 percent per fare class, the
protection increases by roughly two seats in all fare classes. Therefore, fewer seats
are available for low fare passengers and more will then be turned down.
4.1.2.b Loads
Second, in terms of average leg load factors and average fare class loads, we then
note that when airline A accounts for sell-up, its average leg load factors decrease
compared to when it did not account for sell-up on the one hand and are lower than
airline B's average leg load factors on the other hand (c.f. Table 17). In this section,
we will see how the sell-up rates affect loads, both for the airline accounting for sell-
up and for the airline not accounting for sell-up. The result of this analysis will show
that airline A, which is accounting for sell-up, benefits from higher loads in Y, B and
M class and lower loads in Q class but lower overall loads, increasing its revenues
when it is not spilling too many passengers.
Airline A
Figure 12 shows, at demand factor 1.0, the average leg loads by fare class depending
on the input sell-up rate, for airline A.
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Figure 12: Fare Class Loads as a Function of Input Sell-up Rate, DF 1.0
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It clearly appears on this graph that airline A benefits in terms of Y passengers when
it is accounting for sell-up. In particular, the more sophisticated the sell-up rate gets
(and hence the closer it gets to replicating actual passenger behavior), the more Y
passengers book the flights, on average. This is true even when our input sell-up
rates are too high. Similarly, the amount of B and M class passengers also increase
with the input sell-up rates, as more low fare Q class passengers are turned down
when they want to book a flight.
Q class passengers therefore decrease in number as the assumed sell-up rate
increases and eventually drop very low as shown by the last bar on the graph. This
represents what happens when we overestimate the "actual" sell-up rate. The loads in
fare classes Y, B and M are high compared to the other three cases shown here.
However, the tremendous loss in Q class passengers cannot be compensated by these
higher loads in the first three fare classes. Overall, the airline then loses revenues.
It is interesting to note here that constant input sell-up rates lead to higher loads in B
and M classes than differential input sell-up rates. However, in Y class, there are
higher loads when we input differential sell-up rates than when we assume constant
sell-up rates, and the difference is such that it outweighs the previous load
difference, in terms of revenues. Therefore, regardless of the higher loads in B and
M classes at constant assumed sell-up rates for airline A, the revenues are higher at
differential assumed sell-up rates.
Overall, we see that the loads for airline A change in nature as the assumed sell-up
rates vary. The "better" the assumed sell-up rates the more high fare passengers we
get. Moreover, in terms of average leg load factor, we note that the average leg load
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factor tends to decrease as the input sell-up rate increases for airline A, as shown in
Table 17.
Table 17: Average Leg Load Factors, D.F. 1.0
Average Leg Load Factor
Sell-up Rate Airline A Airline B
No Sell-up 75.78% 75.75%
Constant 20% 73.12% 76.33%
Constant 30% 59.73% 80.14%
Differential 71.85% 76.39%
Airline B
In this section, we will focus briefly on what happens to airline B in terms of loads.
We have previously seen that revenues for airline B drop when airline A accounts
for sell-up in this Fare Class Yield Management environment. Airline B's revenues
drop by as much as 0.6 percent. However, as can be seen in Table 13 and Table 15,
revenues for airline B are higher when airline A uses our "best" differential input
sell-up rates than when airline A uses the "best" input constant sell-up rates. Airline
A has higher gains with differential sell-up rates assumed and airline B has lower
losses. This is an unexpected result that we will explain in the following paragraphs.
Figure 13: Average Fare Class Loads for Airline B, DF 1.0
Average Fare Class Loads for Airline B, DF 1.0, Airline B
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As shown in Figure 13, as the input sell-up rates increase for airline A, the loads in Y
class decrease for airline B, as compared to our base case. This, along with a similar
decrease in loads in B class (for all cases but the differential sell-up rate case, as
shown in Figure 13), is the major cause of revenue decrease for airline B. Along with
this reduction in the number of Y and B class passengers, we note an increase in the
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number of M and Q class passengers. This can easily be explained by the fact that
airline A now spills more of these passengers. Airline B's Revenue Management
algorithm protects fewer seats for higher yield passengers and therefore allows some
of these spilled passengers to fill up its lower classes and, in turn to eat up some
space that could have been saved for Y or B class passengers. Therefore, airline B
books more M and Q class passengers as airline A begins accounting for sell-up.
As for the differential sell-up rate case, we note that the loads for airline B are higher
in B and M class than the base case and all of the other input sell-up cases. This
explains that the revenues for airline B are higher in this case then in the other sell-
up cases and explains the result that we pointed out earlier. At the same time, we
also pointed out that the revenues for airline A in this case are higher than at any
other constant input sell-up rate because we better model the consumers' behavior.
Overall, in this situation, both airlines benefit from Airline A switching to
differential input sell-up rates as opposed to constant sell-up rates assumed. Finally,
in terms of average leg load factors, Table 17 shows that, as we expected, average
loads increase for airline B as the input sell-up rates used by airline A increases and
as average leg loads decrease for airline A, which spills more passengers.
4.1.2.c Summary
In summary, we note in this first set of results that when only one airline is
accounting for sell-up, it undoubtedly benefits from this additional understanding
and modeling of passenger behavior, provided it correctly chooses the input sell-up
rates to EMSRb. In particular, we conclude that in the case where only one airline is
accounting for sell-up, the best input sell-up rate tested is a differential rate of 45%,
30% and 20% by fare class, from top down. The revenue gains for airline A ranged
from 0.4% to 1% in the case of the 20% assumed sell-up and from 0.6% to 1.5% in
the case of differential sell-up rates assumed, depending on demand factors.
Another interesting result that we noted here is that the revenue losses for the
competitor (who is not accounting for sell-up) are less when airline A uses
differential sell-up rates and maximizes its revenues. Indeed, airline B loses between
0.2% and 0.6% revenues depending on demand factor at a constant input sell-up rate
by airline A while it only loses between 0.1% and 0.2% when airline A uses
differential sell-up rates assumed.
Once again, what we focus on here is the possible benefits from accounting for sell-
up. However, we do recognize that the benefits are highly dependent on the choice
of the sell-up rates, but we do not focus, in this thesis, on how to evaluate the true
sell-up rates. Rather, we try and get a feel for the possible revenue gains, should the
airlines be able to evaluate the sell-up rates properly and use them in a sell-up model.
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4.1.3 Both Airlines Account for Sell-up
In this section, we now focus on what happens when both airlines account for sell-up
through the EMSRb heuristic. Indeed, now that we know that airline A can improve
its revenues from our base case when it accounts for sell-up, we would like to know
whether these results still hold when the competitor upgrades its Revenue
Management algorithm to account for sell-up. Our expectation, which will prove to
be true, is that both airlines should still gain from accounting for sell-up, but to a
lesser degree than when only airline A was accounting for sell-up.
4.1.3.a Results
We once again used PODS to run different types of simulations. As in the previous
section, we ran both constant and differential assumed sell-up rates. We will follow
the same structure in this section as previously: first we will examine the entire set of
results to get an idea of the magnitude of the possible gains and evaluate the "best"
input sell-up rates. We will then explain these results.
Constant Sell-u p Rates
At constant input sell-up rates used by both airlines, we see from Table 18 that
airline A and B both now achieve revenue gains over our base case. In particular, we
note that the highest revenue gains are now achieved at 15% sell-up rate assumed for
all fare classes. This makes sense as both airlines are now protecting more while
demand remains the same. They therefore split high revenue passengers evenly and
must protect fewer seats in higher fare classes. This then leads to a lower "optimal"
input sell-up rate.
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Table 18: Revenue Gains as a Function of (Constant) Input Sell-up Rate and
Demand Factor
Absolute Percentage Absolute Percentage
Revenue Revenue Revenue Revenue
Gain over Gain over Gain over Gain over
DF Sell-up Rate Revenue Base Base Revenue Base Base
0.8 0% $189,813.00 $189,703.00
10% $190,012.00 $199.00 0.105% $189,885.00 $182.00 0.096%
15% $190,062.00 $249.00 0.131% $189,940.00 $237.00 0.125%
20% $190,046.00 $233.00 0.123% $189,929.00 $226.00 0.119%
25% $189,845.00 $32.00 0.017% $189,694.00 -$9.00 -0.005%
30% $186,652.00 -$3,161.00 -1.665% $187,038.00 -$2,665.00 -1.405%
1.0 0% $226,954.00 $226,952.00
10% $227,360.00 $406.00 0.179% $227,345.00 $393.00 0.173%
15% $227,440.00 $486.00 0.214% $227,415.00 $463.00 0.204%
20% $227,347.00 $393.00 0.173% $227,340.00 $388.00 0.171%
25% $226,890.00 -$64.00 -0.028% $226,869.00 -$83.00 -0.037%
30% $223,696.00 -$3,258.00 -1.436% $223,441.00 -$3,511.00 -1.547%
1.2 0% $259,762.00 $260,029.00
10% $260,328.00 $566.00 0.218% $260,617.00 $588.00 0.226%
15% $260,427.00 $665.00 0.256% $260,722.00 $693.00 0.267%
20% $260,326.00 $564.00 0.217% $260,610.00 $581.00 0.223%
25% $259,680.00 -$82.00 -0.032% $260,085.00 $56.00 0.022%
30% $255,444.00 -$4,318.00 -1.662% $253,378.00 -$6,651.00 -2.558%
Another interesting point here is that the revenue gains have now dropped from what
we previously observed when only airline A accounted for sell-up. We now get
revenue gains between 0.1% and 0.3% depending on the demand factor (compared
to 0.4% to 1%).
Overall, at constant input sell-up rates, when both airlines account for sell-up, the
greatest revenue gain is achieved at a lower input sell-up rate than when only one
airline was accounting for sell-up. In addition, the percentage revenue gain is
smaller. However, the important point of this analysis is that in this case, both
airlines are now better off than when neither airline was accounting for sell-up.
Differential S e li-up Rates
In this section, we once again focus on the influence of differential sell-up rates
assumed on revenue gains, or losses, for both airlines. Once again, we use
Bohutinsky's analysis to justify our choice of differential sell-up rates assumed as a
potentially revenue generating approach to modifying the EMSRb algorithm to
account for sell-up. Once again, we try various input sell-up rates (in the heuristic)
and compare the performance of both airlines under these assumed sell-up conditions
in terms of revenues to our base case. The results of our simulation are shown in
Table 19. The notation for each case is the same as the one described in the previous
section.
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Airline A Airline B
Table 19: Revenue Gains as a Function of (Differential) Input Sell-up Rate and
Demand Factor
Airline A Airline B
Absolute Percentage Absolute Percentage
Revenue Revenue Revenue Revenue
Gain over Gain over Gain over Gain over
In this case, we see that the greatest gain is reached at the same input sell-up rates as
previously, that is, at 45%, 30% and 20% assumed sell-up rate per fare class, from
top down at all demand factors. This tends to indicate that this combination of input
sell-up rates matches rather well the actual behavior of passengers.
The first obvious observation is that we now achieve lower revenue gains compared
to our previous case when only airline A was accounting for sell-up. Indeed, revenue
gains have now dropped to 0.4% to 1.1% from 0.6% to 1.5% depending on demand
factor.
Once again, this result was to be expected as both airlines become more aggressive
in protecting seats for high yield passengers and therefore have to share the
additional sell-up revenues evenly between them, which was not the case when only
airline A was accounting for sell-up.
It is also interesting to note here that the gap between the gains achieved with
constant input sell-up rates and differential input sell-up rates has now increased as
compared to when only airline A was accounting for sell-up. Switching to
differential sell-up rates assumed now increases gains by as much as 0.8% while the
difference was about 0.4% when only airline A was accounting for sell-up. Overall,
we see that differential sell-up rates assumed are clearly the more beneficial way for
the airlines to be accounting for sell-up when both airlines do so, in terms of revenue
generation.
4.1.3.b Explaining the Results
In this section, we will be looking at loads to explain the revenue gains for both
airlines. At this point, given our previous analysis of loads when only airline A
accounts for sell-up, we expect to see similar trends. As for the booking limits and
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DF Sell-up Rate Revenue I Base Base Revenue I Base Base
0.8 0.1-0.2-0.3 $190,333.00 $520.00 0.274% $190,232.00 $529.00 0.279%
0.2-0.3-0.4 $190,362.00 $549.00 0.289% $190,258.00 $555.00 0.293%
0.2-0,3-0,45 $190,598.00 $785.00 0.414% $190,476.00 $773.00 0.407%
0.2-0.3-0.5 $167,631.00 -$22,182.00 -11.686% $163,773.00 -$25,930.00 -13.669%
1.0 0.1-0.2-0.3 $228,165.00 $1,211.00 0.534% $228,209.00 $1,257.00 0.554%
0.2-0.3-0.4 $228,058.00 $1,104.00 0.486% $228,104.00 $1,152.00 0.508%
0.2-0,3-0,45 $228,592.00 $1,638.00 0.722% $228,613.00 $1,661.00 0.732%
0.2-0.3-0.5 $211,300.00 -$15,654.00 -6.897% $202,613.00 -$24,339.00 -10.724%
1.2 0.1-0.2-0.3 $261,773.00 $2,011.00 0.774% $262,016.00 $1,987.00 0.764%
0.2-0.3-0.4 $261,602.00 $1,840.00 0.708% $261,933.00 $1,904.00 0.732%
0.2-0,3-0,45 $262,584.00 $2,822.00 1.086% $262,942.00 $2,913.00 1.120%
0.2-0.3-0.5 $248,038.00 -$11,724.00 -4.513% $243,591.00 -$16,438.00 -6.322%
I
the effect of the heuristic on protections, the reader is referred to Part I, Chapter 3.3
above for more detail.
Comparison w ith Base Case Loads
Let us first of all see how the loads for airline A and B (they are very similar, as both
airlines account for sell-up) change from base and as a function of the input sell-up
rates.
Figure 14: Average Fare Class Loads, DF 1.0
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Figure 14 clearly shows what we expected: Differential input sell-up rates allow for
more Y-class passengers to fly, on average, thus increasing revenues. At the same
.time, these differential sell-up rates reduce the protection in lower fare classes.
Therefore, we see that the differential sell-up case has lower bookings, on average,
in B, M and Q classes. This difference is clearly compensated by the gain in Y class
passengers.
Figure 14 also enables us to explain why the revenues at 20% input sell-up rates are
lower than at 15% input sell-up rates. Indeed, the graph shows that the loads in Y, B
and M class are higher for 20% sell-up rate assumed. However, the loads in Q class
are substantially lower at this higher sell-up rate, and this is not compensated by the
slightly higher loads in all three higher fare classes. Overall, the airlines have lower
revenue gains at these higher input sell-up rates.
Finally, in terms of average leg load factors, we note that as the input sell-up rates
generate more revenues, the average load factor decreases and that both airlines have
essentially the same load factors (for symmetry reasons, as shown in Table 20).
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These average loads are higher than when only airline A was accounting for sell-up,
at differential sell-up rates assumed, as both airlines now protect more for the higher
fare classes and force more passengers to sell up.
Table 20: Average Leg Load Factors, DF 1.0
Comparison w ith Loads when Only Airline A Accounts for Sell-up
In this section, we focus on the
account for sell-up and only one
the load charts to determine how
A.
differences between the case when both airlines
airline accounts for sell-up. We will therefore use
loads change from one case to the next for airline
Figure 15: Loads for Airline A as a Function of Competitive Response, DF 1.0
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We see on this chart that when only airline A is accounting for sell-up, its loads are
the highest in Y class, but the lowest of all three cases in the other three classes. Yet,
airline A then has the highest absolute revenues of all. This is due to the fact that the
loads are high in Y class and comparatively not "too" low in the other three fare
classes.
When both airlines are accounting for sell-up, the loads for airline A (and B) are
high in Y, B and M classes and lower in Q class. This leads to higher revenues than
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Average Leg Load Factor
Sell-up Rate Airline A Airline B
No Sell-up 75.78% 75.75%
Constant 15% 74.44% 74.43%
Constant 20% 73.66% 73.63%
Differential 72.79% 72.71%
the base case and yet lower than in the case when only airline A accounts for sell-up.
Indeed, both airlines now have to compete equally for high yield passengers.
Therefore, loads are higher in the intermediate classes and slightly lower in Y class
than when only airline A was accounting for sell-up. However, all these loads (Y, B
and M) are higher than for the base case. Overall, this leads to the situation we have
been describing earlier.
Finally, we observe here that the major difference in both cases with the base case is
that the loads in Y class are higher.
In terms of average leg load factors, we show in Table 21 that the average leg load
factor increases for airline A when both airlines account for sell-up and assume
differential sell-up rates (compared to when only airline A was accounting for sell-
up). This can be explained by the fact that both airlines are now protecting more in
the higher classes and therefore forcing more passengers to sell up. For airline B,
however, the average leg load factor decreases, which again is natural, as airline B is
now protecting more for higher fare passengers and spilling more low fare
passengers.
Table 21: Comparison in Average Leg Load Factors, DF 1.0
Average Leg Load Factor
Airline A with Sell-up Airline A with Sell-up
vs. B no Sell-up vs. B with Sell-up
Sell-up Rate Airline A Airline B Airline A Airline B
No Sell-up 75.78% 75.75% 75.78% 75.75%
Differential 71.85% 76.39% 72.79% 72.71%
4.1.4 Conclusion
We conclude from this first set of results that there is clearly revenue to be gained
from accounting for sell-up whether the competitor does the same or not. We have
seen that revenue gains range from 0.4% to 1.5% depending on the assumed sell-up
rate and the competitive situation. In particular, gains are higher when only one
airline accounts for sell-up, as it is then able to attract more of the high fare, high
revenue Y class passengers. However, we also established in these results that the
choice of the assumed sell-up rates is critical: If the assumed sell-up rates are too
high, the airline overprotects and suffers very important losses. If the assumed sell-
up rates are too low, the airline does not get all the benefit it should.
The next question we will now focus on in the remainder of this chapter is what
happens when we change the forecasting, and more specifically the detruncation
method, as this represents another approach to increasing protection levels.
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4.2 Projection Detruncation
In this section, we focus on what happens when one of the airlines (or both) switches
to the more aggressive Projection detruncation described in Part I, Chapter 2.1.2.
This can lead to increased protection as we briefly described in the first part of the
thesis. Indeed, as the t value varies we are able to increase or decrease the estimation
of the unconstrained demand and therefore to adjust the forecast and in turn the
protection levels.
The goal of this section is to see if there is any additional gain that can be achieved
by switching detruncation models in addition to the gains we already achieved by
accounting for sell-up. In a first step, we will try and find the best z value for
Projection detruncation. By this we mean search for the r value that gives the best
results (the highest revenues) and at the same time compare this result to the
previously observed revenues obtained with Booking Curve detruncation.
Our base value for r is 0.15, as described in Part I, Chapter 2.1.2. This is the value
we start from and evolve from there, depending on the results we get.
4.2.1 Preliminary Results
In this section, we re-run the previous PODS simulation cases with the "base" 'r
value. In the following paragraphs, we will be using either a constant input sell-up
rate of 20% by fare class or a differential input sell-up rate of 45%, 30% and 20%
per fare class combined with Projection detruncation at r=0.15. These assumed sell-
up rates have consistently proven to give good results and we will therefore focus on
these particular rates.
4.2.1.a Only Airline A Accounts for Sell-up
First of all, we are interested in what happens to revenues when we switch to
Projection detruncation with the base value for x, when only airline A is accounting
for sell-up. It turns out from our results that airline A still has revenue gains when
compared to our base case. However, these gains are lower than they were with
Booking Curve detruncation. This is shown on Figure 16.
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Figure 16: Revenue Gains as a Function of Detruncation and Sell-up, DF 1.0
Revenue Gains for Airline A, DF 1.0
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We clearly see in Figure 16 that more aggressive detruncation is beneficial to the
airline, when no sell-up rate is input. However, as soon as sell-up rates are added, the
revenue gains drop dramatically. The reason for this is that sell-up and detruncation
have essentially the same effect on the Revenue Management algorithm: They
increase the protection in one way or another. Projection detruncation with a low 'r
value works towards increasing the forecast by increasing the estimate of the
unconstrained demand while accounting for sell-up increases the protection by
taking into consideration the probability that a passenger will be willing to pay more.
Therefore, in the end, we end up overprotecting through the addition of both effects.
This first set of results shows us this overprotection:
" Projection detruncation can bring revenue gains, as shown at 0% assumed
sell-up rates, and,
* Aggressive Projection detruncation combined with the assumed sell-up rates
leads to overprotection and lower revenue gains.
The same trends are observed at other demand factors. That is, there is a definite
revenue gain over the base case when airline A does not account for sell-up.
However, as soon as airline A begins to account for sell-up, revenue gains are lower
when using projection detruncation rather than Booking Curve detruncation. This is
summarized in Table 22. Overall, however, there is a decrease in revenues by as
much as 0.45% at demand factor 1.2 compared to the more beneficial Booking curve
detruncation - Differential sell-up rates combination.
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Table 22: Summary of Revenue Gains with Projection Detruncation, t=0.15
4.2.1.b Both Airlines Account for Sell-up
We now focus on what happens when we switch to Projection detruncation for
airline A only, but when both airlines account for sell-up. In the previous sections,
we showed that accounting for sell-up increases the revenues of the airline
implementing the change over our base case. However, when both airlines account
for sell-up, the revenues (for airline A) are lower than when only one of the two
airlines accounts for sell-up. The goal of this section is to study what happens when
airline A switches to the more aggressive Projection detruncation (at r=0.15), when
both airlines account for sell-up. Does airline A increase its revenues? Does airline B
increase its revenues, or do the gains remain the same as when both airlines were
using Booking curve detruncation?
In Table 23, we show the percentage revenue gains (losses) of airlines A and B when
they both account for sell-up, while only airline A uses Projection detruncation. It is
clear that airline A still benefits from the more aggressive Projection detruncation
when neither airline accounts for sell-up. Airline B, on the other hand suffers from
its less aggressive detruncation and has revenue losses (compared to our base case).
However, as soon as we input a constant or differential sell-up rate for both airlines,
we see that the results become very different: It becomes unclear which airline is
better off.
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Percentage
DF Case Detruncation Sell-up Revenue Gain
(Airline A)
0.8 Base BC 0%
0 Proj (Tau=0.15) 0% 0.15%
20 Proj (Tau=0.15) 20% 0.36%
0.2-0,3-0,45 Proj (Tau=0.15) Differential 0.52%
1.0 Base BC 0%
0 Proj (Tau=0.15) 0% 0.55%
20 Proj (Tau=0.15) 20% 0.79%
0.2-0,3-0,45 Proj (Tau=0.15) Differential 1.05%
1.2 Base BC 0%
0 Proj (Tau=0.15) 0% 0.59%
20 Proj (Tau=0.15) 20% 0.76%
0.2-0,3-0,45 Proj (Tau=0.15) Differential 1.06%
Table 23: Percentage Revenue Gains When Both Airlines Account for Sell-up and A
Only Uses Projection Detruncation (T=0.15)
Percentage Percentage
DF Case Detruncation Sell-up Revenue Gain Revenue Gain
(Airline A) (Airline B)
0.8 Base BC 0%
0 Proj (Tau=0.15) 0% 0.15% -0.15%
20 Proj (Tau=0.15) 20% 0.07% 0.05%
10.2-0,3-0,45 Proj (Tau=0.15) Differential 0.32% 0.27%
1.0 Base BC 0%
0 Proj (Tau=0.15) 0% 0.55% -0.40%
20 Proj (Tau=0.15) 20% 0.10% 0.08%
0.2-0,3-0,45 Proj (Tau=0.15) Differential 0.55% 0.45%
1.2 Base BC 0%
0 Proj (Tau=0.15) 0% 0.59% -0.34%
20 Proj (Tau=0.15) 20% 0.00% 0.28%
0.2-0,3-0,45 Proj (Tau=0.15) Differential 0.55% 1.11%
At demand factors 0.8 and 1.0, airline A still has higher revenue gains than B.
Moreover, both airlines are still above the initial base case revenues. However, it is
interesting to note here that the revenues are lower than they were when both airlines
were using Booking Curve detruncation (and accounting for sell-up). Indeed, as the
reader will recall, the revenue gains reached 0.72% at demand factor 1.0 with
differential sell-up rates while we are now at best at 0.55% for the airline using
Projection detruncation. This can be explained by the fact that, now, both airlines
turn down initial low fare passengers, but in greater numbers. Some of these
passengers fill up part of airline B's capacity, thus reducing its overall revenue gains.
At the same time, airline A captures more of the high yield passengers in the last
time frames before departure. However, these passengers cannot make up for the low
fare passengers spilled in the early time frames, as these passengers are shared
between airline A and B. Figure 17 shows the loads at demand factor 1.0, which
confirms our explanation: Airline A has higher loads in the first three fare buckets
while it has substantially lower loads in Q class.
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Figure 17: Loads for both airlines with differential sell-up rates and demand factor
1.0
Loads: Both Airline Using FCYM and Accounting for Sell-up, DF 1.0
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At demand factor 1.2, we observe revenue gains (for airline A) that are lower than
they used to be when neither airline was accounting for sell-up. Moreover, it is now
the airline that is using Booking Curve detruncation that achieves the highest gains.
This can again be explained by the fact that, at high demand factor, airline A, which
is overprotecting for the highest class, ends up rejecting too many lower fare
passengers (B, M and Q). Overall, even though the loads are much higher in Y-class
for airline A (c.f. Figure 18) the difference in loads in the other three fare classes
leads to lower revenues for airline A.
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Figure 18: Loads for both airlines at differential sell-up rates and demand factor 1.2
Loads: Both Airline Using FCYM and Accounting for Sell-up, DF 1.2
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Finally, Figure 18 shows us that the loads in the three lower fare classes are much
higher for airline B, which outweighs the difference in Y-class, as we explained
earlier and leads to higher revenue gains for airline B at demand factor 1.2 when
both airlines are accounting for sell-up while only airline A is using Projection
detruncation.
4.2.1.c Summary
We have seen in the two previous sections that, first of all, Projection detruncation
(at 'r=O.15) combined with sell-up leads to overprotection. Indeed, this leads to lower
revenue gains for the airline using Projection detruncation. Second, we also observed
that, when opposed to an airline also accounting for sell-up, Projection detruncation
does worse than Booking Curve detruncation. Indeed, the load graphs showed us the
overprotection that results from the use of the more aggressive Projection
detruncation algorithm.
In the following sections, we will now see if we can improve the revenues by
changing the t value. That is, we will be testing whether there may be a slightly
more aggressive detruncation method than Booking Curve detruncation that may
allow for higher revenues than those achieved through Booking Curve detruncation.
4.2.2 Best T Value and Related Revenues
In the following sections, we modify the r value in order to evaluate whether there is
additional gain (over gains previously obtained by accounting for sell-up) to be
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achieved by increasing the detruncation. In all the cases described, a good indicator
of the aggressiveness of the detruncation model is the "no sell-up" case. Indeed, in
this case, if the airline using Projection detruncation has positive revenue gains, it
implies, as confirmed by the load charts, that it is protecting more for higher fare
passengers and therefore detruncating more aggressively. On the other hand, if we
see revenue losses, then the airline is effectively not detruncating enough.
4.2.2.a Decreasing the Protection through the Detruncation Method
In this paragraph, we relate the results obtained when we increase the T value, which
corresponds to using less aggressive detruncation. Indeed, increasing the T value, as
the reader will recall from Part I, Chapter 2.1.2, is basically increasing the value of
the ratio B = T, and therefore, as the value of the observed bookings has not
A+B
changed, we move the projection of this observation to the left of the curve, that is,
closer to the initial observation. This leads to less aggressive detruncation and
therefore, in the end, to lower protections.
Therefore, in this paragraph, we describe and explain our results when we modify
the T value. More specifically, we will be running two types of cases:
* In the first cases, we will be varying the T value when airline A is accounting
for sell-up and using Projection detruncation while airline B is doing neither.
e In the second set of cases, we will be modifying the T value when both airlines
are accounting for sell-up but only airline A uses Projection detruncation.
4.2.2.b Only Airline A Accounts for Sell-up
In this first section, we will show that the revenue gains actually do improve when
we increase the T value and hence reduce the aggressiveness of Projection
detruncation. Moreover, results show that we can increase the revenue gains beyond
those obtained with Booking Curve detruncation.
Indeed, as we change the T value from 0.15 to 0.4, we see that the revenue gains
increase for airline A. Moreover, the revenues increase beyond those obtained with
Booking Curve detruncation. Figure 19 shows the distribution of revenues as a
function of the demand factor and the assumed sell-up rate. In particular, we will
now focus on differential input sell-up rates and not so much on constant input sell-
up rates. Indeed, we have established that differential input sell-up rates bring the
most improvement in revenues.
88
Figure 19: Percentage Revenue Gains for Airline A as a Function of the 'r Value and
the Demand Factor, Airline A with Differential Sell-up Rates Assumed,
Airline B without Sell-up
%rcerage uRae Ghins for Aidine Aas a Rntion d aid Fator
andTvalue
0.8 1.0 12
Demand Factor
EDax3ingctne EPecfaiT=0.15 0ProjectiaT=02 PNectiMT=025 EPeim T=Q35 PNecfimT=Q4
As the r value increases from 0.15 to 0.2, 0.25, 0.3, 0.35 and 0.4, we note that there
appears to be a peak in revenue gains at a r value somewhere in between 0.25 and
0.3. In this case, we can then safely assume that we have reached the "optimal" T
value for our simulation. Even though this result by no means gives us an "optimal"
T value applicable in general, it gives us the best in our simulations. In terms of
revenue gains, we see that we not only reach a maximum, but that this maximum
revenue gain is above the revenue gain achieved with Booking Curve detruncation,
at all three tested demand factors. At demand factor 1.0, we see on the Figure 19 that
the gains increase by as much as 0.2% (at T=0.25).
In terms of loads, we show on Figure 20 what happens. The best T value leads to
higher loads in B and M class, slightly higher loads in Q class, while loads are a little
lower in Y class than when we were using Booking Curve detruncation. Overall,
however, loads are very similar and this explains why the additional revenue gain
achieved through Projection detruncation is minimal.
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Figure 20: Comparison in Loads for Airline A when it Alternatively Uses Projection
Detruncation or not, Combined with Sell-up; Airline B Uses Booking
Curve Detruncation without Sell-up, DF 1.0
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Overall, the additional revenue gains achieved through Projection detruncation are
very small, in the order of 0.2% at the most.
This is in contrast to earlier studies (Zickus9 ) that found that switching to Projection
detruncation brings clear revenue gains, ranging from 0.15% at demand factor 0.8 to
0.55% at demand factor 1.0 and 0.6% at demand factor 1.2. Zickus also found that
switching the detruncation method to Projection detruncation had a much greater
impact than modifying the Forecaster. Overall, according to Zickus's findings, it is
beneficial to switch to Projection detruncation. However, in our case, it is not, for the
following reasons:
" We are accounting for sell-up and therefore already increasing the protection
levels for the higher fare classes,
* Switching to Projection detruncation increases the protection levels, but in a
less sensitive way. Indeed, Projection detruncation increases the protection
levels in a uniform manner as it detruncates in the same way regardless of the
fare class that is concerned. In contrast, sell-up models allow us to apply
different sell-up rates to different classes and therefore to better account for
small differences in between the classes.
Overall, the combination of these two incremental ways to increase protection levels
overlap and may lead to a reduction in revenue gains. The sell-up model allows for
more flexibility in terms of the adjustments of the protection levels. Therefore,
adding a more aggressive detruncator leads to overprotection.
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4.2.2.c Both Airlines Account for Sell-up
Finally, in this last section of this first chapter, we will be discussing the second
case: What happens when both airlines account for sell-up and only airline A uses
Projection detruncation.
As in the previous paragraph, we get an optimal value for T, as far as revenue gains
are concerned, for airline A. This optimal T value turns out to be the same as
previously, that is, in the vicinity of 0.25-0.3. We were uncertain whether this would
be the case or not, as both airlines now better model consumer behavior in terms of
accounting for sell-up. Therefore, we would have expected the ensuing protections to
be closer to the "reality" of the simulator and hence the t value to be a little greater
than in the previous case.
Moreover, the revenue gains increase again by about 0.2% at demand factor 1.0, as
shown in Table 24. This increase is in the same order of magnitude as in the case
when only airline A accounts for sell-up. Once again, the additional revenue gain
over the case when both airlines account for sell-up is minimal.
Table 24: Percentage Revenue Gains for Airline A when both Airlines are
Accounting for Sell-up with Differential Sell-up Rates Assumed, and only
Airline A is Using Projection Detruncation
Differential Sell-up Rates At All Demand Factors
DF Detruncation Revenue Gain
0.81Booking Curve 0.41%
Projection (T=0.25) 0.46%
1.0 Booking Curve 0.72%
Projection (T=0.25) 0.91%
1.2 Booking Curve 1.09%
Projection (T=0.25) 1.20%
4.2.3 Conclusion
In conclusion to this second section, we note that there is a gain to be achieved
through switching to Projection detruncation. This gain was obtained when
combined to sell-up gains, at a T value between 0.25 and 0.3. Moreover, this
"optimal" - value is "optimal" both when only one or both airlines actually account
for sell-up.
The revenue gains, however, are in the vicinity of 0.1% to 0.2% over the
combination of Booking Curve detruncation and sell-up. That is to say, they are
minimal. These revenue gains correspond to an adjustment of the loads, as shown in
Figure 20. Loads in B, M and Q class increase a little while loads in Y class decrease
slightly, thus generating very small revenue gain over EMSRb with sell-up and
Booking Curve detruncation.
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4.3 Adjusted Booking Curve
In this section, we now study the impact of our third detruncation method, Adjusted
Booking Curve detruncation. The reader will remember that this Adjusted Booking
Curve detruncation is nothing more than usual Booking Curve detruncation scaled
by a factor between 0 and 1 to account for the fact that the usual Booking Curve
algorithm tends to under-estimate the unconstrained demand. Therefore, when we
implement this scaling, we effectively detruncate more, thereby increasing the
protections in the higher fare classes.
Once again, we will follow the pattern we have been following in the previous
sections and present the results when only one airline accounts for sell-up and then
when both airlines account for sell-up. In the following sections, airline A is the only
airline using this modified detruncation technique.
4.3.1 Only Airline A Accounts for Sell-up
In this section, we describe the results of our simulations when we use Adjusted
Booking Curve detruncation. In particular, we vary the value of the scaling
parameter to find the optimal value as a function of the input sell-up rate for airline
A. We will see that, in this case, this optimal scaling parameter varies quite a bit as a
function of the assumed sell-up rate. However, the highest revenue gains will still be
achieved at the same input sell-up rates as earlier and at a scaling factor of 0.9 or 1.0,
that is, with very little scaling or no scaling at all.
4.3.1.a Constant Sell-up Rates
Figure 21 shows how revenues vary as a function of input sell-up rate and scaling
parameter, at demand factor 1.0. It should be noted here that the same trends are
observed at demand factors 0.8 and 1.2.
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Figure 21: Percentage Revenue Gains as a Function of Assumed Sell-up Rate and
Scaling Factor, DF 1.0
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We clearly see on this graph that the maximum of all curves, which indicates the
maximum revenues, our goal, is located on the 20 percent constant input sell-up rate
curve, at a scaling factor of 0.9. Clearly, the revenue gains vary tremendously as a
function of the sell-up rates, on the one hand, as shown by the vertical variation at a
fixed scaling factor value. This result had already been established earlier with a
scaling factor of 1.0 (Booking Curve detruncation). On the other hand, the horizontal
scale shows the variation in revenues as a function of the scaling factor. Again, we
see on this figure that the revenues, at a given input sell-up rate, vary dramatically as
a function of the scaling factor. For example, at a constant input sell-up rate of 20
percent, we reach a revenue gain of 0.85% at a scaling factor of 0.9. However, if we
move to a Pbscale value of 0.6, revenue gains decrease to 0.67%. Moreover, it is also
interesting to point out that, while it is clearly sub-optimal at a constant input sell-up
rate of 20 percent per fare class, this 0.6 Pbscale value is best for a sell-up rate of 10
percent per fare class.
Table 25: Percentage Revenue Gains as a Function of Demand Factor and Pbscale
Factor, 20% Sell-up Rate per Fare Class
Revenues Percentage Gains
DF Pbscale Airline A Airline B Airline A Airline B
0.8 0.9 $190,562.00 $189,286.00 0.39% -0.22%
1.0 $190,559.00 $189,302.00 0.39% -0.21%
1.0 0.9 $228,888.00 $225,626.00 0.85% -0.58%
___1.0 $228,846.00 $225,731.00 0.83% -0.54%
1.2 0.9 $262,206.00 $258,350.00 0.94% -0.65%
r _ 1 1.0 $262,205.00 $258,423.00 0.94% -0.62%
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In terms of revenue gains, we note from Table 25 that the revenues are indeed a little
higher when we adjust the Booking Curve detruncation method by a factor of 0.9.
However, it is also very clear that the difference in revenues is very small and cannot
therefore be truly considered as significantly different.
Overall, this first analysis of gains achieved through Adjusted Booking Curve
detruncation leads us to the conclusion that, first of all, our "best" constant input
sell-up rate of 20 percent per fare class is still the "best" rate even when using
Adjusted Booking Curve detruncation. Moreover, the additional gains that can be
obtained through this other detruncation method are, at best, minimal.
4.3.1.b Differential S ell-up Rates
In this case, we use our previously defined differential assumed sell-up rates of 45%,
30% and 20% sell-up rates per fare class. The results show that now, clearly, the
highest revenue gains are achieved at a scaling factor of 1.0, that is, when no scaling
is done. All the results are shown in Table 26.
Table 26: Percentage Revenue Gains as a Function of Demand Factor and Pbscale
Parameter at Various Assumed Sell-up Rates
Input Sell-Up
DF=0.80 Pbscale
0.40
0.60
0.80
0.90
No Adj 1.00
Input Sell-Up
DF=1.00 Pbscale
0.40
0.60
0.80
0.90
No Adj 1.00
Input Sell-Up
DF=1.20 Pbscale
0.40
0.60
0.80
0.90
No Adj 1.00
0.00 Differential Sell-Up
Airl. A Airl. B %wrtBC %wrtBC Air. A Air. B %wrtBC %wrtBC
190,329 189,386 0.27% -0.22% 189,965 189,781 0.08% -0.02%
190,292 189,432 0.25% -0.20% 190,477 189,647 0.35% -0.09%
190,116 189,538 0.16% -0.14% 190,784 189,591 0.51% -0.12%
189,970 189,624 0.08% -0.10% 190,876 189,580 0.56% -0.12%
189,813 189,703 0.00% -0.06% 190,948 189,575 0.60% -0.13%
0.00 Differential Sell-Up
Airl. A Airl. B %wrtBC %wrtBC Airl. A Airi. B %wrtBC %wrtBC
228,565 225,724 0.71% -0.54% 227,238 226,706 0.13% -0.11%
228,429 225,956 0.65% -0.44% 228,488 226,479 0.68% -0.21%
227,924 226,345 0.43% -0.27% 229,251 226,428 1.01% -0.23%
227,520 226,590 0.25% -0.16% 229,464 226,465 1.11% -0.21%
226,954 226,952 0.00% 0.00% 229,593 226,540 1.16% -0.18%
0.00 Differential Sell-Up
Airl. A Airl. B %wrtBC %wrtBC Airl. A Air. B %wrtBC %wrtBC
261,743 258,502 0.76% -0.59% 259,068 261,146 -0.27% 0.43%
261,788 258,621 0.78% -0.54% 261,007 260,531 0.48% 0.19%
261,248 259,085 0.57% -0.36% 262,567 260,037 1.08% 0.00%
260,641 259,491 0.34% -0.21% 263,135 259,911 1.30% -0.05%
259,762 260,029 0.00% 0.00% 263,596 259,825 1.48% -0.08%
Table 26 clearly shows that at all three demand factors, scaling the Booking Curve
does not lead to any improvement in the revenues achieved by accounting for sell-
up. However, as seen in this same table, when no sell-up is assumed, the "best"
scaling factor is close to 0.4-0.5. This confirms that more aggressive detruncation
does improve the revenues, when no sell-up is assumed. Overall, we then confirm
our hypothesis that detruncation and accounting for sell-up have the same effect:
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Increase the seat protection and better match passenger behavior to increase the
revenues of the airline.
4.3.2 Both Airlines Account for Sell-up
In this section, we now study what happens to the revenues for airline A when both
airlines account for sell-up. In this set of simulations, we set both airlines to account
for sell-up while only airline A uses Adjusted Booking Curve detruncation. We see
that the revenues do not improve when we increase the detruncation by adjusting the
Booking Curve by a scaling factor strictly less than 1.
Table 27 summarizes the results obtained through simulation.
Table 27: Percentage Revenue Gains when Both Airlines Account for Sell-up
DF=0.8 Pbscale
0.40
0.60
0.80
0.90
No Adj 1.00
DF=1.0 Pbscale
0.40
0.60
0.80
0.90
No Adj 1.00
DF=1.2 Pbscale
0.40
0.60
0.80
0.90
No Adj 1.00
0.
1A
.
CL,
.5
8
1
-
0
.
Airl. A
Revenues
Air. B
Percentage Gain
over Base
Airi. A Air. B
$189,423.00 $189,293.00 -0.21% -0.27%
$189,977.00 $189,831.00 0.09% 0.01%
$190,332.00 $190,215.00 0.27% 0.21%
$190,489.00 $190,349.00 0.36% 0.28%
$190,598.00 $190,476.00 0.41% 0.35%
Airl. A Air. B %wrt BC %wrt BC
$225,728.00 $225,756.00 -0.54% -0.53%
$226,969.00 $226,993.00 0.01% 0.02%
$227,895.00 $227,903.00 0.41% 0.42%
$228,273.00 $228,269.00 0.58% 0.58%
$228,592.00 $228,613.00 0.72% 0.73%
Air. A Air. B %wrt BC %wrt BC
$258,894.00
$260,288.00
$261,495.00
$262,065.00
$262,584.00
$259,267.00
$260,652.00
$261,885.00
$262,451.00
$262,942.00
-0.33%
0.20%
0.67%
0.89%
-0.29%
0.24%
0.71%
0.93%
1.09% 1.12%
All the scaling factors tested here do not bring any improvement to the revenue gains
from EMSRb with sell-up under regular Booking Curve detruncation. The reason for
this can partly be explained by our previous results. Indeed, we know that when we
apply a scaling factor less than 1, we increase the detruncation. This phenomenon
can be compared to reducing the T value with Projection detruncation. Our analysis
of Projection detruncation has led us to believe that there is very little improvement
to be gained by increasing the detruncation. Adjusted Booking Curve detruncation is
another way to switch to more aggressive detruncation. The goal of the method
remains the same: To increase the aggressiveness of the detruncation. It is therefore
quite logical that we should get the same results as with Projection detruncation,
even though the method itself is different.
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4.3.3 Conclusion
In this section, we have seen that, regardless of the competitive situation in terms of
accounting for sell-up, there is very little, if anything, to be gained from switching
detruncation methods from BC detruncation to Adjusted Booking Curve
detruncation. Unlike Projection detruncation where we achieved revenue gains of
about 0.1% above our initial gains obtained by accounting for sell-up, we have no
consistent evidence that there is any gain to be achieved with Adjusted Booking
Curve detruncation. In particular, our analysis shows that the best results are
obtained with Booking Curve detruncation (which is the extreme case Adjusted
Booking Curve, when the scaling parameter is set to 1).
4.4 Summary
In this chapter, we studied the possible revenue gains that can be achieved by
accounting for sell-up in a Fare Class Yield Management environment. Our
simulations show that we can expect revenue gains as high as 1.5% when only one
airline is accounting for sell-up and as high as 1.1% when both airlines account for
sell-up, at demand factor 1.2. Moreover, it appears that the potential revenue gains
depend on the demand factor, but, whatever the demand factor, the gains are
positive. In addition, we also noted that airline A maximizes its revenues when it
uses a differential input sell-up rate in the EMSRb heuristic. At the same time,
airline B is also better off when its competitor uses a differential input sell-up as
opposed to constant input sell-up rates. As logic suggests, when both airlines account
for sell-up, the revenue gains decrease for airline A, as both airlines are now better at
protecting their inventory.
Finally, we examined Projection detruncation and Adjusted Booking Curve
detruncation in an attempt to further improve our gains, if possible. Our conclusion
is that accounting for sell-up and modifying the detruncation method amount more
or less to the same result in terms of booking limits and protections. However,
accounting for sell-up provides more flexibility in terms of where to protect more or
less. This is shown by the differential sell-up rates that are designed to match
passenger willingness-to-pay.
Through simulations, we found out that the "best" t value was in the vicinity of
0.25-0.3, and allowed revenue increases of at most 0.2% over the gains achieved by
accounting for sell-up. However, as far as Adjusted Booking curve detruncation is
concerned, we noted that the "best" scaling factor was 1, that is, when no adjustment
was made. Overall, we also pointed out that the revenue gains obtained by switching
detruncation methods are minimal.
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Chapter 5: Sell-up in a Virtual Bucket Environment
In this second chapter of Part II, we will now be dealing with a virtual bucket
environment in our Revenue Management system. In particular, airline A will
always be using Greedy Virtual Nesting (GVN, c.f. Chapter 1.2.2.a) as its Revenue
Management algorithm. In addition, it should be reminded here that our base case
has not changed and remains EMSRb vs. EMSRb as described at the beginning of
this second part of the thesis.
This chapter will be devoted to understanding and explaining what happens when
one of the airlines, or both, accounts for sell-up in a more sophisticated Revenue
Management environment, namely GVN. It has been established in previous
research, including Lee8 , that switching to a virtual bucket environment brings
revenue gains ranging from 0.7% at demand factor 0.8 to 1.6% at demand factor 1.0
and 1.4% at demand factor 1.2. We note here that, as we explained in Part I, Chapter
1, on Revenue Management methods, GVN does not perform quite as well at high
demand factors, as it favors connecting passengers over local passengers. The reader
will recall that this means that two local passengers, who individually pay a lower
fare, may be displaced in favor of a connecting passenger who pays a higher fare.
However, the sum of these two lower local fares may be higher than the connecting
fare, hence reducing the overall revenue gain for the airline. This problem becomes
more critical as demand increases.
Our goal in this chapter, independently of this limitation of GVN, is to evaluate the
possible revenue gains that can be achieved if the airline using GVN accounts for
sell-up. We established in the previous chapter that, in a Fare Class Yield
Management environment, accounting for sell-up is clearly beneficial to the airline.
The revenue gains range from 0.6% to 1.5% when only one airline is accounting for
sell-up and both are using Booking Curve detruncation. The question we raise in this
chapter is whether we can improve the revenue gains when the airline both accounts
for sell-up and uses a Revenue Management algorithm designed to perform basic 0-
D control.
The structure of this chapter will be very similar to that of Chapter 1 in that we will
first focus on what happens when we use Booking Curve detruncation, describe the
results and potential revenue gains, and then switch to Projection detruncation and
see what happens in this case.
It is important that the reader remember here what we mean by input or assumed
sell-up rates: These are the sell-up rates that we input in the Belobaba-
Weatherford2 2 heuristic. These input sell-up rates are estimated by us to match as
best as possible the propensity of a passenger to sell up to a higher fare class.
97
5.1 Booking C urve Detruncation
In this section, we will be focusing on the potential revenue gains achievable when
one airline or both airlines account for sell-up and use Booking Curve detruncation
in conjunction with GVN. As our results will show, accounting for sell-up clearly
leads to revenue gains over our EMSRb vs. EMSRb base case. In the following
paragraphs, we will first focus on the effect of accounting for sell-up when airline B
uses Fare Class Yield Management (FCYM) and we will then look at the revenue
gains that can be achieved when both airlines use GVN as their Revenue
Management system. Finally, we will study how gains vary with the competitive
situation. However, we will start by defining the notion of input sell-up rates and in
particular differential input sell-up rates in a virtual bucket environment.
5.1.1 GVN vs. EMSRb
In this first section we will be focusing on the impact of accounting for the
possibility of sell-up when airline A uses GVN and is competing against an airline
that only uses Fare Class Yield Management (FCYM), typically EMSRb, with or
without accounting for the possibility of sell-up. We will see that whether or not
airline B accounts for sell-up, airline A nonetheless benefits from accounting for
sell-up, compared to our base case scenario (EMSRb vs. EMSRb).
5.1.1.a Only Airline A Accounts for Sell-up
As described above, in this section, we focus on the revenue gains achieved by
airline A when it is the only airline accounting for sell-up. We always compare our
results to the base case. The simulations show that the revenue gains are now very
high. They reach as much as 3.7% over base EMSRb without sell-up assumed at
demand factor 1.2 and differential sell-up rates assumed.
We divide this section into two sub-sections dealing respectively with constant input
sell-up rates and then with differential input sell-up rates. We will see in the
following paragraphs that, as we established with EMSRb Revenue Management,
differential input sell-up rates, when well chosen, lead to higher revenue gains than
constant input sell-up rates.
Constant Inpu t Sell-up Rates
Given that GVN is different from FCYM in that it favors long-haul connecting
passengers over short-haul local passengers, and since it spreads demand into more
buckets, we expect the "best" constant input sell-up rates, with GVN, to be lower
than with FCYM: Indeed, the algorithm will tend to "blow-up" earlier with GVN
than with FCYM. We therefore first tested different input sell-up rates to confirm or
reject this hypothesis. Table 28 shows the "best" sell-up rates assumed at all three
demand factors. We note here that constant sell-up rates, in a virtual bucket
environment, are simply the probability that a passenger will be willing to sell-up
form one bucket to the next.
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Table 28: Revenue Gains as a Function of Demand Factor and Input Sell-up Rate
Absolute Revenue Gain Percentage Gain overEMSRb Base
DF Input Sell-up Rate Airline A Airline B Airline A Airline B
0.8 0% $1,302.00 -$1,093.00 0.69% -0.58%
10% $1,874.00 -$1,415.00 0.99% -0.75%
20% $1,726.00 -$1,931.00 0.91% -1.02%
30% -$4,140.00 -$1,749.00 -2.18% -0.92%
1.0 07/
10 /C
200/
30 0/c
1.2 0 7
100/
20 /
300/
$3,575.00 -$2,148.00 1.58% -0.95%
$4,669.00 -$2,801.00 2.06% -1.23%
$5,173.00 -$3,403.00 2.28% -1.50%
$2,383.00 -$3,790.00 1.05% -1.67%
$3,503.00 -$1,654.00 1.35% -0.64%
$5,946.00 -$2,833.00 2.29% -1.09%
$8,139.00 -$4,049.00 3.13% -1.56%
$5,439.00 -$4,998.00 2.09% -1.92%
We observe in Table 28 that airline A achieves revenue gains at all three demand
factors when accounting for sell-up. In particular, we observe a peak in revenue
gains at 10 percent input sell-up rates and demand factor 0.8, with 1% gains, while at
demand factors 1.0 and 1.2, the peak is reached at 20 percent input sell-up rates and
is respectively 2.3% and 3.1%. A possible explanation for the difference in "best"
input sell-up rates as a function of demand factor may be in the virtual buckets. As
we introduce these buckets and input a sell-up rate into the algorithm, at low demand
factors, the lower buckets are going to close down earlier than without sell-up
assumed, and this will have a higher impact on revenues as it will keep the higher
buckets open and therefore allow for most of the long haul passengers to find
available seats, especially discount seats as they will book first. Therefore, the high
yield, late booking, local passengers will find less availability. Overall, the impact of
denying access to these passengers will then be higher on revenues, which is what
we observe here. This is the same problem, but translated to demand factor 0.8, as
the usually observed disadvantage of GVN, which favors connecting passengers over
local passengers and therefore has a greater tendency to have lesser revenue gains at
higher demand factors.
Similarly, we also note that at 30 percent input sell-up rates, we observe lower gains
at all three demand factors. At demand factor 0.8, the algorithm is hugely
overprotecting, while at demand factors 1.0 and 1.2 we have lower revenues but still
positive gains. However, once again, at these demand factors, we are also
overprotecting.
In terms of loads, we now focus on virtual bucket loads. Indeed, airline A now uses
virtual bucket fare mapping, whereas airline B still uses EMSRb fare class mapping.
For convenience purposes, we will map the bookings for both airlines according to
virtual buckets.
We first look at the distribution of passengers between virtual buckets for airline A
at a constant input sell-up rate of 20% per virtual bucket. We note on Figure 22 that
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the load distribution increases with demand in the first four buckets whereas the
loads decrease in the last two buckets as demand increases. This points out the fact
that at high demand factors, GVN protects more for connecting passengers. In
addition, absolute loads increase with demand (not shown on Figure 22).
Figure 22: Load Distributions by Virtual Bucket for Airline A at a Constant Input
sell-up Rate of 20% per Virtual Bucket
Load Distributions by Virtual Bucket for Airline A
20% Input Sell-up Rates
30.00%
24.79% 25.76% 25.51% E DF 0.8
25.00% - 22.29 22.10% EDF 1.0
20.96% __25 0 DF 1.2
20.00% 19.25%
16.08% 16.6 /6 1.7*
1 50% 4.420/ 15.35*/ 15.32 
15.87%
10.00% 9.25%
5.00% --
1.91''
0.00%
1 2 3 4 5 6
Virtual Bucket
As far as comparing the loads between airlines, Figure 23 shows the loads by virtual
bucket for both airlines at demand factor 1.0 and a constant input sell-up rate of 20
percent per virtual bucket. It is clear on Figure 23 that the loads are substantially
higher for airline A in the first five buckets and lower in the last bucket. This shows
that when airline A is accounting for sell-up, it rejects a lot more low fare passengers
and spills them to the competing airline, overall increasing its revenues by getting
more high fare passengers. Conversely, airline B is less efficient in protecting its
seats and fills up with low fare passengers.
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Figure 23: Loads by Virtual Bucket at Demand Factor 1.0 and 20% Input sell-up
Rate
Loads by Virtual Bucket, DF 1.0
10
0
_j
25.00
20.00
15.00
10.00
5.00
0.00
1 2 3 4 5 6
Fare Bucket
MlAirline A: GVN with Sell-up 20% MAirline B: FCYM w/o Sell-up
Finally, in Figure 24, we take a closer look at what happens when revenues start
decreasing. Figure 24 shows the load distributions by virtual buckets for airline A at
demand factor 0.8 as a function of the input sell-up rate. We see on Figure 24 that
the passenger distribution according to virtual buckets is such that the percentage of
passengers in the first five buckets increases with the input sell-up rate. However, the
amount of passengers in the last bucket decreases much faster and leads to huge
revenue losses. Moreover, this chart does not show the absolute value of the loads
but the distribution of the loads. Hence we do not see on Figure 24 that the average
load factor decreases with the input sell-up rate, and that the differences actually
increase in terms of absolute loads.
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Figure 24: Passenger Distribution by Virtual Bucket as a function of the Input sell-
up Rate, DF 0.8
Load Distribution by Virtual Bucket, DF 0.8 m 10ownput Seli-up
Rate
020% Input Sell-up
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Figure 25: Virtual Bucket Loads at Demand Factor 0.8, as a Function of the Input
sell-up Rate
Loads by Virtual Bucket, DF 0.8
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Finally, Figure 25 shows the absolute loads and confirms the fact that the general
trend in loads in the first four buckets is that loads are higher as the input sell-up rate
increases. However, in the last two buckets, loads decrease at 30% input sell-up rate.
In particular, in the lowest bucket, the load is extremely low, thus explaining the
overall loss in revenues. As far as the 20% input sell-up rate case is concerned, what
happens is that the losses incurred as a result of the lower loads in the last two
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buckets outweigh the gains in the higher four buckets, thus leading to an overall
reduction in revenues.
In summary, all these results show that the combination of sell-up models with
GVN, when opposed to an airline that uses EMSRb (or Fare Class Yield
Management, a.k.a. FCYM) without accounting for sell-up, always brings revenue
gains ranging from 1% to about 3.1% depending on the demand factor, at 20% input
sell-up rate at demand factors 1.0 and 1.2, and at 10% input sell-up rate at demand
factor 0.8.
Differential In p ut sell-up Rates
In this paragraph, we now focus on differential input sell-up rates, as we once again
expect them to lead to higher revenue gains, as Bohutinsky20 suggested. We will see
that the results confirm this hypothesis. However, it is more difficult to justify our
choice of input sell-up rates, and we will spend the first paragraph explaining this
choice.
Choosing a Differential Sell-up Rate
Bohutinsky20 suggests that it is reasonable to believe that business and leisure
passengers do not have the same willingness-to-pay and have different likelihood to
sell up or buy a higher fare ticket when their first choice is not available. However,
in the case of virtual buckets, fares are mapped according to their dollar value.
Therefore, a given virtual bucket may contain a short-haul Y along with fare with a
long-haul M fare, while another bucket may only have B class long-haul fares, etc.
Overall, it now becomes very difficult to distinguish between passenger types and
explain willingness to sell up by the fare bucket. In the extreme buckets, one can
argue that we have mostly high fare passengers and low fare passengers, depending
on the extremity of the bucket. It would therefore be easier to justify a choice of
differential input sell-up rates in these extreme buckets.
In accordance with Bohutinsky's results 20 , we picked the same type of sell-up rates
as earlier, and decided to run tests on three particular combinations:
" 45%-35%-30%-20% and 10% per virtual bucket, from top down,
* 40%-35%-30%-20% and 10% per virtual bucket, and,
e 35%-30%-25%-15% and 5% per virtual bucket.
The results are shown on Table 29.
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Table 29: Revenue Gains as a Function of Differential Input Sell-up Rate, DF 1.0
Percentage Gain overAbsolute Revenue Gain EMSRb Base
DF Input Sell-up Rate Airline A Airline B Airline A Airline B
1.0 40-35-30-20-10% $6,427.00 -$3,410.00 2.83% -1.50%
45-35-30-20-10% -$4,862.00 $1,792.00 -2.14% 0.79%
35-30-25-15-5% $5,847.00 -$3,112.00 2.58% -1.37%
We clearly see in Table 29 that the first input sell-up rate tested brings the highest
revenue gains. We therefore decided to keep this as the "differential input sell-up
rate" for the remainder of the thesis, at least in terms of assumed inputs to GVN.
Results
Revenues
As suggested in Table 29, we get very high revenue gains when we account for sell-
up and input a differential sell-up rate in the EMSRb Sell-up Heuristic as part of the
GVN Revenue Management algorithm. Depending on demand factor, revenue gains
range from 1.2% to 3.6%. In terms of gains over the initial GVN algorithm, Figure
26 shows the differences as a function of demand factor. We note here that the
difference increases with the demand factor. Moreover, the lesser performance of
GVN at high demand factors that can be seen on Figure 26, when airline A is not
accounting for sell-up, seems to have disappeared when we account for sell-up.
Figure 26: Comparison between Gains from GVN with and without Sell-up when
the Competitor Does Not Account for Sell-up
Gains From GVN with and without Sell-up
4.00% --- - - ---- --- ---------------
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Overall, the revenue gains are substantial and almost double the gains achieved by
using GVN without sell-up. Another interesting point is that, similar to the EMSRb
case, airline B, which is using the basic Fare Class Yield Management method,
happens to be losing less money when its competitor switches to differential input
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sell-up rates. The reason for this is that airline A is now trying to match its
protections to passenger behavior more closely. The result is that airline A achieves
lower load factors, but gets more Y and B class passengers and spills more M and Q
class passengers. Overall, airline B benefits from this in that its loads are higher than
when airline A uses a constant input sell-up rate of 20 percent per virtual bucket. We
will get more into the details of this in the following paragraph.
Loads
In this paragraph, we briefly go into the details of the loads as a function of the input
sell-up rate. Consistent with all our previous results, we will see that when airline A
accounts for sell-up, the loads by fare class increase with the input sell-up rate in Y
class. However, they decrease in Q class. This is consistent with the fact that at high
input sell-up rates, we overprotect. As shown on Figure 27, a differential input sell-
up rate brings the highest revenues, and this is due to the fact that it reaches the
highest loads in Y class, while maintaining reasonable loads in the other three fare
classes, and in particular in Q-class. We observed, in earlier results, that the greatest
difference in loads between high and low demand factors resides in the fact that the
loads in Q class are very low when using high input sell-up rates, as we are highly
overprotecting. This difference in loads leads to a substantial difference in revenues.
Overall, Figure 27 shows us that loads are higher in Y class for airline A when it
uses differential input sell-up rates. In B and M classes, the loads are very similar to
the other two cases, while in Q class they are lower than at 10% input sell-up rates,
but higher than at 20% input sell-up rates. We remind the reader here that 20% sell-
up rates assumed led to the best results at constant input sell-up rates and demand
factor 1.0.
Figure 27: Loads for Airline A as a Function of the Input Sell-up Rate, DF 1.0
Loads for Airline A Depending on the Input Sell-
up Rate
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In terms of comparing the loads of airline A to those of airline B, Figure 28 shows
the loads by virtual buckets. As before, we observe that the loads for airline A are
higher in the first five buckets but lower in the last bucket. The data also reveals that
the average leg load factor for airline A is higher than for airline B. This is a major
difference from the previous case. Indeed, when both airlines were using EMSRb,
the average leg load factor for airline B was higher than for airline A at differential
input sell-up rates. However, as was the case for EMSRb with sell-up, the average
leg load factor for airline A has decreased from the "no sell-up assumed" case, as
airline A is now protecting more for higher fare passengers.
Figure 28: Loads by Virtual Bucket, Airline A with Differential Sell-up Assumed,
Airline B w/o Sell-up, DF 1.0
Loads by Virtual Bucket, DF 1.0
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5.1.1.b Conclusion
This first look at GVN accounting for sell-up shows us that there is a substantial
revenue gain to be achieved by accounting for sell-up in this virtual bucket
environment. Consistent with previous results, the highest gains are reached at a
differential input sell-up rate, and can go as high as 3.7% at demand factor 1.2. In the
following section we will be focusing on what happens to the revenues when both
airlines account for sell-up.
5.1.2 Both Airlines Account for Sell-up
In this section, we now focus on the revenue gains that may be achieved when both
airlines account for sell-up. This set of simulations opposes airline A using GVN
with sell-up to airline B using EMSRb with sell-up. When using constant input sell-
up rates, we will be using exactly the same input sell-up rates by fare class and by
virtual bucket. When using differential input sell-up rates in the Belobaba-
Weatherford heuristic2 2 , we will be using what we determined to be the best rates in
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the previous paragraphs. That is, for the EMSRb method, we will use 45%-30% and
20% per fare class, and, for GVN, we will be using 40%-35%-30%-20% and 10%
per virtual bucket, from top down.
Once more, simulations show that there is revenue to be gained by accounting for
sell-up in this specific competitive situation. In particular, we observe that airline A
achieves revenue gains as high as 3.3% at a differential input sell-up rate
combination, while airline B loses money, but comparatively less than when it was
not accounting for sell-up.
In the following paragraphs, we will first present the revenue gains (or losses), and
then take a closer look at the loads achieved by the two airlines, in order to explain
the observed phenomena.
5.1.2.a Revenues
As stated in the previous paragraph, airline A still achieves revenue gains when its
competitor upgrades its Revenue Management algorithms to account for the
possibility of sell-up. However, consistent with previous results on EMSRb, and as
we would expect, as the competitor upgrades its Revenue Management method to
account for sell-up, it increases its share of high yield passengers and, therefore, the
revenues of airline A decrease compared to the case when airline B did not account
for sell-up.
Table 30 shows the revenue gains for both airlines depending on airline B's
accounting for sell-up or not. It appears clearly in this table that the revenue gains
drop for airline A as the competitor begins accounting for sell-up. On the other hand,
revenue losses also decrease for airline B when it accounts for sell-up. Once again,
differential input sell-up rates yield the best results for both airlines in both
situations.
Table 30: Percentage Revenue Gains as a Function of Demand Factor, Competitive
Situation and Input Sell-up Rates
Percentage Gain over EMSRb Base
Airline A Airline A Airline B Airline B
DF Sell-up Rate GVN SU vs GVN SU vs FCYM w/o SU FCYM with SU
FCYM no SU FCYM with SU vs GVN SU vs GVN SU
0.8 20% 0.91% 0.78% -1.02% -0.72%
Differential 1.24% 1.20% -0.86% -0.45%
1.0 20% 2.28% 1.88% -1.50% -0.84%
Differential 2.83% 2.53% -1.50% -0.67%
1.2 20% 3.13% 2.55% -1.56% -0.71%
Differential 3.68% 3.30% -1.65% -0.47%
These results also show that the impact of the change in airline B's Revenue
Management method is less at demand factor 0.8 for both airlines, while at demand
factors 1.0 and 1.2, the effect on airline A's revenues is a loss of about 0.3% in both
cases, at differential input sell-up rates. Airline B, on the other hand benefits more
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and more as the demand factor increases. This can be explained by the fact that, as
demand increases, B is able to attract more high yield passengers, and hence reduces
its losses (compared to the EMSRb vs. EMSRb base case). Moreover, as we
discussed earlier, since airline A is using GVN, it will tend to protect more for
connecting passengers who bring higher revenues (on a per passenger basis) but can
be lower yield passengers on each leg, compared to local passengers. Therefore,
airline B will get more of the local, higher yield traffic, and thus increase its
revenues, to overall reduce its losses.
5.1.2.b Loads
Looking at loads allows us to understand the difference in revenues between airline
A and airline B on the one hand and the difference in revenue gains depending on
the input sell-up rates on the other hand.
First of all, Figure 29 shows that airline A has substantially higher loads in buckets
3, 4 and 5, while in buckets 1 and 2, airline B has slightly higher loads. In bucket 6,
airline B has much higher loads than airline A. In terms of average leg load factor,
airline A achieves 78% load factor while airline B is at 71%, at demand factor 1.0.
Lower average load factors combined with substantially lower loads in the
intermediate virtual buckets leads to the revenue differences we observed in the
previous paragraph (5.1.2.a above). Indeed, airline B is slightly better at attracting
the very high revenue passengers (in buckets 1 and 2) but the overall loads, and the
fact that airline A gets most of the average revenue generating traffic while airline B
is overwhelmed by the very low revenue traffic, are responsible for the large revenue
difference between the two airlines.
Figure 29: Loads by Virtual Bucket, Demand Factor 1.0, Both Airlines Account for
Sell-up
Loads by Virtual Bucket, DF 1.0
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20.0019.5220.00
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108
Finally, Figure 30 compares the loads by virtual bucket for airline A, depending on
the input sell-up rate, constant or differential, when airline B is accounting for the
possibility of sell-up. We observe that the major difference is that airline A achieves
higher loads in the first three buckets and the last bucket. The average leg load factor
is very similar for both cases: 78% in the differential case and 77% in the constant
input sell-up rates case (at demand factor 1.0). Therefore, we can conclude from
Figure 30 that the major difference in revenues between these two cases comes from
the fact that loads are "better" distributed when we input differential sell-up rates. By
"better" distributed, we mean that even though in both cases airline A gets roughly
the same amount of passengers, on average, the number of high revenue generating
passengers is higher at differential input sell-up rates.
Figure 30: Loads by Virtual Bucket for Airline A, depending on the Assumed Sell-
up Rate
Loads by Virtual Bucket, DF 1.0
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5.1.3 Conclusion
This first section allowed us to determine whether there were revenue gains to be
obtained from accounting for sell-up in the GVN case, and how much gain could be
achieved. It turns out that whether or not airline B is accounting for sell-up in a
FCYM case, there is revenue to be gained by accounting for sell-up in the GVN
environment. These gains range from 1.2% to 3.7%, depending on the demand
factor, with differential input sell-up rates when only airline A accounts for sell-up.
When both airlines account for sell-up, these gains drop to 1.2% to 3.3% with
differential input sell-up rates. We also looked at loads and explained the
relationship between loads and revenue gains or losses for both airlines.
5.2 GVN vs. G VN
In this section, we now focus on the revenue gains achieved by airline A when its
competitor also uses GVN with or without sell-up. We will see in the next
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paragraphs that airline A still benefits from accounting for sell-up. However, its
revenue gains will drop considerably, as we will describe in the following
paragraphs. For consistency purposes, we keep comparing the revenues to our base
case. However, the reader should also keep in mind that the revenue gains over our
base case, when both airlines use GVN but do not account for sell-up, are the
following:
0 0.09% at demand factor 0.8
0 0.50% at demand factor 1.0, and
e 0.42% at demand factor 1.2.
This section will, as previously, be divided into two subsections: The first subsection
will deal with the case when only airline A accounts for sell-up. We will discuss
revenues and loads by virtual buckets. In the second subsection, we will focus on the
impact of the competitor's move towards better Revenue Management by accounting
for sell-up.
5.2.1 Only Airline A Accounts for Sell-up
In this subsection, we will be discussing the effect of accounting for sell-up in the
case when only airline A accounts for sell-up. Our results show that the airline using
GVN and accounting for sell-up (airline A) gains from this change. As previously,
the best input sell-up rates are differential sell-up rates, as can be seen in Table 31
that summarizes the revenue gains. The differential input sell-up rates that are used
in the following paragraphs are the same as previously defined, that is, 40%-35%-
30%-20% and 10% per virtual bucket, from top down.
The "best" input sell-up rates, that is, the rates that led to the highest revenue gains
were the following:
* 10% for constant input sell-up rates, and,
e 40%-35%-30%-20% and 10% per virtual bucket for differential input
sell-up rates.
Above these rates, we see that the revenues start deteriorating and finally turn into
losses as airline A's Revenue Management system starts overprotecting for the
higher classes.
As shown in Table 31, the revenue gains for airline A range from 0.6% at demand
factor 0.8 to 1.6% at demand factor 1.0 and 2.5% at demand factor 1.2 with
differential input sell-up rates. Once again, it clearly appears in Table 31 that the
benefits of differential input sell-up rates are substantially higher than those of
constant input sell-up rates. In particular, at demand factor 1.2, the percentage gains
more than double when airline A switches to differential input sell-up rates.
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Table 31: Percentage Revenue Gains for Airline A as a Function of the Demand
Factor and Input Sell-up Rates, GVN with Sell-up vs. GVN
Demand Input Sell-up Rates Percentage Revenue Percentage Revenue Gains
Factor Gain Over Base Case over GVN vs. GVN
0.8 10% 0.35% 0.26%
Differential 0.56% 0.47%
1 10% 0.95% 0.45%
Differential 1.58% 1.08%
1.2 10% 1.20% 0.78%
Differential 2.51% 2.09%
In terms of loads, we see in Figure 31 that accounting for sell-up (in a revenue
generating way, that is, at 10% constant input sell-up or differential input sell-up
rates) generally leads to higher loads in the first three buckets for airline A
(compared to the loads of airline A in other cases). In buckets four and five, we see
that a constant input sell-up rate of 10% achieves loads very similar to those of the
no sell-up assumed case, while the differential sell-up case achieves lower loads. In
the lowest bucket, both input sell-up rates cases have approximately the same loads,
substantially lower than those of the "no sell-up" case. Moreover, the average load
factors are very similar for both input sell-up cases (75.9% in the 10% input sell-up
case and 75.4% in the differential input sell-up case at demand factor 1.0). This
allows us to conclude that the revenue difference between the two sell-up cases lies
mostly in the distribution of passengers amongst the various fare buckets.
Compared to no sell-up assumed, the average leg load factors decrease in both sell-
up cases, consistently with what we experienced with EMSRb and what we would
expect. The average leg load factor in the no sell-up assumed case is about 77%.
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Figure 31: Load Distribution by Virtual Bucket for Airline A, Depending on the
Assumed Sell-up Rate, DF 1.0
Average Loads by Virtual Bucket, Airline A, DF 1.0
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Finally, our last analysis of loads concerns the difference in loads between airline A
and airline B when airline A accounts for sell-up. Figure 32 shows the loads by
virtual bucket. We see on this chart that the loads for airline A are again higher in the
first three buckets and lower in the last three buckets. Moreover, the average leg load
factor for airline A is about 75%, while airline B has an average leg load factor of
about 77% (at demand factor 1.0). Therefore, we can conclude from these two
indicators that the revenue difference, to the benefit of airline A, is due to the higher
loads in the first three buckets. More low fare passengers are spilled towards airline
B, while airline A increases its "high revenue generating" passenger loads.
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Figure 32: Loads by Virtual Bucket, GVN with Sell-up vs. GVN w/o Sell-up, DF 1.0,
Differential Sell-up Rates Assumed
Average Load by Virtual Buckets, Airline A, DF 1.0
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A similar pattern is observed at 10% input sell-up rates, but in that case, the loads
achieved by airline A are a little lower, and those of airline B a little higher, which
explains the lower difference in revenues between airlines A and B.
In summary, we have seen in this paragraph that, once again, as both airlines use a
virtual bucket Revenue Management scheme, but only one accounts for sell-up, the
revenues for the airline accounting for sell-up increase and reach a peak at
differential input sell-up rates. These results compare to those described with
EMSRb in the previous chapter. However, the gains are much higher. There are two
reasons for this: First of all, both airlines are using a basic O-D control Revenue
Management algorithm, namely GVN, which is more likely to reach higher
revenues. Second, the network layout is such that it favors GVN over EMSRb. We
will explain this in more detail at the end of this chapter on GVN.
5.2.2 Both Airlines Account for Sell-up
In the following paragraphs, we now study what happens to the revenues of airline A
when both airlines account for the possibility of sell-up in a virtual bucket
environment. Once again, we will try various cases, and in particular constant input
sell-up rates and differential input sell-up rates.
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Table 32: Percentage Gains as Function of Demand Factor and Input Sell-up Rates,
GVN vs. GVN
Percentage Revenue Gain Over Base Case
Demand Input Sell-up Rates Both Airlines Account for Airline A only Accounts for
Factor Sell-up Sell-up
0/-r0% 0.09% 0.09%
0.8 10/6-10% 0.19% 0.35%
Both Differential 0.28% 0.56%
0/-r0% 0.50% 0.50%
1 10/-r10% 0.65% 0.95%
Both Differential 0.97% 1.58%
0/-0% 0.42% 0.42%
1.2 10/-r10% 0.80% 1.20%
Both Differential 2.27% 2.51 %
Table 32 shows that the revenue gains are, as usual, highest when the airlines use
differential input sell-up rates. It is also apparent in this table that the revenue gains
achieved at differential input sell-up rates are higher than when no sell-up is
assumed. This points out that there is a gain to be achieved by accounting for sell-up
in a virtual bucket environment. Accounting for sell-up with differential input sell-up
rates roughly doubles the gains obtained by switching to GVN from EMSRb at
demand factor 1.0. At demand factors 0.8 and 1.2, the difference is even greater,
more than three times greater at demand factor 0.8 and almost six times greater at
demand factor 1.2. Table 32 also shows us that the revenue gains are lower when
both airlines account for sell-up than when only airline A does. Revenues drop by
about 0.3% at demand factor 0.8 and 1.2 and by more than 0.6% at demand factor
1.0 and at differential input sell-up rates.
In terms of loads, we see in Figure 33 the distribution of loads amongst the six
virtual buckets as a function of the input sell-up rates. As previously observed, our
input differential sell-up rates consistently achieve the highest loads in the first three
buckets, while in the last three buckets, the loads are higher in the other cases.
Moreover, the average leg load factor is very similar in both cases. The revenue
difference can therefore be explained mostly by the difference in the distribution of
passengers across virtual buckets. This distribution favors the set of differential sell-
up rates, as they lead to more high fare passengers, on average.
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Figure 33: Loads by Virtual Buckets as a Function of Input Sell-up Rates, DF 1.0,
GVN vs. GVN
Average Loads by Virtual Bucket, Airline A, DF 1.0
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In summary, our results again show that accounting for sell-up, even when both
airlines do so, does indeed bring revenue gains to the airline taking this possibility
into consideration. The gains range from 0.6% to 2.5% depending on the demand
factor. Moreover, as usual, and as suggested by Bohutinsky20, the revenue gains
reach a peak at differential input sell-up rates.
5.2.3 Summary
In this section, we studied the effect of sell-up models on virtual buckets, that is,
when one or both airlines use Greedy Virtual Nesting as their Revenue Management
algorithm. In addition, we were only looking at the effect of accounting for sell-up
when the detruncation method used is Booking Curve detruncation. Our findings
show that once again, accounting for sell-up increases the protection for higher
classes and increases the revenue gains, as long as the input sell-up rate does not lead
to overprotection.
Moreover, our results also show, as was the case with EMSRb, that when both
airlines account for sell-up, the revenue gains are lower than when only one airline
accounts for sell-up, for the airline accounting for sell-up.
Finally, at this point we also note that GVN benefits more from accounting for sell-
up when its competitor is using FCYM, in the network 6B scenario. We will discuss
at the end of this chapter why network 6B favors GVN over EMSRb, and, in our last
chapter we will be testing the influence of a larger network on these results. This will
give us a sense of the impact of the network definition on revenue gains. Figure 34
summarizes our previous results at demand factor 1.0.
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Figure 34: Summary of Booking Curve Detruncation Results at Demand Factor 1.0
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5.3 Projection Detruncation
In this section, we now allow airline A to modify its detruncation method in an
attempt to further increase its revenues. Airline A will still be accounting for sell-up
while airline B will either take this possibility into consideration or not.
This section will be divided into two subsections. In the first subsection, we will
study in details the impact of Projection detruncation on the gains achieved by GVN
combined with sell-up models. The competing airline will, in that case, be using
EMSRb FCYM combined with Booking Curve detruncation, but without accounting
for sell-up. We will then study the changes in revenue due to Projection detruncation
and compare them to revenues obtained with Booking Curve detruncation. In the
second subsection, we will then focus on more general results, by changing the
competitor's Revenue Management scheme: We will be modifying the detruncation,
the algorithm used and accounting for sell-up in some cases and not in other cases.
5.3.1 GVN with Projection Detruncation vs. Base Case EMSRb
In this subsection, we explain the results obtained through the simulation of airline A
using GVN combined with the sell-up heuristic and Projection detruncation, when
the competitor uses EMSRb with Booking Curve detruncation but without sell-up.
We will be looking at various t values, as the reader will remember from previous
analyses (c.f. Zickus9 , Chapter 4.2.2.a) that the t value is directly linked to the
aggressiveness of the detruncation.
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5.3.1.a Revenues
Figure 35 shows the revenue gains of airline A depending on the t value and on the
demand factor, for airline A using GVN with sell-up and airline B using EMSRb
without sell-up.
Figure 35: Airline A Revenue Gains as a Function of r, GVN with Differential Sell-
up Assumed vs. EMSRb w/o Sell-up
Gains From GVN with Sell-up
0.8 10 1.2
Demand Factor
It appears clearly that there is a peak revenue gain achieved somewhere between
,r=0.2 and 0.3. At T<0.2, we see from this chart that revenues drop, indicating that the
detruncation has become too aggressive and that airline A is overprotecting, while
for T>0.3, revenues also drop, but this now indicates that airline A is not protecting
enough. We will confirm these statements in the next paragraphs when we look at
loads.
These results also show clearly that the additional gain to be expected from
Projection detruncation is in the neighborhood of 0.1% at all demand factors, that is,
very low.
Hence, our first important two results here are the following:
" Projection detruncation with 0.2<T<0.3 can bring about 0.1% additional
revenues to the airline accounting for sell-up and using GVN.
e The "optimal" T value is very similar to the "optimal" previously obtained
with EMSRb.
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5.3.1.b Loads
We will now be looking at loads by virtual bucket. Figure 36 details the distribution
of loads as a function of the detruncation method (x value or Booking Curve
detruncation).
Figure 36: Loads by Virtual Bucket, GVN with Differential Sell-up Rates Assumed
and Projection Detruncation vs. EMSRb w/o Sell-up and Booking Curve
Detruncation, DF 1.0
Virtual Buckets Loads, DF 1.0, GVN with Differential Sell-up and
Proj vs. EMSRb Base
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Figure 36 confirms what we stated earlier. Indeed, we see on Figure 36 that at T=0.2,
the loads are higher than in any other case in the first four buckets, while
substantially lower than all other three cases in the lower two buckets. Conversely,
the exact opposite is observed at T=0.4. Indeed, in this case, the loads are the lowest
in the first four buckets but the highest in the last two. This confirms that at t<0.2 or
t>0.3 we are respectively over- and under-protecting.
Figure 36 also shows that the loads at r=0.3 are very similar to those of Booking
Curve detruncation, at demand factor 1.0, which corresponds to the fact that revenue
gains are very similar whether we use Projection detruncation with T=0.3 or Booking
Curve detruncation.
Finally, Figure 36 shows us the distribution of absolute loads amongst the virtual
buckets at T=0.2, as compared to Booking Curve detruncation. It turns out that the
major difference with Booking Curve detruncation loads is that the loads in the first
four buckets are higher, while the loads in the last two are lower. Overall, the
average leg load factor is about 75% at T=0.2 and demand factor 1.0, while it is
about 77% with Booking Curve detruncation, at the same demand factor. This leads
us to the conclusion that the 0.1% difference in revenues between these two cases is
due to the fact that Projection detruncation allows the airline to achieve higher loads
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in the high revenue buckets. Moreover, these higher loads more than offset the
revenue losses suffered in the lowest two buckets, where the loads are higher for
Booking Curve detruncation.
In summary, these results show that there are revenue gains to be obtained by
switching to Projection detruncation, and that these additional revenue gains are very
similar to those obtained with EMSRb. The "optimal" t value lies within the interval
[0.2; 0.3]. However, we also noted here that these additional revenue gains are very
low, in the vicinity of 0.1%, and therefore, once again, minimal. Moreover, these
gains are very sensitive to the change in the t value and all the more so as the
demand factor increases. Indeed, at T=0.15 and demand factor 0.8, the overall
revenue gains are still above Booking Curve detruncation revenue gains, but below
t=0.2 revenue gains. However, at demand factors 1.0 and 1.2, the gap increases and
the revenue gains drop below those of Booking Curve detruncation at T=0.15.
5.3.2 Effect of th e Competitor's Revenue Management Method
In this section, we allow the competing airline to upgrade its Revenue Management
system to various levels of "sophistication". We think it is necessary here to remind
the reader that when we refer to differential input sell-up rates, we always imply the
following:
e In the case of an airline using GVN, the input sell-up rates are 40%-35%-
30%-20% and 10% by virtual bucket, from top down.
" In the case of an airline using FCYM, the input sell-up rates are 45%-30% and
20% by fare class, from top down.
In all the cases studied below, we will always have the simulations set up so that
either only one airline accounts for sell-up, or when both airlines do, they will be
using the "same" input sell-up rates. By this we mean that if they are both using
constant input sell-up rates, they will be using the same input sell-up rates by virtual
buckets or fare class. If they are both using differential input sell-up rates, they will
be using the above-described rates.
Finally, the purpose of 5.3 being to evaluate the impact of Projection detruncation
combined with GVN and the Belobaba-Weatherford Sell-up model22 on the
revenues of airline A, airline A will obviously always be using GVN with Projection
detruncation and sell-up.
In the following paragraphs we describe the simulations we ran and then discuss our
results.
5.3.2.a Simulations
At various T values we ran the following four sets of simulations:
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* Both airlines use GVN combined with the sell-up model, while only airline A
uses Projection detruncation. We vary the t value in order to get the best
possible results in terms of revenues.
" Both airlines use the same combination of GVN, input sell-up rates and
Projection detruncation.
" Airline A uses GVN with Projection detruncation and input sell-up, while
airline B uses FCYM (EMSRb) combined with sell-up and Projection
detruncation.
* Finally, both airlines use Projection detruncation combined with sell-up, but
airline A uses GVN as its Revenue Management algorithm while airline B
uses EMSRb FCYM.
Figure 37 summarizes the revenue gains for airline A in all of the above cases as a
function of the r value. The reader should remember that all revenue gains are
against the "base case".
Figure 37: Summary of Revenue Gains for all Cases as a Function of T, DF 1.0
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Our first comment on these results is that the revenues seem to reach a peak once
again at T~0.3. This is similar to the previously observed results. Let us now
compare these results to the gains achieved with Booking Curve detruncation, on a
case-by-case basis.
First of all, the reader will recall that at demand factor 1.0, GVN vs. GVN, both with
sell-up and booking curve detruncation yielded revenue gains of 0.97% for both
airlines. We therefore note that this gain is higher than what we achieve here with
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Projection detruncation. The revenue gains are nonetheless very close to the 0.97%
gains observed previously. However, it seems from Figure 38 that switching to
Projection detruncation for one of the two airlines leads to an overall decrease in
revenues for both airlines. Indeed, Figure 38 shows that the revenues for airline B
have decreased slightly to 0.9%. This could be explained by an inadequate protection
level that airline A creates with Projection detruncation. This inadequate protection
causes airline A's revenues to drop slightly, but also airline B's revenues to decrease.
Indeed, as the protection changes for airline A, airline B's loads drop slightly.
Airline A is protecting a little more, therefore airline B gets more of the low yield
traffic and its revenues decrease. This is shown by the fact that airline A's revenues
decrease at T=0.4. Overall, in this case, there seems to be no revenue to be gained
from switching to Projection detruncation for airline A.
Figure 38: Revenue Gains for Both Airlines in all Four Cases, DF 1.0
Percentage Revenue Variation over Base, DF 1.0
T=0.3 (When Applicable)
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Competitive Situation
Our second case assumes that both airlines use the same Revenue Management
scheme, that is, both use GVN with sell-up and Projection detruncation. Once again,
there is a peak in revenues at T~0.3. However, once more, the maximum revenue
gain seems to be about 0.9%, which are below the revenue gains when the
detruncation method used was Booking Curve detruncation. This indicates that in the
case when both airlines account for sell-up, Projection detruncation leads to lower
revenue gains than Booking Curve detruncation. This is independent of the T value.
Our third case assumes that airline A uses GVN with sell-up and Projection
detruncation, while its competitor uses EMSRb with sell-up and Booking Curve
detruncation. Once again, we remind the reader that the revenue gains when airline
A used Booking Curve detruncation instead of Projection detruncation in this same
situation was 2.53% at demand factor 1.0. We now have a revenue gain of 2.54% at
T=0.3 and at demand factor 1.0. This revenue gain, as compared to our base case, is
very close to the revenue gain achieved with Booking Curve detruncation. Both
121
revenue gains are so close that we cannot attribute this revenue increase to Projection
detruncation and be sure that it is not due to the randomness of the simulation.
Finally, our last case opposes airline A with GVN to airline B with EMSRb, both
accounting for sell-up and using Projection detruncation. Once again, we see on that
the revenue gains are lower than they were in the case when neither airline was using
Projection detruncation. Moreover, we also observe that the revenue gains decreased
when compared to the previous case when only airline A was using Projection
detruncation. We also note that airline B's losses were 0.67% at demand factor 1.0
when both airlines accounted for sell-up and neither used Projection detruncation.
Here, the losses of airline B have decreased to 0.57% (c.f. Figure 38). This tends to
confirm the fact that airline A is less efficient at protecting seats for high revenue
passengers and that airline B regained some of its lost traffic.
Overall, all these four cases confirm what our initial results tended to prove, that is,
that there is very little, if anything, to be gained from switching to Projection
detruncation, when sell-up is being accounted for.
In order to confirm that the pattern of results described above holds at higher
demand factors, we tested the same cases at a higher demand factor (1.2) and
summarized the results on Figure 39. This confirms that the revenue gains are
minimal. Indeed, if we take the example of airline A using GVN with sell-up when
its competitor uses EMSRb, and switch the detruncation method from Booking
Curve detruncation to Projection detruncation for airline A alone, we see that we
achieve a 0.12% gain. This remains very low. Moreover, in all the other cases shown
here, the gain of switching to Projection detruncation is less than 0.1%, when sell-up
rates are used. This is a critical difference with Zickus's results9 on Projection
detruncation. The reason for this much lower impact of the detruncation method on
the revenue gains is that accounting for sell-up and using a more aggressive
detruncation method have very similar effects on protection levels. However,
accounting for sell-up allows for finer modifications of these protections. Therefore,
the additional protection reached with Projection detruncation becomes unnecessary.
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Figure 39: Revenue Gains as a Function of the Competitive Situation, DF 1.2
GVN Percentage Revenue Gains over Base, DF 1.2, Differential
Sell-up (When Applicable)
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5.3.3 Summary
In this section we discussed the impact of Projection detruncation on the revenues
achieved by an airline using GVN as its Revenue Management method combined
with the Belobaba-Weatherford Sell-up heuristic22 . Our results show that the
additional gains from Projection detruncation are in the neighborhood of 0.1% or
less at T=0.3. Our results clearly show that there is an optimal T value between 0.2
and 0.3, as was the case in the EMSRb case. Overall, our conclusion is that the
detruncation method, in a virtual bucket environment, has very little impact on the
airline's revenue gains when the airline also accounts for sell-up. We explained in
5.3.2.a why the detruncation method had a smaller impact on revenues than
accounting for sell-up. Compared to the gains achieved by accounting for sell-up, the
incremental gains achieved through Projection detruncation are very small.
In this paragraph, we would also like to stress the fact that Network 6B, our
simulated network is extremely "GVN-friendly". Indeed, we explained earlier in the
thesis that GVN performs much better in an environment where connecting demand
is high and local demand is low and where short-haul legs have higher demand than
long hauls, combined with a fare structure that has connecting passengers pay higher
fares than local passengers. It turns out that Network 6B combines both of these
properties in that it was set up to have 60 percent connecting passengers and a
suitable fare structure.
Overall, network 6B clearly favors GVN over EMSRb, which is one factor that
should be kept in mind regarding the comparison of EMSRb and GVN gains.
123
5.4 Conclusio n: Sell-up vs. Detruncation - Present Findings
At this point of the thesis, we have looked at the effect of accounting for sell-up and
at the impact of the detruncation method. We think that it is important at this point to
summarize our findings and draw preliminary conclusions.
When we studied the impact of sell-up models and Projection detruncation in the
FCYM environment, we observed that the revenue gains could reach as much as
1.5% at demand factor 1.2 when only airline A accounted for sell-up. In all FCYM
cases, the additional gain achieved by switching to Projection detruncation was
about 0.1%.
When the Revenue Management method used was GVN, we observed in the
previous paragraphs the same trends as with FCYM. The revenue gains achieved by
accounting for sell-up are, however, considerably higher than those obtained by
changing the detruncation method. Once more, we refer the reader to Zickus9 , who
explained in detail the influence of Projection detruncation on the revenue gains of
airline A. The gains were about 0.7% at demand factor 1.0 and T=0.15, while we
achieved higher revenue gains by accounting for sell-up in a fare class Revenue
Management environment. Moreover, this detruncation method adds one more
parameter to the simulator and makes it more complicated to differentiate all the
effects influencing the revenue variations.
Overall, as shown on Figure 40, the incremental gains achieved through sell-up
models are consistently higher than those of Projection detruncation. However, they
depend on the competitive situation.
Figure 40: Impact of Sell-up Models and Projection Detruncation at Demand Factor
1.0
Effect of Sell-up and Projection Detruncation, DF 1.0
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In this chapter, we then conclude that the effect of accounting for sell-up is the
overriding effect when it comes to increasing GVN revenue gains.
Our final comment at this stage is that Bohutinsky's thesism regarding the fact that
differential input sell-up rates better represent the passengers' behavior than constant
input sell-up rates seems to be confirmed by our results. Indeed, we consistently get
higher revenue gains with these differential input sell-up rates, compared to with
constant input sell-up rates.
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Chapter 6: Comparison with Other O-D Methods -
Validation of our Results in a Larger Network
In this chapter, we will compare the results we obtained by accounting for sell-up
and modifying the detruncation method to previously described results for more
advanced O-D methods. In particular, we will be comparing our revenue gains to
those of the Bid Price methods described in Part I, as well as those obtained with
8DAVN. These results were established by Lee .
This chapter will also allow us to describe the results observed when accounting for
sell-up in a bigger network. As we previously explained, we would like to validate
our previous sell-up results in this larger network. In particular, we wish to study the
impact of the network size and layout on the revenue gains.
6.1 Comparison with Other O-D Methods
The reader will recall from previous chapters that the revenue gains from accounting
for sell-up greatly outweigh those achieved by switching to Projection detruncation
when the airline is accounting for sell-up: We explained in Part II, Chapter 5.4, that
switching to Projection detruncation led to 0.1% to 0.2% incremental revenue gains.
When not accounting for sell-up, Zickus9 showed that the revenue gains achieved by
switching to Projection detruncation are 0.55% at demand factor 1.0, and therefore
comparable to or lower than those achieved by accounting for sell-up, depending on
the case. The reader will recall that the revenue gains at demand factor 1.0 when
only airline A was accounting for sell-up (with FCYM and Booking Curve
detruncation) was 1.18%. At the same demand factor, but when both airlines were
accounting for sell-up and inputting differential sell-up rates, the revenue gains
dropped to 0.72%. At demand factor 1.0, the percentage revenue gains are the
following:
e 1.5% when only airline A accounts for sell-up in a FCYM environment,
* 0.7% when both airlines account for sell-up in a FCYM environment,
* 2.8% when airline A accounts for sell-up in a virtual bucket environment
while airline B uses FCYM without accounting for sell-up,
* 2.5% in the same situation, but when both airlines account for sell-up,
e 1.5% when only airline A accounts for sell-up but both airlines use GVN,
* 1% when both airlines account for sell-up in a virtual bucket environment.
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All these results are with Booking Curve detruncation, as we established that the
detruncation method had a minor additional effect on the revenue gains.
Our purpose in this section will then be to compare these results to those obtained
with other O-D methods, namely, Netbid, HBP, DAVN and ProBP, all described in
Lee's thesis8 . We will base our comparison on revenue gains over our base case.
6.1.1 Previous Results
Lee8 and Bratu17 established the following results on Network 6B. In particular, the
revenue gains over the base case are shown on Figure 41.
Figure 41: Revenue Gains
1.0, Network 6B
over Base as a Function of the Competitive Situation, DF
Revenue Gains, DF 1.0
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Figure 41 shows that the highest revenue generating Revenue Management methods
are DAVN and ProBP. The reader is referred to Part I of this thesis for more detailed
explanations of both of these methods. The major characteristics of these two
methods are respectively that DAVN uses a displacement cost to evaluate the
"network" revenue of having a passenger book a given flight, while ProBP calculates
the bid price for each leg according to a proration system that incorporates both
stochasticity of demands and implicit nesting of ODFs over the network.
All these results were obtained on Network 6B and can therefore safely be compared
to our previous results. To simplify our comparisons, we will only focus on the gains
achieved by accounting for sell-up.
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6.1.2 Comparison with our Results
In this section, we present our results and previously established results by Lee8 and
Bratu . All our results involving Sell-up will be at differential input sell-up rates, as
we confirmed Bohutinsky's thesis20 that differential input sell-up rates lead to
higher revenue gains.
6.1.2.a Comparison with Earlier Results
Figure 42: Revenue Gains as a Function of the Competitive Situation, DF 1.0
Revenues Gains in Various Cases, for Airline A, DF 1.0
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Figure 42 is essentially divided into two parts. The left-hand side of the chart reports
the results described by Lee and presented in the previous paragraph. The right-
hand side of the chart summarizes all our previous results at demand factor 1.0 and
with Booking Curve detruncation.
First of all, it appears that EMSRb benefits from accounting for sell-up and achieves
revenue gains comparable to those of Netbid. The reader is referred to the Part I of
this thesis for more information on Netbid. We remind the reader that Netbid solves
a deterministic LP to obtain the bid prices for each leg. Whether or not the
competitor accounts for sell-up, the revenue gains from accounting for sell-up in a
FCYM environment are equivalent to those of Netbid. However, the only relevant
comparison that we can make here concerns the case when the competitor does not
account for sell-up. As we already stated, EMSRb then does better than Netbid, but
does not quite achieve the same gains as GVN. There remains a difference of about
0.4%.
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The second major result that appears on this chart is the very good performance of
GVN with sell-up when the competitor uses FCYM, be it with or without sell-up. In
terms of revenue gains, GVN with sell-up always outperforms GVN, when its
competitor uses FCYM. Moreover, the revenue gains get very close to those of
ProBP. Once again, the reader can refer to the first part of this thesis for more
information on both of these Revenue Management methods. We can infer that
revenue gains similar to those of the "best" O-D methods can be achieved through
"lower technology" Revenue Management methods such as GVN.
Finally, we also observe on Figure 42 that regardless of the competitive situation,
when airline A uses GVN combined with the sell-up heuristic, its revenue gains are
always positive and always better than those of Netbid.
Overall, we observe that the revenues obtained by accounting for sell-up are
generally good. In particular, when airline A uses GVN, it achieves revenues above
those of ProBP. Overall, the gain over EMSRb is close to 3 percent.
Our conclusion to this first section is that the revenue gains achieved by accounting
for sell-up, and in particular in a virtual bucket environment, are very high and can
be higher than those of the "best" O-D Revenue Management methods tested to date,
when they do not account for sell-up.
6.1.2.b Effect of Competitor Using Sell-up on O-D Methods
In this section, we now focus on the effect of accounting for sell-up when the
competitor also accounts for sell-up, and compare the results to those of all the other
O-D methods when the competitor accounts for sell-up. In Figure 43, we present the
revenue gains (compared to the base case EMSRb vs. EMSRb) for airline A when
airline B accounts for sell-up. Our purpose in this section will be to compare the
performance of the O-D methods when the competitor accounts for sell-up to the
revenue gains achieved in similar conditions by EMSRb accounting for sell-up and
GVN accounting for sell-up.
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Figure 43: Revenue Gains for Airline A when Competitor Accounts for Sell-up, DF
1.0
Revenue Gains foir Airline A
Competitor Accounts for Sell-up, DF 1.0
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The most striking results in this case are, first of all, that GVN with sell-up does
substantially better than GVN without sell-up (when the competitor is accounting for
sell-up in a FCYM environment): It achieves revenues almost twice as high as it did
without accounting for sell-up (when airline B is accounting for sell-up). Second of
all, GVN with sell-up performs very well and has the second best revenue gains, just
below ProBP.
EMSRb, on the other hand, does not do quite as well. The revenue gains prove that
we are still doing better than when no sell-up is assumed. However, any other
Revenue Management method is performing better than EMSRb in this case.
We also note here that Netbid is the only Revenue Management method that actually
performs better when its competitor is accounting for sell-up (c.f. Figure 42 and
Figure 43). This is most likely related to the fact that airline B now protects more
and therefore spills passengers towards the airline A, which under Netbid, accepts
these passengers.
6.1.3 Conclusion
These results suggest that accounting for sell-up, either in a Fare Class or Virtual
Bucket environment, brings substantial revenue gains to the airline accounting for
sell-up. Moreover, in the case of GVN, we observe that these gains are equivalent to
those of ProBP without sell-up, our former best case.
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When the competitor is not accounting for sell-up, EMSRb and GVN, when
combined with the sell-up heuristic, lead to substantial revenue increases that
respectively compare to Netbid and ProBP revenue gains.
When the competitor is accounting for sell-up, GVN does very well, as opposed to
all the other O-D methods, and has revenue gains comparable to those of ProBP (the
highest revenue generating Revenue Management method). EMSRb, on the other
hand, still achieves gains by accounting for sell-up, but its gains are the lowest of all
methods presented on our charts.
Once again, we remind the reader here, that Network 6B is GVN friendly and
therefore favors this algorithm over FCYM. Therefore, the purpose of our next
section will be to study the impact of a larger network on the revenue gains.
6.2 Validation of Previous Results in a more Complex Network
In this section we will be running our simulations on the bigger network C. Our goal
will be to confirm or reject our results on this bigger network. In particular, we will
be focusing on GVN and how it performs in an environment that is less well suited
to its "greedy" preference for connecting passengers.
The first subsection will describe Network C and its specificity. The following
subsection will summarize and explain our results.
6.2.1 Network C
Let us first introduce our new network. Once more, we remind the reader here that
we introduce this network with the sole purpose of validating the results we observed
on the smaller Network 6B. The major difference with Network 6B is the size of the
network.
In particular, Network C has 40 spoke cities with two hubs, one for each of the two
competing airlines. This network was designed to better reflect the US geography.
Therefore, the cities were set up with twenty on each side of the hubs, the hubs being
located in the "middle" of the network, as shown on the following figure. Moreover,
this network was generated using demand indices and attractiveness of cities
The flows on this network are assumed to be unidirectional, from West to East, with
three different banks (a bank is a time period during which a set of flights arrives
from the spoke cities in time to connect with flights departing from the hub). In this
case, 21 flights arrive at the hub and depart from the hub during each bank.
Overall, this network has 252 flight legs per day that serve a total of 482 O-D
markets. The reader will recall here that Network 6B, in comparison, had only 24
legs that served a total of 54 markets.
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Figure 44: Network C Geographical Layout
The revenue gains for the base cases were run on this network in order to get an idea
of the new revenues on this bigger network. The following chart shows the revenue
gains at all three demand factors (0.8, 1.0 and 1.2).
Figure 45: Network C Revenue Gains over Base Case (EMSRb vs. EMSRb)
Network C Revenue Gains for Airline A
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These results (Figure 45) show that GVN now performs much worse than any other
Revenue Management method, including EMSRb. The reason for this is that the
network is not GVN friendly anymore. It was setup to allocate demand to all legs in
a more random manner. However, the assignment of demand results in non-
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symmetric distribution of demand as a function of distance, unlike Network 6B.
Overall, we end up with a less "virtual-friendly" network.
The pattern of results, other than the fact that GVN does not perform well, has
remained the same in that DAVN still leads to the second highest revenue gains after
those of ProBP. However, HBP does better than Netbid only at demand factors 0.8
and 1.0.
Having reviewed the base results, we will now focus on the effect of sell-up models
on the revenue gains for both EMSRb and GVN in particular, once again without
focusing on the effect of the detruncation method.
6.2.2 Sell-up Res ults in Network C
In this section, we describe the revenue gains achieved by accounting for sell-up in a
fare class environment and in a virtual bucket environment. As stated earlier, we
would like to confirm or reject our previous findings, that is, that accounting for sell-
up leads to substantial revenue gains either in a fare class or a virtual bucket
environment.
In the following paragraphs, we will be looking at the percentage revenue gains to
evaluate whether the sell-up related gains are still substantial. We will compare these
percentage gains to previously observed gains on Network 6B to see how they
change in this larger network.
6.2.3 Influence o f Network Size on EMSRb and GVN
We have already shown on the previous graphs (Figure 43 and Figure 45), that the
revenue gains have already dropped by switching from Network 6B to Network C
for all Revenue Management methods. In terms of revenue gains for EMSRb and
GVN, Figure 46 shows the trends at demand factor 1.0 on this larger network. It
should be stressed here that there are major differences in terms of load factors
between networks 6B and C, differences that are responsible for much of the revenue
differences. In particular, Network C has lower load factors due to a wider (and more
realistic) distribution of demands among legs. However, we are not focusing on
these issues here, but rather on the "ranking" changes from one network to the next.
That is, how does GVN perform compared to EMSRb and how did the ranking
change from what we observed in Network 6B. The other major issue we are
interested in is the revenue gains attributable to sell-up models.
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Figure 46: Comparison between Network 6B and Network C Revenues, EMSRb and
GVN, DF 1.0
Revenue Gains with Sell-up, DF 1.0
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On this larger network, two major effects appear on the chart:
e First of all, we observe that EMSRb is now doing a little better in this larger
network, regardless of whether the competitor is accounting for sell-up or not.
* Second, we also note that GVN is doing considerably worse than it used to in
the smaller network. In particular, when no sell-up is assumed, GVN actually
incurs losses. However, once we account for sell-up, it generates revenues and
even outperforms EMSRb when both airlines account for sell-up.
Overall, we see that the non-friendliness of the network to virtual buckets clearly
reflects on the ranking of the Revenue Management methods : GVN now does worse
than EMSRb (when neither airline is accounting for sell-up, and in most cases
involving sell-up), while it did much better than EMSRb in network 6B. When only
airline A is accounting for sell-up, EMSRb leads to greater revenue gains than GVN,
both methods having positive revenue gains. However, when both competitors
account for sell-up, then GVN outperforms EMSRb by 0.1%, as can be seen on
Figure 46.
This first set of results allows us to conclude that the network size and layout (and
especially load factors) do play an important role on revenues, but that accounting
for sell-up still brings substantial revenue gains. These revenue gains (over the base
case) have decreased by a substantial order of magnitude for GVN, but have
remained in the same neighborhood for EMSRb. Finally, our last comment on this
set of results is that GVN still brings slightly higher revenues than EMSRb, when
both airlines account for sell-up with differential rates. Once again, we need to stress
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the fact that the two networks have substantial load differences at demand factor 1.0
which are in part responsible for the differences in revenue gains observed between
the two networks.
6.2.4 Comparison with other O-D Methods
In the following paragraphs, we now present the revenue gains of all the other O-D
methods and compare them to the revenues achieved by accounting for sell-up, both
in the EMSRb and the GVN case.
Figure 47: Revenue Gains for all O-D Methods, DF 1.0
Revenue Gains over Base as a Function of the O-D Method
Network C, DF 1.0
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The first major result shown on Figure 47 is the dramatic change in the revenue
gains of all five O-D methods: GVN, Netbid, DAVN, HBP and ProBP. These
revenue gains have dropped substantially from the level they reached in Network 6B.
However, once again, this is attributable to the differences in load factors between
the two airlines. However, in terms of "ranking" of the methods, ProBP is still the
Revenue Management method that leads to the highest revenue gains (without sell-
up) with 1.16% gains at demand factor 1.0. In addition, as we described earlier,
GVN suffers most from the change of network with a loss of about 1.8% revenues at
demand factor 1.0, leading to overall losses rather than revenue gains, as shown on
Figure 46.
When airline A accounts for sell-up, at differential input sell-up rates, we observe
that the highest revenue gains are now achieved with EMSRb. Unlike was the case
with Network 6B, EMSRb with sell-up now clearly outperforms all O-D methods (as
shown on Figure 47). Moreover, the revenue gains from GVN with sell-up are also
greater than those of all other O-D methods, even though less than those of EMSRb
with sell-up.
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This paragraph leads to the following very important conclusions:
* First of all, the sell-up heuristic, that is, accounting for sell-up in a fare class
or virtual bucket environment, leads to substantial revenue gains (roughly
1%), whatever the network size. Accounting for sell-up is therefore a very
robust and stable way to increase revenues for an airline using FCYM or GVN
Revenue Management methods.
* Second, in a larger network GVN does much worse than it used to in the
smaller network 6B. It is the Revenue Management method that suffers most
from the change in network layouts.
6.2.5 Conclusion
This previous section on Network C allowed us to validate our network 6B results.
Independently of what happens to the other O-D methods when we switch networks,
the crucial observation to remember here is that the sell-up heuristic at differential
input sell-up rates still performs very well and brings substantial revenue gains of
about 1 percent at demand factor 1.0, whether we use EMSRb FCYM or GVN.
The network size therefore seems to have very little impact on the gains achieved by
accounting for sell-up. On the other hand, the network size and layout did greatly
modify the performance of all the O-D methods (compared to EMSRb with Booking
Curve detruncation and without sell-up). The most striking effect was that GVN
actually had lower revenues than EMSRb when it did not account for sell-up.
However, as soon as we account for sell-up in this Virtual Bucket environment,
GVN recovers quickly, yet still has lower revenues than EMSRb with sell-up.
6.3 Observed Sell-up Rates (OSR)
Finally, in this last section we compare the sell-up rates we input to those we can
evaluate with PODS. The output files in PODS give us each passenger's actual
choice, given this passenger's first choice. While totally unavailable to the airlines in
practice, the output of our simulation allows us, as we analyze the results of a case
run, to evaluate the "true" sell-up rate, the Observed Sell-up Rate (OSR).
In the following paragraphs, we will first explain briefly what the output is and how
we use it to compute the OSR. We will then compute these Observed Sell-up Rates
for a few cases and compare them to our best-case estimates, namely our differential
input sell-up rates. For the purpose of this analysis, we will focus on EMSRb, as we
will discover that the OSR's are extremely different from our inputs
In the following paragraphs, we will be running Network 6B only, for consistency
purposes. Indeed, the vast majority of our results were obtained in this smaller
network and we feel it is more reasonable to keep using this network.
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6.3.1 Computing the Observed Sell-up Rate
The PODS output files give us the actual choice of a passenger, given this
passenger's first choice. Therefore, once we know the actual choice of the passenger
given his first choice, we can count the number of passengers who chose a different
Path/Fare combination, but on the same airline. Indeed, we implicitly define sell-up
as the number of passengers who decided to fly on another Path/Fare combination,
but on the same airline. Buying a higher fare on the competing airline does not
constitute sell-up, but rather spill.
Moreover, given the layout of the network, and the fact that there is no favorite
airline, we get two very important additional "constraints" imposed on passengers:
e All passengers who did not get their first choice can either sell-up, spill to the
other airline or decide not to fly. They cannot sell-down.
" For the OSR computation, a passenger who sells up must do so on the same
path as the network layout imposes that to fly from city A to city B, the
passenger fly either airline A or B, each of them having exactly one departure
per day.
Having set up this rather restricting picture, we now move on to the actual
computation. This makes use of very simple mathematics: we first compute the
observed sell-up rate by passenger type (pax) and fare class (c) using the following
formula:
2 PercentagePax
OSR0(Pax, C)= DIFF-F,SAME-A
1 - Percentage(SameFSameP)
We sum the number of passengers who booked a different fare on the same airline
(including those who booked a different path, if it were possible) and divide this
number by the number of passengers who actually did not get their first choice and
are therefore susceptible to sell up.
Once we have this intermediate Observed Sell-up Rate, we aggregate this number of
all the passengers who flew in a given fare class, regardless of whether they are
business or leisure passengers, for a given airline, in order to get a valid comparison
with the sell-up rates we input in the Belobaba-Weatherford heuristic2 2 . This is
given by this next formula, which is a simple weighted average for all the
passengers:
OSR(C) = BusPax x OSR(Bus, ) + LeisPax x OSR(Leis, C)
BusPax + LeisPax
For each fare class, we now have an Observed Sell-up Rate that we can compare to
our estimate of the sell-up rate (input in the heuristic).
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6.3.1.a Example
In the following paragraph, we give an example of how to compute the OSR for a
given fare class and passenger type. The reader will recall that in Y class, there can
be no sell up, as there is nowhere to sell up.
Table 33 shows the passengers' actual choices given their first choice, in terms of
percentages. Given these percentages, we use our first formula to generate the last
column of Table 33. In this column, we have the OSR by fare class, passenger type
and airline. The reader will note here that the percentage of passengers who chose to
fly on a different path and on the same airline (columns 7 and 9) is constantly 0.
Indeed, Network 6B does not offer the possibility to choose amongst various paths
on the same airline for a given Origin-Destination market.
Table 33: PODS output - Actual Choice Given First Choice Percentages
First Choice
TYP AL CLS I #OBS
~1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
1>
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
4
4,065,216
3,187,359
483,239
164,037
3,932,481
3,085,545
469,093
159,277
15
0
570
7,867,530
22
0
567
7,685,930
Actual Choice
DIFF P DIFF P DIFF P DIFF P
SAME P SAME P SAME F SAME F
SAME F DIFF F SAME A DIFF A
94.9%
67.1%
50.1%
31.7%
95.0%
67.0%
50.3%
33.4%
100.0%
0.0%
85.1%
53.7%
100.0%
0.0%
84.8%
56.3%
0.0%
16.3%
33.2%
50.6%
0.0%
16.4%
33.3%
50.0%
0.0%
0.0%
1.9%
5.1%
0.0%
0.0%
2.3%
4.9%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
1.0%
1.0%
1.2%
2.1%
1.0%
0.9%
1.0%
1.2%
0.0%
0.0%
2.1%
3.6%
0.0%
0.0%
1.4%
2.2%
DIFF F DIFF F
SAME A DIFF A
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.6%
1.5%
2.0%
0.0%
0.6%
1.4%
1.8%
0.0%
0.0%
0.4%
0.3%
0.0%
0.0%
0.2%
0.3%
Given these intermediate OSR's, we now aggregate
we then obtain, for airline A:
the results over a fare class and
Table 34: Observed Sell-up Rates for Airline A, by Fare Class
OSR
B->Y 49.5%
M->B,Y 66.5%
Q->M,B,Y 12.9%
This simple example showed how to evaluate the Observed Sell-up Rates given the
PODS output. We will be using these OSR's in the next paragraphs to compare them
to our "optimal" differential input sell-up rates.
6.3.1.b Results
In the following paragraphs, we present the results of our simulations. Airlines A and
B will both be using EMSRb with or without accounting for sell-up. In addition, we
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Oeved]
NOGO
4.0%
15.0%
14.0%
13.5%
4.0%
15.1%
13.9%
13.6%
0.0%
0.0%
10.5%
37.3%
0.0%
0.0%
11.3%
36.3%
will always be using Booking Curve detruncation. In the first paragraph, we focus on
the Observed Sell-up Rates when neither airline accounts for sell-up. We will be
looking for consistency in the OSR's as a function of the demand factor. Then, we
will be looking at the influence of airline A accounting for sell-up on these OSR's.
Finally we will conclude with a comparison of these rates with our "optimal" input
sell-up rates.
6.3.2 Observed Sell-up Rates as a Function of the Demand Factor
In this paragraph, we present the result of our computation of the OSR's when
neither airline accounts for sell-up, in a FCYM environment. The results of these
simulations are shown in Table 35. We observe that these rates are consistent at all
three demand factors. In the higher two classes, the sell-up rates seem to be
decreasing when the demand factor increases from 0.8 to 1.2. On the other hand, the
Observed Sell-up Rate for Q class barely increases with the demand factor. This can
be explained by the fact that as demand increases, EMSRb will increase the
protection for the higher classes, hence slightly reducing the Observed Sell-up Rates
for these higher classes. At the same time, the lower classes will close down earlier,
hence leading to an increase in the Observed Sell-up Rate and the NOGO rate
(percentage of passengers who decide not to fly). The NOGO rate is not shown in
this table, but it increases from about 24% to 54% for leisure passengers as the
demand factor increases from 0.8 to 1.2.
Table 35: Observed Sell-up Rates as a Function of Demand Factor, EMSRb vs.
EMSRb
Demand Factor 0.8 1.0 1.2
Sell-up B->Y 53.75% 50.00% 48.27%
Rate M->Y,B 70.85% 66.64% 65.28%
Rate Q->Y,B,M 12.61% 12.59% 13.08%
We also observe from Table 35 that the Observed Sell-up Rates are indeed
differential, in that they are different for each fare class. However, they also are quite
different from our input in several ways.
First of all, the values of these rates are quite different from what we input, and
generally much higher, except in Q class, where the rates are much lower.
Second, these rates are not spread out in the same way. Our choice of sell-up rates
was based on the assumption that the higher the fare class, the greater the
willingness-to-pay, and therefore the higher the probability that a passenger in that
class will accept to sell-up. However, this is not what we observe here.
In summary, this section suggests that the Observed Sell-up Rates are rather stable as
a function of the demand factor, yet are quite different from what we input. As far as
the difference between the OSR and the input sell-up rates is concerned, there are
two possible explanations. First of all, it could be that the method we use to compute
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the OSR is not valid or that the bookings reported by PODS are biased by some
unknown factor. However, this is unlikely. The more probable explanation is that the
EMSRb sell-up heuristic is not very realistic.
6.3.3 Influence of Accounting for Sell-up on Observed Sell-up Rates
In the following paragraphs, we run the simulator with airline A and/or airline B
accounting for sell-up either at constant input sell-up rates or at differential input
rates. We focus on the influence of these changes to the airlines' Revenue
Management methods on the Observed Sell-up Rates.
Table 36 summarizes our results, for airline A, in terms of Observed Sell-up Rates.
Table 36: OSRs as a Function of the Input Sell-up Rate, DF 1.0
DF 1.0 Input Sell-up Rates
Base 20%-0% 20%-20% DS-O% DS-DS
B->Y 50.0% 54.3% 53.8% 53.7% 54.8%
M->Y,B 66.6% 70.8% 69.9% 66.6% 68.3%
Q->Y,B,M 12.6% 13.2% 13.8% 10.8% 12.1%
It appears from Table 36 that accounting for sell-up, be it for one airline or both
tends to lead to an increase in the Observed Sell-up Rate in classes B and M. In class
Q, however, the Observed Sell-up Rate seems to remain more or less constant
regardless of whether or not one or both airlines account for sell-up. However, a
general conclusion from Table 36 is that the Observed Sell-up Rates tend to remain
very stable as we change the input sell-up rates in the Belobaba-Weatherford
heuristic2.
In summary, we observe from the above results that the Observed Sell-up Rates
seem to not depend very much upon whether or not the airlines account for sell-up,
in the FCYM case.
6.3.4 Summary
The first major observation from this section is that the Observed Sell-up Rates, as
computed through the output of PODS, are very stable, regardless of the demand
factor or the input sell-up rate if one or both airlines are accounting for sell-up.
The second critical observation is related to the values of these Observed Sell-up
Rates. First of all, the Observed Sell-up Rates are indeed differential, as suggested
by Bohutinsky2 0 and confirmed by our results in this chapter. However, they are not
in the same "order" as our input sell-up rates. Indeed, our assumption was that the
sell-up rate increased with the fare class. We believed, as reflected by our choice of
sell-up rates, that as passengers by a higher fare, they have higher willingness-to-
pay, and therefore a greater probability to sell up to a higher class. However, the
Observed Sell-up Rates are high in B class, highest in M class and lowest in Q class.
Second, these sell-up rates are much higher than our input sell-up rates in B and M
141
classes, and lower in Q class. The reader will recall here that our differential sell-up
rates were 45%, 30% and 20% from top down, while the Observed Sell-up Rates are
in the neighborhood of 50%, 67% and 13%.
Our final observation in this section is that these sell-up rates cannot be used as such
in the heuristic. Indeed, as we explained in 4.1.1.a, too high sell-up rates lead to
overprotection and then revenue losses when the heuristic explodes. When we input
these sell-up rates into the heuristic, we ended up with revenue losses of about 10%
to 17% depending on the demand factor. These differences in Observed and input
Sell-up rates may be explained by the fact that the forecaster implicitly estimates part
of the sell-up by forecasting demand for a given class regardless of whether it is
direct demand or demand that is the results of a passenger selling up. The major
reason for this being that the forecasts are based on historical data and that historical
data includes the sell-up of some passengers towards higher classes.
6.4 Conclusio n
This chapter allowed us to draw the following major conclusions:
e First of all, accounting for sell-up allows revenue gains of about 1 percent
with FCYM at demand factor 1.0. These revenue gains are lower than those of
most of the other Revenue Management methods available to us in PODS.
However, they compare to the revenue gains of Netbid, in Network 6B. The
revenue gains of GVN with sell-up bring tremendous improvement and are
comparable to the "best" O-D methods available (ProBP and DAVN) in this
"virtual-friendly" network.
" Second of all, the revenue gains achieved by accounting for sell-up seem to
hold very well in a larger network. In particular, as all the other O-D methods
suffer from the new network layout, EMSRb with sell-up performs extremely
well and becomes the best method. GVN on the other hand also suffers
dramatically from the switch to Network C, yet its losses are turned into gains
when accounting for sell-up.
e Third and finally, the "optimal" sell-up rates, as defined in Part II of this
thesis, seem to be very different from those we found to be observed in PODS.
However, as we explained at the send of the previous section, this may be
related to the performance of the forecaster.
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CONCLUSION
Summary of Findings
The reader will recall that our primary objective in this thesis was to estimate the
influence of sell-up models on the revenues of a leg-based Revenue Management
algorithm. In addition, we also wished to determine whether it would be possible for
airlines to achieve revenue gains comparable to those of O-D Revenue Management
methods, compared to EMSRb, while remaining in a Leg-based Revenue
Management environment. Our goal was to provide insight into whether a small
airline may be able to increase its revenues by accounting for sell-up and improving
its forecasting capabilities, in its less advanced Leg-based Revenue Management
system, and forgo the cost of installing a much more expensive O-D system.
Our results showed that it is possible to increase revenues for an airline using Leg-
based Revenue Management algorithms whether it uses EMSRb or GVN. More
specifically, we achieved revenue gains ranging from 0.7% to 2.8% at demand factor
1.0 depending on the competitive situation and the Revenue Management algorithm
used by the airline, as discussed in this thesis. The fundamental results that emerged
from the thesis are summarized in the following paragraphs.
First of all, inputting a sell-up rate in the Belobaba-Weatherford heuristic 2 2 and
using this heuristic in the Revenue Management algorithms (EMSRb or GVN) can
generate revenue gains for the airline implementing this change. However, this
happens only in the case when the sell-up rates are properly chosen by the user. As
we discussed in Part I, Chapter 3.3, the chosen sell-up rates should match, as best we
can estimate, the propensity of a certain category of passengers to sell up. As we
discussed earlier in the thesis, it is not the purpose of this thesis to quantify the
sensitivity of the revenue gains to the choice of the sell-up rates. We focus on the
range of the revenue gains we can achieve by accounting for sell-up in a leg-based
environment.
Second, the best sell-up rates, as suggested by Bohutinsky , are differential. We
showed in the thesis that these rates depend on the Revenue Management algorithm
used (EMSRb or GVN) but are always designed to match passengers' propensity to
sell up. Indeed, different Revenue Management algorithms require different inputs in
terms of sell-up rates, depending on whether they use a set of virtual buckets or do
the computations on a fare class basis. EMSRb and GVN, for example, do not use
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the same mapping of the fares, and therefore, we had to define two different types of
differential input sell-up rates. In all cases, assuming differential sell-up rates
brought higher revenue gains.
Third, we established that, whether only one airline, or both airlines, account for sell-
up, results in a change in the revenue gains observed by airline A: Airline A's
revenue gains are lower when the competitor accounts for sell-up compared to when
the competitor did not account for sell-up. However, the fundamental conclusion
from our results is that both airlines still benefit from accounting for sell-up. Another
way to explain this is that airline Revenue Management is not a zero-sum game: If
both airlines improve their Revenue Management algorithms (by accounting for sell-
up, for example), they can both benefit and improve their revenues, overall
increasing the total network revenues.
Fourth, in terms of the effect of the detruncation method, unlike the results shown by
Zickus9 , switching to another of the three available detruncation methods (from
Booking Curve detruncation) does not lead to a substantial additional increase in
revenues over the case when we accounted for sell-up. Indeed, we showed that both
detruncation and the sell-up heuristic had the same effect: increase the protection
levels in the higher classes. However, accounting for sell-up leads to more sensitive
variations in the protection levels. The sell-up heuristic allows specification of the
sell-up rate for each fare class or virtual bucket and, this, in turn impacts differently
on the additional protection for each fare class (or virtual bucket). On the other hand,
the detruncation method is has more general effect that cannot be adapted to each
fare class or virtual bucket. Overall, combining the sell-up heuristic with more
aggressive detruncation is excessive. We also point out here that our results do not
contradict Zickus's results in any way. Accounting for sell-up and switching to
another detruncation method have similar impacts on the Revenue Management
algorithms, yet accounting for sell-up leads to higher gains. Moreover, accounting
for sell-up and switching to more aggressive detruncation have overlapping effects
that eventually lead to overprotection.
Finally, in terms of the network size, we also showed that all the results observed on
the small network (6B) also apply to the bigger network (C) environment. In
particular, the sell-up heuristic performs very well with GVN or EMSRb in that it is
responsible for revenue increases with both these Revenue Management algorithms
(in Network 6B or Network C). The revenue gains are in the neighborhood of 1%.
This final comment is very important in that it allowed us to confirm that our
conclusions on the effect of sell-up models on revenues does not depend on the
network size or the demand distribution in terms of the percentage revenue gains that
can be obtained.
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Figure 48: Revenue Gains Due to the Incorporation of Sell-up Models
Revenue Gains over Base as a Function of the O-D Method
DF 1.0
3.00% 2.88%
2.53%
2.50% - Network C
N Network 6B
2.00% -
1.50%
.116% 1.19%
1.00% 0.92%0.72%
0.50%
0.00%
EMSRb Diff vs EMSRb EMSRb Diff vs EMSRb GVN SU vs EMSRb GVN SU vs EMSRb SU
Diff
Competitive Environment
Figure 48 summarizes the revenue gains attributable to the incorporation of the sell-
up models in EMSRb or GVN. This chart shows the difference in gains in the two
networks tested. The difference in revenue gains for GVN can be explained by the
difference in load factors between Network 6B and Network C.
Overall, Figure 48 shows that there is a non-negligible revenue gain to be achieved
by accounting for sell-up, be it in the EMSRb or the GVN Revenue Management
environment. Even in the worst-case scenario for GVN, there still is about 0.7%
gains to be obtained from accounting for sell-up, over the base case scenario
(EMSRb vs. EMSRb). This confirms our initial hypothesis, which was that there
were gains to be achieved from switching to Leg-based models that account for sell-
up without necessarily implementing more complex O-D algorithms.
Figure 48 summarizes most of our results in terms the impact of sell-up on airline
revenues. It shows that accounting for sell-up can lead to non-negligible revenue
gains in both our networks (6B and C). It also shows that, even though the network
layout and distribution of demand clearly impacts the gains, accounting for sell-up
invariably leads to revenue gains of about 1 percent.
Future Research Directions
Two major future research directions will be discussed in the following paragraphs:
* First of all the possibility of an algorithm that would estimate the actual sell-
up rate and use it as an input to the heuristic.
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e Second of all, the incorporation of a sell-up heuristic in other O-D methods
that do not rely on leg-based algorithms to determine the protection levels.
Estimating the Observed Sell-up Rates
In our simulations, we used the PODS output files to evaluate the Observed Sell-up
Rates, based on true data. However, it is clear that the airlines do not have this type
of information available. Indeed, passengers are not tested for their willingness to
sell-up. It could be possible to record the number of passengers who accepted to pay
a higher fare given that their first choice was unavailable. However, again as
discussed by Bohutinsky , this would be both impractical and difficult to
implement. Moreover, even in our experiments, we only estimate the sell-up rates
that we input in the heuristic. A legitimate question that we raise is: How do we
evaluate the true sell-up rates?
Therefore, another approach to this problem would be to use previous booking data
to forecast the sell-up rates. This would also potentially eliminate the overprotection
that we expect to observe with the static sell-up rates. Indeed, as we start accounting
for sell-up through the heuristic, we increase the protection for the higher fare
classes or buckets. Therefore, the recorded demand should increase in these fare
classes thus increasing the forecasts and in turn the protection levels in these higher
fare classes. If the input sell-up rates are not modified, the airline should ultimately
end up in a situation where it is overprotecting in the higher fare classes. Such a
forecaster has been developed by Hopperstad and briefly tested. The first results
show that the forecast sell-up rates are inconsistent with both the observed and the
input sell-up rates. We do not present any results in this thesis regarding the
estimator, as represents a preliminary effort that requires further research.
This estimator should, in the long run, allow the airlines to increase their revenues by
accounting for sell-up in a way that responds to demand and therefore is not based
on educated guesses, as was shown in this thesis.
Incorporating Sell-up Models in other O-D Methods
In this thesis, we only tested the effect of the Belobaba-Weatherford heuristic2 on
the leg-based EMSRb and GVN Revenue Management methods. Indeed, the
heuristic was designed to work with the EMSR model. As we showed in the last part
of the thesis, the revenue gains achieved by these two methods, when the airline
accounted for sell-up, were substantial and even above those of all the other O-D
methods, including ProBP, when they did not account for the possibility of sell-up.
A legitimate future direction then is to explore the possibility to include a sell-up
model in these other O-D methods. DAVN also uses the EMSR algorithm to
compute the protection levels. Therefore, it is possible (and this option is offered in
PODS) to use the Belobaba-Weatherford heuristic2 2 with DAVN. However, the LP
bid price methods do not yet offer the possibility to account for sell-up. Therefore,
future directions include developing a heuristic that would enable us to account for
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sell-up in the bid price environments on the one hand, and testing the heuristic on
these methods to see how much revenue gains it can bring to the airline using it, on
the other hand.
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GLOSSARY
Detruncation
In PODS, detruncation is the process of estimating the actual demand for a flight.
Indeed, flights are limited in capacity and therefore a full flight could have had a
higher demand than capacity allowed.
Forecasting
Forecasting consists in estimating future demand for a given flight, based on
previously recorded demand only. In a global setting, it encompasses two concepts,
detruncation and forecasting. Detruncation is explained above. The second concept,
forecasting, is the action of estimating future demand based on previously estimated
demand (through the detruncator).
ODF
Origin-Destination Fare. This term refers to the demand on a given origin-
destination market at a specific fare.
PODS
Passenger Origin Destination Simulator. This simulator was developed by
Hopperstad, Berge and Filipowski at the Boeing Company. It allows the user to
simulate a competitive network of airlines.
Revenue Man a gement
Revenue Management, also known as Yield Management, is the process of setting
protections levels and booking limits on each fare class in order to maximize the
revenues of the airline.
Sell-up
Sell-up is the human behavior that lets passengers travel at a higher fare than the one
initially requested. This is due to the fact that each passenger has a maximum
willingness-to-pay, and is therefore willing to spend as much money as this price.
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When offered a fare, the passenger will accept it if it is below his (her) maximum
willingness-to-pay. In the thesis we distinguish different types of sell-up.
Assumed Sell-up - Input Sell-up
This is the sell-up that we use as a part of the Belobaba-Weatherford heuristic.
We estimate the sell-up rates based on previous simulations and previous work by
Bohutinsky. This sell-up is no more than an educated guess.
Observed Sell-up
This sell-up is based on PODS outputs. The output files give us the actual choice
of every passenger given their first choice. Based on this data, we compute an
estimate of the "true" sell-up rates (c.f. Part II. Chapter 6.3.1).
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